XVI
FIFA World Cup
France 98
10 June – 12 July

Technical Report
Fédération Internationale de Football Association

President: Joseph S. Blatter
Acting General Secretary: Michel Zen-Ruffinen

Address: FIFA House 11 Hitzigweg P.O. Box 85 8030 Zurich

Telephone: 41-1/384 9595 Telefax: 41-1/384 9696 Telex: 81794 fif ch
Cable address: FIFA Zurich Internet: http://www.fifa.com

Organising Committee for the FIFA World Cup, France 98

Chairman: Lennart Johansson (Sweden)
Deputy Chairman: Julio H. Grondona (Argentina)

Members: David H. Will (Scotland) Issa Hayatou (Cameroon) Dr Antonio Matarrese (Italy) Dr Chung Mong-joon (Korea Republic) Jack A. Warner (Trinidad and Tobago) Dr Viacheslav Koloskov (Russia) Abdullah K. Al-Dabal (Saudi Arabia) Dr Michel D’Hooghe (Belgium) Dr Ram Ruhee, OBE (Mauritius) Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder (Germany) Ricardo Terra Teixeira (Brazil) Mohamed bin Hammam (Qatar) Sener Erzik (Turkey) Charles J. Dempsey, CBE (New Zealand) Jacques Georges (France) Egidius Braun (Germany) Alan I. Rothenberg (USA) Claude Simonet (France) Angel Maria Villar Llona (Spain) Sir Bert Millichip (England) Dr Franco Carraro (Italy) Abdellatif Semlali (Morocco) Jesús M. Pallares Esclúes (Paraguay) Fernand Sastre (France) Tadao Murata (Japan) René Hussy (Switzerland)

Advisers: Horst R. Schmidt (Germany) Dato’ Peter Velappan (Malaysia)
## CONTENTS

### Prefaces
- Dr. João Havelange: 4
- Joseph S. Blatter: 5
- Lennart Johansson: 6
- Michel Platini: 7

### Facts and Figures
- Results and Classifications: 10
- Basic data of France 98: 12

### Tournament analyses
- Overall analysis France 98: 15
- Technical/tactical analysis: 25

### Analysis of achievements

| Team analyses | Places 17–32 | Morocco | South Africa | Tunisia | Iran | Saudi Arabia | Korea Republic | Japan | Jamaica | USA | North, Central America and Caribbean (CONCACAF) | Colombia | South America (CONMEBOL) | Spain | Belgium | Austria | Scotland | Bulgaria | The 16 title contenders | Places 1–16 | Argentina | Brazil | Chile | Croatia | Denmark | England | France | Germany | Italy | Mexico | Netherlands | Nigeria | Norway | Paraguay | Romania | Yugoslavia | Refereeing | Volker Roth: High refereeing standards |
|---------------|--------------|---------|--------------|---------|------|-------------|---------------|------|-----------|-----|---------------------------|---------|-------------------------|-------|---------|--------|---------|---------|---------------------|-----------|-----------|------|-------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|-------|-----------|--------|--------|----------|---------|----------|---------|------------------|---------|
| Africa (CAF)  |              |         |              |         |      |              |               |      |           |     |                          |         |                      |       |         |        |         |         |                      |           |           |      |       |         |       |         |        |       |        |       |         |         |       |         |         |       |         |       |       |         |       |
| Asia (AFC)    |              |         |              |         |      |              |               |      |           |     |                          |         |                      |       |         |        |         |         |                      |           |           |      |       |         |       |         |        |       |        |       |         |         |       |         |         |       |         |       |       |         |       |
|              |              |         |              |         |      |              |               |      |           |     |                          |         |                      |       |         |        |         |         |                      |           |           |      |       |         |       |         |        |       |        |       |         |         |       |         |         |       |         |       |       |         |       |

### Auxiliary Services
- Sports Medicine: Sports Medical Committee: Healthy condition: 116
- Security: Walter Gag: The organisation of security: 120
- Fairplay: Keith Cooper: Is Fair Play realistic?: 122
- Organisation: Walter Gag: Good marks for the organisers: 126
- Media: Keith Cooper: World Cup 98: A huge media event: 128
- Mentale Fitness: Ruedi Zahner: The French were mentally prepared: 130
- Sponsoring: VIPs – Very Important Partners: 132

FIFA Delegation France 98: 133
Any reference to France ’98 cannot fail to arouse in me what is now becoming a familiar mixture of emotions.

On the one hand, there is gratification in the knowledge that this World Cup, the seventh of my term of office as President of FIFA, was if anything an even greater event than all those that had preceded it.

On the other hand, of course, there is the inevitable sadness that cannot be concealed at the fact that this was to be my final World Cup as President. As with so many things in life, the joy and the sorrow are mixed intimately together and require time to distinguish and to assess.

But despite all the melancholy of farewell, the ultimate sensation is of course one of delight. France is a land that has always been dear to my heart, and the welcome that this magnificent country extended to us all was one of the finest features of France ’98.

Whether in the stadium or in the city, whether watching live or on television, the warmth of the French people towards their guests was at times almost tangible. If there had been those who, before France ’98, had wondered sceptically whether this great country would be able to offer such a generous welcome, they were proved categorically wrong.

The commitment of the French people to the success of their World Cup, well before captain Didier Deschamps lifted the gold trophy at the end of a memorable Final, was not least personified by the passionate role played by President Jacques Chirac, to whom I would like to reiterate here our heartfelt gratitude for his untiring support for this great project.

Another President also comes to mind, whose name evokes that same mixture of joy and sadness mentioned earlier. Fernand Sastre had been FIFA’s friend and ally well before France embarked upon the adventure of the 1998 World Cup. But this was to be the crowning glory to his life’s work in the service of football. Fernand Sastre’s passing just a few days into the tournament he had done so much to create was the cause of great dismay, but even this was alleviated to some extent by the thought that he had, after all, lived to see the realisation of his great endeavour.

Into retirement I take with me the memory of great friends such as Fernand Sastre. I take also the image of players in the yellow shirts of my native Brazil holding aloft a banner of thanks to me at the end of the Final in the Stade de France. I take the sound of roar of the crowd, the singing and the chanting, the smell of the grass and the tingle of excitement that was always there, at the start of every match.

All these sensations and more ran together in France ’98. They will remain with me forever, as I am sure they will remain with everyone who witnessed this unforgettable competition.
The FIFA World Cup is football’s shop-window. There can be no better promotional platform for the game than the world’s biggest sports event. So it is essential for the overall health of our sport that when the World Cup takes place, it is a success.

Before and during the World Cup, FIFA was often asked how it would judge that success. Our reply was always the same: if the consumers, the public, are happy, then so are we. That satisfaction is the measure of our success.

In these very valid terms, the 1998 World Cup was an undoubted success. The reaction of the public and the media was overwhelmingly positive. For over a month, France 98 dominated the world’s events, and emerged from the marathon with acclaim.

Thanks not least to television, the World Cup provided dramatic testimony to football’s extraordinary universal appeal. Television audiences around the globe broke all records. For nearly five weeks, football was the number one talking point in homes, offices, bars, buses, even parliament and royal palaces. What other phenomenon has ever attained such power to unite?

United we stand, divided we fall. How true the old adage is! Even before the World Cup had begun on 10 June, the football world was united at the FIFA Congress that traditionally precedes the start of the tournament.

This year’s Congress was held under a special star, with the departure of that unparalleled servant of world football, João Havelange, and the election of a successor.

I was immensely proud to feel such an expression of consensus of world football opinion and support at the moment of my election. It strengthened my resolve to reinforce the ties that bind the football world together. The tournament itself, with its evident spirit of goodwill among teams and spectators alike, then served to reaffirm this solidarity.

France 98 showed the way that I intend my presidency of FIFA to pursue, emphasising the unity that exists within our sport, stressing the beauty and dynamism of the game itself, and making it accessible to the largest possible public.

These and the other many positive elements of our sport will be discussed in the following pages — together with the problem areas that we still have to tackle and resolve. I am sure that both the casual reader and the serious student of this report will come to the same conclusion as I mentioned above: that France 98 was indeed a great success.
There had never been any doubt in my mind that the French Organizing Committee would put together a World Cup worthy of its status as the last of the century. France has always been a stalwart of European and world football. It has accumulated expertise which already expressed itself in the splendid European Championship in 1984. And then, as now, the host nation emerged as winners.

On that occasion, Michel Platini organized the team around him on the pitch and Fernand Sastre was in charge of organization off the field. The same combination led the CFO dynamically into the realization of a World Cup that was in almost every way bigger than any before it.

Bigger does not automatically mean better, but on this occasion it invariably was. Despite the complexities of organisation caused by an expansion to 32 teams and, especially, by teams being no longer linked to one or two base venues, the tournament proceeded with impressive smoothness, a tribute to the men and women who had worked so hard to achieve just that.

Not only men and women, but boys and girls, too: the army of volunteers, many of them in their tender years, played a vital role in creating the efficiency and the atmosphere that characterised France 98 as a particularly congenial tournament, the way football tournaments are supposed to be.

Neither should we forget, when paying tribute to all those who contributed in one way or another to the success of the event, the expertise of the people who produced such brilliant television pictures that carried the atmosphere of the tournament to the farthest corners of the globe.

The World Cup is indeed becoming, increasingly, a television event. That is nothing more than a normal reflection of our times. But television can only portray the subject matter that it is there to be covered.

France 98 provided subject matter of a quality that made the world hold its breath. Above all, despite all the diving and pulling that will surely be mentioned elsewhere in this report, the players and their mentors exhibited commendable fair play under pressure — a spirit nowhere better exemplified than on 31 June, FIFA Fair Play Day, which is also described in more detail on a later page.

And so to 2002. It is said before each World Cup that the previous one will be a hard act to follow. And that is particularly true of France 98.
The problem with trying to assess the success of a football tournament is that ultimately that judgement depends upon the quality of the football itself. And football is notorious in the way that it divides opinion: some find it good, some find it less so. But such a subjective view of football is in itself an integral part of the game's special appeal—and so why should even the World Cup be different?

What is sure is, that while France 98 may not have produced any truly outstanding individual players, it revealed many very good teams and produced many very good matches. Players with the skill to play the ball were protected more than ever before, not least as a result of the new measures about the tackle from behind. And the course of the tournament was such that suspense was maintained right to the end.

So in these terms, too, France can be more than happy with the biggest sports event in the nation's history. French pride would have been upheld even if the Final had been lost, but the comprehensive victory against Brazil was a very rich icing on a cake in the best French gastronomic tradition.

In the years when France was campaigning to host the 1998 finals, we used the slogan «All of France wants the World Cup». At times during the long preparation period, it is true that it was difficult to substantiate that claim literally. But as the event drew nearer, and certainly as coach Aimé Jacquet led Zinedine Zidane, Laurent Blanc, Marcel Desailly and their colleagues ever closer to their Holy Grail, the nation closed ranks behind them, urging them to a famous victory whose significance went well beyond the sporting and onto a wider, yet more important social plane.

It is true that some off-field incidents cast their shadow over the event for a while. But while we should never fail to learn the lessons of certain problems with ticketing (which are never completely to be avoided) or the unrest in Marseilles and Lens, neither should we allow them to detract from the overwhelmingly positive image and sensation that France 98 left behind, especially in France itself.

I cannot close these remarks without following the others who will have paid tribute, once again, to my co-president at the CFO, Fernand Sastre. Whatever France 98 may have achieved, it could never have been achieved without Fernand's wisdom and his organisational insight. The conclusions of this report would have been far less positive had Fernand not been with us, all those years, to guide the tournament's destiny—and may it thus be a testimony to his work, and to the man himself.
«Le jour de gloire est arrivé ...»
CHAMPION DU MONDE
**Facts and figures**

**Group A: Brazil, Scotland, Morocco, Norway**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.6.98</td>
<td>Saint-Denis</td>
<td>Brazil vs Scotland</td>
<td>2:1 (1:1)</td>
<td>Jose M. Garcia-Aranda, ESP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.6.98</td>
<td>Montpellier</td>
<td>Morocco vs Norway</td>
<td>2:2 (1:1)</td>
<td>Prom Un-Prasert, THA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.6.98</td>
<td>Bordeaux</td>
<td>Scotland vs Norway</td>
<td>1:1 (0:0)</td>
<td>Laszlo Vogner, HUN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.6.98</td>
<td>Nantes</td>
<td>Brazil vs Morocco</td>
<td>3:0 (2:0)</td>
<td>Nikolai Levnikov, RUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.6.98</td>
<td>Saint-Etienne</td>
<td>Scotland vs Morocco</td>
<td>0:3 (0:1)</td>
<td>Ali Mohamed Bujairi, UAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.6.98</td>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>Brazil vs Norway</td>
<td>1:2 (0:0)</td>
<td>Esfandiar Baharestani, USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Group B: Italy, Chile, Cameroon, Austria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.6.98</td>
<td>Bordeaux</td>
<td>Italy vs Chile</td>
<td>2:0 (1:1)</td>
<td>Lucien Bouchardeau, NIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.6.98</td>
<td>Toulouse</td>
<td>Cameroon vs Austria</td>
<td>1:1 (0:0)</td>
<td>E. Gonzalez Chavez, PAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.6.98</td>
<td>Saint-Etienne</td>
<td>Italy vs Austria</td>
<td>1:1 (0:0)</td>
<td>John J. Toro Rendón, COL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.6.98</td>
<td>Montpellier</td>
<td>Italy vs Cameroon</td>
<td>3:0 (1:0)</td>
<td>Edward Lennie, AUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.6.98</td>
<td>Saint-Denis</td>
<td>Italy vs Austria</td>
<td>2:1 (0:0)</td>
<td>Paul Durkin, ENG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.6.98</td>
<td>Nantes</td>
<td>Chile vs Cameroon</td>
<td>1:1 (0:0)</td>
<td>Laszlo Vogner, HUN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Group C: France, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Denmark**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19.6.98</td>
<td>Lens</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia vs Denmark</td>
<td>0:1 (0:0)</td>
<td>Javier Castrilli, ARG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.6.98</td>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>France vs South Africa</td>
<td>3:0 (1:0)</td>
<td>M. Rezende de Freitas, BRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6.98</td>
<td>Toulouse</td>
<td>South Africa vs Denmark</td>
<td>1:1 (0:1)</td>
<td>John J. Toro Rendón, COL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6.98</td>
<td>Saint-Denis</td>
<td>France vs Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>4:0 (1:0)</td>
<td>Arturo Briozzo Carter, MEX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.6.98</td>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>France vs Denmark</td>
<td>2:1 (1:1)</td>
<td>Pierluigi Collina, ITA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.6.98</td>
<td>Bordeaux</td>
<td>S. Africa vs Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2:2 (1:1)</td>
<td>Mario Sanchez Yanten, CHI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Group D: Spain, Nigeria, Paraguay, Bulgaria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19.6.98</td>
<td>Montpellier</td>
<td>Paraguay vs Bulgaria</td>
<td>0:0 (0:0)</td>
<td>Abdul Rahman Al Zaid, KSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.6.98</td>
<td>Nantes</td>
<td>Spain vs Nigeria</td>
<td>2:3 (1:1)</td>
<td>Esfandiar Baharestani, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.6.98</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Nigeria vs Bulgaria</td>
<td>1:0 (1:0)</td>
<td>Mario Sanchez Yanten, CHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.6.98</td>
<td>Saint-Etienne</td>
<td>Spain vs Paraguay</td>
<td>0:0 (0:0)</td>
<td>Ian Mc Leod, RSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.6.98</td>
<td>Lens</td>
<td>Spain vs Bulgaria</td>
<td>6:1 (2:0)</td>
<td>Mario Van der Ende, HOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.6.98</td>
<td>Toulouse</td>
<td>Nigeria vs Paraguay</td>
<td>1:3 (1:1)</td>
<td>Prom Un-Prasert, THA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Group E: Netherlands, Belgium, Korea Republic, Mexico**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.6.98</td>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>Korea Rep. vs Mexico</td>
<td>1:3 (1:0)</td>
<td>Günter Benkö, AUT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.6.98</td>
<td>Saint-Denis</td>
<td>Netherlands vs Belgium</td>
<td>0:0 (0:0)</td>
<td>Pierluigi Collina, ITA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.6.98</td>
<td>Bordeaux</td>
<td>Belgium vs Mexico</td>
<td>2:9 (1:0)</td>
<td>Hugh Dallas, SCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.6.98</td>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>Netherlands vs Korea Rep.</td>
<td>5:0 (2:0)</td>
<td>Ryszard Wojcik, POL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.6.98</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Belgium vs Korea Rep.</td>
<td>1:1 (1:0)</td>
<td>M. Rezende de Freitas, BRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.6.98</td>
<td>Saint-Etienne</td>
<td>Netherlands vs Mexico</td>
<td>2:2 (2:0)</td>
<td>Abdul Rahman Al Zaid, KSA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scoreboard**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>GF</th>
<th>GA</th>
<th>Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6:3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5:4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5:5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2:6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7:3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4:4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3:6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2:5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9:1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3:3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3:6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2:7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5:5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3:1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8:4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2:7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7:2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7:2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3:3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Republic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2:9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Group F: Germany, USA, Yugoslavia, Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.6.98</td>
<td>Saint-Etienne</td>
<td>Yugoslavia vs Iran</td>
<td>1:0 (0:0)</td>
<td>Alberto Tejada Noriega, PER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.6.98</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Germany vs USA</td>
<td>0:0 (1:0)</td>
<td>Said Belqola, MOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.6.98</td>
<td>Lens</td>
<td>Germany vs Yugoslavia</td>
<td>2:2 (0:1)</td>
<td>Kim Milton Nielsen, DEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.6.98</td>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>USA vs Iran</td>
<td>1:2 (0:1)</td>
<td>Urs Meier, SUI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.6.98</td>
<td>Montpellier</td>
<td>Germany vs Iran</td>
<td>5:0 (0:0)</td>
<td>E. Gonzalez Chavez, PAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.6.98</td>
<td>Nantes</td>
<td>USA vs Yugoslavia</td>
<td>0:1 (0:1)</td>
<td>Gamal Ghandour, EGY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Germany | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 6:2 | 7
2. Yugoslavia | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 4:2 | 7
3. Iran | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2:4 | 3
4. USA | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1:5 | 0

### Group G: Romania, Colombia, England, Tunisia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15.6.98</td>
<td>Montpellier</td>
<td>Romania vs Colombia</td>
<td>1:0 (1:0)</td>
<td>An-Yen Lim Kee Chong, MUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.6.98</td>
<td>Lens</td>
<td>Colombia vs Tunisia</td>
<td>2:1 (0:0)</td>
<td>Bernd Heynemann, GER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.6.98</td>
<td>Saint-Denis</td>
<td>Romania vs Tunisia</td>
<td>1:1 (0:1)</td>
<td>Edward Lennie, AUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.6.98</td>
<td>Lens</td>
<td>Colombia vs England</td>
<td>0:2 (0:2)</td>
<td>Arturo Brizio, MEX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Romania | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 4:2 | 7
2. England | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 5:2 | 6
3. Colombia | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1:3 | 3
4. Tunisia | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1:4 | 1

### Group H: Argentina, Japan, Jamaica, Croatia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.6.98</td>
<td>Toulouse</td>
<td>Argentina vs Japan</td>
<td>1:0 (1:0)</td>
<td>Mario Van der Ende, HOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.6.98</td>
<td>Lens</td>
<td>Jamaica vs Croatia</td>
<td>1:3 (1:1)</td>
<td>Manuel Mello Pereira, POR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.6.98</td>
<td>Nantes</td>
<td>Japan vs Croatia</td>
<td>0:1 (0:0)</td>
<td>Ramesh Raman, TTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.6.98</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Argentina vs Jamaica</td>
<td>5:0 (1:0)</td>
<td>Rune Pedersen, NOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.6.98</td>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>Japan vs Jamaica</td>
<td>1:2 (0:1)</td>
<td>Günter Benko, AUT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.6.98</td>
<td>Bordeaux</td>
<td>Argentina vs Croatia</td>
<td>1:0 (1:0)</td>
<td>Said Belqola, MOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Argentina | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 7:0 | 9
2. Croatia | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 4:2 | 6
3. Jamaica | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3:9 | 3
4. Japan | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1:4 | 0

### Round of 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26.6.98</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Brazil vs Chile</td>
<td>4:1 (3:0)</td>
<td>Marc Batta, FRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.6.98</td>
<td>Saint-Denis</td>
<td>Nigeria vs Denmark</td>
<td>1:4 (0:2)</td>
<td>Bernd Heynemann, GER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.6.98</td>
<td>Montpellier</td>
<td>Germany vs Mexico</td>
<td>1:1 (1:0)</td>
<td>Manuel Pelo Pereira, POR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.6.98</td>
<td>Saint-Etienne</td>
<td>Argentina vs England</td>
<td>2:2 (2:2)</td>
<td>José-Manuel Garcia Aranda, ESP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.6.98</td>
<td>Bordeaux</td>
<td>Romania vs Croatia</td>
<td>0:1 (0:1)</td>
<td>Javier Castrill, ARG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03.7.98</td>
<td>Saint-Denis</td>
<td>Italy vs France</td>
<td>0:0, a.e.t.</td>
<td>Hugh Dallas, SCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.7.98</td>
<td>Nantes</td>
<td>Brazil vs Denmark</td>
<td>3:2 (2:1)</td>
<td>Ramona Ghandour, EGY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.7.98</td>
<td>Lens</td>
<td>Netherlands vs Argentina</td>
<td>2:1 (1:1)</td>
<td>Arturo Brizio, MEX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.7.98</td>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>Germany vs Croatia</td>
<td>0:3 (0:1)</td>
<td>Rune Pedersen, NOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Quarter Finals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03.7.98</td>
<td>Saint-Denis</td>
<td>Italy vs France</td>
<td>0:0, a.e.t.</td>
<td>Hugh Dallas, SCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.7.98</td>
<td>Lens</td>
<td>Brazil vs Denmark</td>
<td>3:2 (2:1)</td>
<td>Ramona Ghandour, EGY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.7.98</td>
<td>Montpellier</td>
<td>Netherlands vs Argentina</td>
<td>2:1 (1:1)</td>
<td>Arturo Brizio, MEX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.7.98</td>
<td>Bordeaux</td>
<td>Romania vs Croatia</td>
<td>0:3 (0:1)</td>
<td>Rune Pedersen, NOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Semifinals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07.7.98</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Brazil vs Netherlands</td>
<td>1:1, 1:1 (0:0)</td>
<td>Ali Mohamed Bujsaim, UAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.7.98</td>
<td>Saint-Denis</td>
<td>France vs Croatia</td>
<td>2:1 (0:0)</td>
<td>José-Manuel Garcia Aranda, ESP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Match for third place

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.7.98</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Netherlands vs Croatia</td>
<td>1:2 (1:2)</td>
<td>Epifano Gonzalez Chavez, PAR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Final

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Referee</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19.7.98</td>
<td>Saint-Denis</td>
<td>Brazil vs France</td>
<td>0:3 (0:2)</td>
<td>Said Belqola, MOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COUPE DU MONDE
FRANCE 98

BORDEAUX
Coupe du Monde
France 98

Marseille

LENS
Coupe du Monde France 98

Saint-Quentin
Coupe du monde
France 98
The Venues in Brief

Bordeaux - The Club: Girondins de Bordeaux; The Stadium: Stade Lescure, Capacity: 35,200; Average per match: 31,800 (6 matches); In Bordeaux played Italy, Chile, Scotland, Norway, Belgium, Mexico, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Croatia and Romania.

Nantes - The Club: FC Nantes-Atlantique (FCNA); The Stadium: La Beaujoire - Louis Fonteneau, Capacity: 39,500; Average per match: 35,500 (6 matches); In Nantes played Spain, Nigeria, Brazil, Morocco, Japan, Croatia, Chile, Cameroon, USA, Yugoslavia and Denmark.

Lens - The Club: Lens Racing Club; The Stadium: Felix Bollaert; Capacity: 41,975; Average per match: 37,050 (6 matches); In Lens played Saudi Arabia, Denmark, Jamaica, Croatia, Germany, Yugoslavia, Spain, Bulgaria, Colombia, England, France and Paraguay.

Paris - The Club: Paris Saint-Germain F.C.; The Stadium: Parc des Princes; Capacity: 49,000; Average per match: 45,500 (6 matches); In Paris played Germany, USA, Nigeria, Bulgaria, Argentina, Jamaica, Belgium, Korea Republic, Brazil, Chile, Netherlands and Croatia.

Lyon - The Club: Olympique Lyonnais; The Stadium: Gerland; Capacity: 44,000; Average per match: 39,100 (6 matches); In Lyon played Korea Republic, Mexico, Romania, Colombia, USA, Iran, France, Denmark, Japan, Jamaica, Germany and Croatia.

Saint-Denis - The Stadium: Stade de France; Capacity: 80,000; Average per match: 78,222 (9 matches); In Saint-Denis played Brazil, Scotland, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Austria, Romania, Tunisia, Nigeria, Denmark and Croatia.

Marseille - The Club: Olympique Marseille; The Stadium: Velodrome; Capacity: 60,000; Average per match: 54,857 (7 matches); In Marseille played France, South Africa, England, Tunisia, Netherlands, Korea Republic, Brazil, Norway, Italy and Argentina.

Saint-Etienne - The Club: A.S. Saint-Etienne; The Stadium: Geoffroy Guichard; Capacity: 36,000; Average per match: 30,600 (6 matches); In Saint-Etienne played Yugoslavia, Iran, Chile, Austria, Spain, Paraguay, Scotland, Morocco, Netherlands, Mexico, Argentina and England.

Montpellier - The Club: Montpellier-Herault S.C.; The Stadium: La Mosson; Capacity: 35,500; Average per match: 29,800 (6 matches); In Montpellier played Morocco, Norway, Paraguay, Bulgaria, Italy, Cameroon, Colombia, Tunisia, Germany, Iran and Mexico.

Toulouse - The Club: Toulouse F.C.; The Stadium: Municipal; Capacity: 37,000; Average per match: 33,500 (6 matches); In Toulouse played Cameroon, Austria, Argentina, Japan, South Africa, Denmark, Romania, England, Nigeria, Paraguay, Netherlands and Yugoslavia.

Cautions and Expulsions

- Number of goals scored: 171
- Average per match: 2.67
- Number of wins: 45
- Number of draws: 19
- Number of decisions by penalty-kicks: 3
- Number of penalties awarded: 18
- Number of games ending 1-0: 12
- Number of games ending 0-0: 4
- Highest score: 6-1 (ESP vs BGR)

- Number of goals scored by substitutes: 15
- Number of goals scored by numerically inferior teams: 3
- Number of games won by numerically inferior teams: 2
- Number of wins after conceding 1st goal: 6

- Yellow cards: 176
- Red cards (second yellow): 74
- Red cards (second yellow): 2
- Red cards: 14
- Recapitulation:
  - Yellow cards: 250
  - Red cards (second yellow): 4
  - Red cards: 18
BASIC DATA

Average age of all the teams
France 98
27 years, 8 months
USA 94
27 years, 3 months

Youngest player
France 98
Samuel Eto'o (Cameroon)
Date of birth: 10.3.81
USA 94
Ronaldo (BRA)
29.9.76

Oldest player
France 98
Jim Leighton (Scotland)
Date of birth: 24.7.58
USA 94
Roger Milla (Cameroon)
20.5.52

Official FIFA Awards

Fair Play Award
1. France and England

adidas Golden Ball
Golden Ball: Ronaldo (BRA)
Silver Ball: Davor Suker (HRV)
Bronze Ball: Lilian Thuram (FRA)

adidas Golden shoe
Golden Shoe: 6 goals: Davor Suker (HRV)
Silver Shoe: 5 goals: Gabriel Batistuta (ARG)

FIFA Award for the Most Entertaining Team
France

Fastest Goal Award
Celso Ayala (PAR) (against Nigeria on 24.6.1998)

Jashin Award for the Best Goalkeeper
Fabien Barthez (FRA)
Overall Analysis

The seventh country to get its name on the list of World Cup winners is, of course, France. On 12 July, 80,000 spectators watched the French team defeat title-holders Brazil, thanks to two goals from their playmaker Zinedine Zidane and a third from Emmanuel Petit. Croatia, who beat Holland for third place, despite the better football coming from the Dutch, were the surprise team of the tournament.

Coach Aimé Jacquet was the architect of this French success. While his tactical plan drew a lot of criticism from many of the fans of "The Blues", the course he steered was proved correct when the team achieved the greatest triumph in the history of French football. He managed to put the right team together for each match, instilled in them the tough mental attitude that enabled them to come back after a shock (and there were several) and never lose their composure. They also had that touch of luck that seems to favour the deserving – for example in the penalty shoot-out against Italy or the Golden Goal that Laurent Blanc scored against Paraguay (the first ever in a World Cup final round).

The footballer of the future will have to be an all-rounder. This French champion team showed that at the top today it is necessary to be able to fulfil a number of roles. For example, playmaker Zidane was sometimes seen right back on the edge of his own penalty box helping out his colleagues in defence, and moments later being in a scoring position himself at the other end. Another example would be Thierry Henry, nominally a striker, but he would drop back into midfield and then make a sudden burst down the right wing. Dunga too can be mentioned in this respect. Having been the

Chile under fire: although Cameroon went all out in their last game, they failed to pull off the win they needed to sweep them into the second round. The match ended in a 1-1 draw.
driving force of the Brazilian team's attacks in 1994, this time he took over the role of the no-longer available Mauro Silva and operated as a screen in front of his own defence. The schooling of players for the future must equip them with a wide range of skills, to make it easier for them and their coaches to play a flexible pattern of football.

**Little change in the balance of power**

The increase in the number of teams from 24 up to 32 did not significantly alter the balance of power between the different continents. The big surprises that Africa or Asia might have provided did not come to pass, and the scene. Of the 15 European sides in the tournament, 10 earned a place in the second round and they accounted for six of the eight quarterfinalists. Three reached the semifinals and these ended up in positions 1, 3 and 4. Brazil's unique status of being the only non-European side to win the World Cup in Europe (Sweden 1958) was unchallenged.

After EURO 96, French coach Aimé Jacquet had carefully analysed the reasons for his team's elimination and prepared his squad this time in the light of that experience. He assembled a large team of assistants (in 96 he had had to attend to too many details himself), devoted a lot of attention to the choice of players number 15 to 99 in his selection (a far-sighted move that paid off well in view of the large number of injuries and suspensions) and intensified both the physical and mental aspects of the team's preparation. The French Association's training centre was the ideal place for putting all these plans into action in order to prepare the team for what was clearly going to be a difficult tournament for them.

On their first appearance at a World Cup final round, Croatia proved to be the big surprise. Nine of their first-choice players are engaged in the major European leagues (England, Italy, Germany and Spain) and they brought a lot of experience into the national side. The usual attributes that players from this part of the world demonstrate (individual skills, unpredictability) were backed up by teamwork and solidarity, as well as fierce pride and a desire to do well in the name of their young country.

The Dutch were among the most attractive teams in this competition. With the exception of their opening game against Belgium they played the kind of attacking football that makes people everywhere want to watch them. The internal squabbling that had earlier centred around Edgar Davids (who proved to be one of the key figures in their success) was no longer a problem. The philosophy that has guided most of Dutch football at club and national level, as well as in all age categories, for some 25 years — technically skilled attacking play — was this team's policy too. Bad luck in penalty shooting against Brazil prevented the "Oranje" from being even more successful.

Italy's performances in the group games did not augur well for the later stages of the competition. They depended too heavily on their excellent tactical disposition, their good organisation and the scoring ability of Christian Vieri (5 goals). Del Piero had recovered from his injury but it was clear that he was behind in his training programme. By contrast, Roberto Baggio proved to be more than just an alternative to the Champions' League finalist and next to Vieri was the one who provided most impulses in the Italian attack.

The high average age of the German side had been a topic for media discussion both at home and abroad. But it was not only the moderate temperatures that were responsible for them earning a safe place in the second round. Then, beginning against Mexico in the round of the last 16, they were forced to recognise that the opposition had made progress in both physical and tactical terms. In the quarterfinal, the strong counter-attacking Croatians took their revenge for a defeat by Germany in EURO 96. They inflicted a heavy defeat on Berti Vogts' men, and
the justified expulsion of Wörns after 40 minutes was not the only reason for the decisive outcome of this match.

As at EURO 92, Denmark provided a big surprise. While not too convincing in their group games, the Laudrup brothers motivated the team, first against Nigeria and then against Brazil, to perform at their highest level. While they just lost to the South Americans, they showed some technically refined football and provided moments of total surprise for their opponents. Under their Swedish coach Johannson and taking part in their first World Cup since 1986 they were responsible for some of the most positive moments of the tournament.

England confirmed the progress they have made under Glenn Hoddle, with their excellent organisation, strong individual players and a good mixture of experience and young talent (Owen). But a lack of control at decisive moments (Beckham's red card) and bad luck in the penalty battle against Argentina saw them eliminated earlier than they deserved.

Yugoslavia, Romania and Norway performed pretty much in accordance with expectations. The Yugoslavs under the guidance of coach Santrac showed both their best and their worst against Germany, playing confidently, with technical elegance and good team harmony they took a 2.0 lead, then they became anxious and full of nerves, allowing the opponents to pull back first one and then another goal.

Then in the second round against Holland they lacked all their previous confidence and had little to offer, even though the goal that put them out came very late in the game. Romania came unscathed through the group games, and perhaps it all had been a bit too easy, for when they ran into Croatia in the second round their concentration was not as sharp as it should have been. A penalty just before the end of the first half proved to be the deciding factor: Norway confirmed their status as Brazil's bogey team by beating them in the final match of Group A, a repeat of their success in 1997, although it must be said that the Brazilians at that stage were assured of qualification. Then the superbly organised Italians proved to be too much for them. After Vieri scored early on the Scandinavians were unable to react strongly enough to alter the outcome of the match.

Of the Europeans, Spain turned out to be the biggest disappointment. Defeat in their opening match against Nigeria proved in retrospect to have been a decisive step on the road to early elimination. Surprisingly they failed to hold on when they were twice ahead, and it was individual errors that finally cost them this game. After that they were not able to turn their fate around, achieving only a 0.0 against Paraguay, which meant that the sweeping 6:1 win against a disheartened Bulgarian team(473,311),(523,363) was of no avail.

A win in their final match against a collectively battling Korean side would have earned the Belgians a place in the last sixteen, but a lack of concentration in front of goal saw the game end 1:1, and with it their last hopes. Austria found themselves in the position of being on the verge of upsetting Italy - with a bit more spirit of adventure on their part might have achieved it. Before then they had pushed their luck to the limit, earning equalisers against Cameroon (91st minute) and Chile (92nd) almost as the referee was about to call time. The whole Scottish contingent proved an attraction for the tournament, with the team's fair play and their fantastic supporters behind them all the way, but even this time round they could not conquer the jinx that always sends them home after the group games. Finally the Bulgarians: they performed disappointingly due to a lack of form on the part of their key players - what a difference from their rousing efforts of 1994.

South America's confirmation

It was expected that defending champions Brazil would at last reach the final once again. With a squad of players of their quality it would be difficult for them to be seen as anything other than favourites - a role they

Colombia captured in a free-fall (Preciado [21] seen here in the match against England).

The South Americans gave disappointing displays and never once seemed capable of qualifying for the second round.
would have to live with. And Zagallo's men were up to the challenge right through to the final, but there they met a rampant French team and appeared surprisingly uncertain and uninspired themselves. The exact causes of this weak performance will probably never be known. Rumours that Ronaldo was unwell or injured may well have some substance behind them, but that a team of this class would be so affected by such an event is hard to imagine.

While Argentina's performance cannot be rated as disappointing, it did not fulfil the hopes of the many fans who travelled to France with them. Their opponents from the 1978 final, Holland, proved to be their departure point in the quarterfinals, and to get that far they had made heavy demands on their quota of luck in going all the way against England in the match before and won only on penalties. In Ayala, Veron, Ortega, and also Gallardo, not to mention top scorer Batistuta, they had exceptionally talented players in the side who put their skills at the disposal of the team. Nonetheless they did not manage to make France 98 the big success which they hoped would make up for their unhappy showing in 1994.

Having last appeared in Spain in 1982, Chile were back again at the World Cup and hoped that they would qualify for the second round for the first time since 1962, when they had been the host country. The manner in which they achieved this was perhaps lucky, but their place among the last 16 was fully deserved. After being undefeated in their group games (3 draws), the team and their officials were convinced that they could bring off a surprise against Brazil. But lapses of concentration in defence led to the Brazilians going ahead in the first half, and after that Chile never got back on terms. In Zamorano and Salas they had one of the most effective striking partnerships in the competition. Four goals (Salas) and two assists (Zamorano) testify to the good cooperation between these two players.

Among the personalities present in France was The German player, Oliver Bierhoff, tussling with the Americans, Dooley (5), Regis (6) and Pope. Transferred to AC Milan before the start of the World Cup and, with three goals to his credit, he proved to be his team's best goal scorer alongside Klinsmann.
proved their greatest strength. The 3:1 win over the more highly rated Nigerians in the last group game was the high point of their achievement, though they held their own against the emerging champions France in the next match, only losing in the 24th minute of extra time.

Colombia were the weakest of the five South American teams by a good margin. Their style of play had little in common with what is considered good modern practice and totally lacked changes of pace, moments of surprise and driving impulse. Little wonder then that against the two European teams in their group, England and Romania, they were without a chance, and that their only success was a lucky 1:0 win over Tunisia.

Were the African teams over-rated?

Optimists (or were they dreamers) saw 1998 as the year when Africa would celebrate its first World Cup champions. The five teams representing the continent came to France with correspondingly high hopes, but none of them managed to live up to this expectation. Various factors contributed to this poor showing (last-minute replacements of coaches and thus alterations of playing systems, administrative oversights, over-estimation of their own ability), and compared to 1994 the overall performance was a step backwards rather than forwards.

Despite their qualifying for the second round, Nigeria's showing has to be rated as a disappointment. Technically skilled down to the last man, their eleven players looked like a group of individuals rather than a team. On the one hand they had a bit of luck and some superb individual moments, on the other they made some glaring tactical and individual mistakes, the balance was enough to get them into the second round, but no further. There the tactically well-prepared Danes showed that they too had some individual brilliance and they exposed the weaknesses in the Nigerian side.

To make it worse, the Nigerian keeper had anything but a good day and contributed to his team's elimination. Probably the best African team was Morocco. Only Norway's surprising win against Brazil cost them a place among the last 16. Coach Henri Michel had the disappointment of seeing his team win their last group game against Scotland and seeming certain of going through, only to hear that the latest score of 1:1 between Brazil and Norway had become 1:2, and that the Scandinavians had thus edged them out of second place. The Moroccans were devastated by this and were consoled by the Scottish fans (what an advert for fair play, as mentioned above) as well as their own. Morocco played complete football, with players of the necessary quality in their team to do this, as well as being tactically well drilled and ready to fight for victory. They deserved more than this early elimination, but lost their chance by not getting more than just one point from the first two matches (against Norway and Brazil).

The Frenchman Claude Le Roy was hailed as a national hero in 1998 when he led Cameroon to victory in their continental championship. Similar success was expected from him when he took over the «Indomitable Lions» shortly before the World Cup started. In view of their strong group opponents (Austria, Chile and Italy), this team, the youngest in the competition with an average age of 24 years and 1 month, had no great expectations to live up to and a chance to gain valuable experience. In fact, they could have achieved more than the two creditable results against Chile and Austria. A lack of concentration (e.g. letting the Austrian equalize in stoppage time) cost them a place in the second round. But this was a promising side, playing fresh and attractive football. The most memorable moment was Njanka's opening goal against Austria when he ran with the ball half the length of the pitch, leaving opponents in his wake and giving the goalkeeper no chance of stopping him either.

For South Africa, their first ever qualification for a World Cup final round was a signal for great celebration at home, only dampened a little by their defeat against Egypt in the final of the African Nations' Cup in Burkina Faso. Expectations remained high, even though they too replaced the coach just before the World Cup, appointing another Frenchman, Philippe Troussier, to the position. But hard times for Spain: once again the Spaniards performed below their usual standards and as a result found themselves taking an early plane home. Pizzi (9, in combat with Gamboa) was fielded only once and that was for barely an hour in the match against Paraguay. Even he failed to come up to coach Clemente's expectations.
an African championship is different from the World Cup - a lesson they had to learn. With a bit more luck they might have progressed further, but their overall performance would not really have justified a place among the best 16.

Finally, Tunisia. They managed to salvage some honour with a 1-1 draw against group winners Romania, and the team, coached by Henry Kasperczak, certainly had some fine players in its ranks. But less than optimal physical condition and a lack of international experience (out of the entire squad only four were with foreign (= European) clubs), meant that they were not up to the overall level of their group opponents.

Asia still waiting for a surprise

At international level, Asian teams are still waiting for a breakthrough. Even with their quota raised to four teams, they were still a long way from earning a place in the second round. Japan and Iran looked the best of the four, with the co-organisers of the World Cup 2002 playing quick attractive football. But they still lack players up front who can take advantage of the many chances they create. Out of all the promising situations they developed all but one came to nothing, and it's simple football logic that whatever else you may do well, if you don't score goals you won't win. What they did well was to play as a team, right up to the opponent's penalty area, and this was backed up by their good physical condition and strict discipline in following the coach's tactical plan to the letter. But in addition to their (almost) total inability to put the ball in the net, they were a bit naive in defence and seemingly unable to change the pace of their game - it was top speed all the time. They too lacked the much-quoted but still vital element of international experience.

In this respect, Iran were a little better off; they had three players who are regularly in action in Germany - Ali Daei (now with Bayern Munich), Azizi (1 FC Cologne) and Bagheri (Arminia Bielefeld). A fourth, Rashadzeh, will be with Bayer Leverkusen for the coming season. Despite this, they also failed to make it through to the next round. In their case it was partly due to a lack of condition (especially noticeable in the last group game against Germany), and also to their defensive behaviour at certain moments (committing fouls near the penalty box and thus giving an opponent a dangerous free kick opportunity). Without these weaknesses they might have decided the prestige battle against the USA more clearly. But they were effective with their counter-attacks, and the majority of their players showed good technical skills.

Korea and Saudi Arabia did not rise above the status of also-rans. The Saudis, who had engaged the Brazilian World Cup-winning coach Carlos Alberto Parreira, hoped to be able to repeat their success of 1994, but failed for several reasons. Firstly, their lack of physical condition, then an unrealistic view of their capabilities, and finally that almost Asia-wide lack of international experience. In this case that comes as no surprise - players are not allowed to join foreign clubs. If they wish to come closer to the best teams in the world, then there will have to be some fundamental alterations in the structure of Saudi Arabian football.

Korea's first match against Mexico showed that their will to win can push them beyond the boundaries of acceptable play. Shortly after scoring the opening goal, Ha Seok Ju was sent off for a nasty foul. The subsequent 1-3 defeat was the beginning of the end of Korea's adventure. But to their credit they never gave up, even in the hopeless situation of being 0.5 down against Holland - they still fought for every ball. The point they won against Belgium was celebrated as if they had won the title, but all the same they (and all the other Asian teams) will have to do a lot in the next four years if they are to make a better showing on home soil.

Mexico saves the day for CONCACAF

Mexico's dominance of the CONCACAF scene continues unchallenged. This time there was potentially more in it for them than the usual qualification for the second round. During the group games it was clear that this team, now coached by Manuel Lapuente, had made progress, above all in terms of tactics, but also
The USA team came to France with their ambitions raised, now that Major League Soccer is up and running in the States. They can put an unlucky draw down as one of the reasons for their early elimination – being in a group with Germany and Yugoslavia is not easy. But even so, their cramped performance against the reigning European champions (showing too much respect for a big name was certainly the problem here) was not a promising start. After that they were more relaxed against Iran and only bad luck in finishing prevented them from earning a point at least. Finally against Yugoslavia, they also could have achieved more than just an honourable defeat.

**Variety for the spectators**

The CFO went to some lengths to provide a varied programme of matches in each of the venues. In practice this meant that every team had to travel between their group matches, each one in a different city. The 32 delegations chose to locate themselves in one place, travelling to their next match a day in advance of a match and returning immediately afterwards.

This modus was regarded somewhat critically, especially by the coaches. Too much travel in between games would upset preparations, recuperation time, the daily rhythm, etc. – these were the arguments heard. But discussions held during the World Cup indicated that changing venues brought welcome variety, especially for the players. The feeling of being cooped up in a camp was avoided. Of course a plan of this kind makes heavy demands on the organisation of local transportation systems – it all has to function, and it did just that, despite the Air France strike.

The long intervals between matches were welcomed by most of the coaches. Despite the travelling there was enough time for the players to relax, recover from minor injuries and concentrate their attention on the next game. Some officials thought that rest periods of up to seven days were too long for players to adjust to what would later be an intensive schedule. The modus for Japan/Korea 2002 is not yet known and details are eagerly awaited. Whether the teams will again be playing their group games in three different venues is also not known at this point.

**Coaches fired during the tournament – a negative innovation for the World Cup**

No fewer than three national associations dismissed their team’s coach in the course of the tournament following a failure to perform up to expectation. Such turns of event may be regular occurrences in some continents and countries just before or during major competitions, but not at the World Cup. This trend needs to be studied, and it raises the question as to the level of respect that the coach’s work deserves. Short term decisions such as replacing the coach during a competition indicate an unrealistic evaluation of a team’s potential, plus a lack of knowledge and understanding, and in no way help in the continuous development of football. Characteristically it was those countries in greatest need of a continuous programme of development at all levels of the game that took steps of this kind.
Joint winners of the Fair Play Trophy

England and France shared first place in the Fair Play rankings, with 908 points, just ahead of Norway (882) and Brazil (816). 250 yellow cards were shown by the referees and 82 red; of these four were the consequence of a second bookable offence in the same match.

Fines imposed by the Disciplinary Committee for these offences amounted to CHF 411,000, the money going towards continuing the Fair Play campaign.

Suker, Ronaldo, Ayala, Barthez, France

Davor Suker was the top goal-scorer with six successes, followed by Gabriel Batistuta and Christian Vieri with 5 each. The journalists present voted Ronaldo as the best player of the tournament (Golden Ball), with Suker and Lilian Thuram next in line. Celso Ayala (Paraguay) scored the fastest goal of the competition (against Nigeria), exactly 45 seconds after the kick-off and he received a special award. Fabien Barthez won the Lew Yashin Trophy as the best goalkeeper. France was not only in the opinion of the media representatives the most attractive tournament team and thus won the FIFA Entertainment Award.

Attacking football

France 98 offered attacking football in every sense. Even the so-called outsiders came on the pitch ready to go for goals and not simply prevent them. This is to the credit of their coaches who contributed in this way to making the tournament a more attractive event. The players were happy to put their coach’s intentions into practice – their delight in going forward was clear to see. Only in this way was it possible to play such entertaining football for a whole month.

Emmanuel Petit topped his magnificent display in the final against Brazil by scoring the third goal to clinch certain victory for the French hosts.

Davor Suker (Croatia, 9) and Lothar Matthäus (Germany, 8): a direct confrontation between two outstanding personalities on the pitch.
In 1994, Rasheed Yekini (Nigeria), was the first ever Nigerian player to score for his national team at a World Cup. Four years later he made only the odd appearance as a substitute but this did not deter him from some brilliant acrobatic displays (such as here against Spain).

The match between the outsiders in group H ended in victory for Jamaica by the skin of their teeth against Japan: Lowe (17) locked in battle with Nakayama, the only goal scorer from Japan in this tournament.
As was to be expected, there was nothing very new and certainly nothing revolutionary on the tactical level at France 98. What was new was having 32 teams instead of the previous 24. Beneficiaries of this increase were above all Africa (5 teams now, instead of 3) and South America (also 5, including the reigning world champions). Concafe’s allocation went up from two to three, Asia’s from two to four, and Europe’s from 13 to 15 (including the host country). Africa’s performance failed to deliver the expected improvement, while the other continents’ results were within the expected range.

European or South American head coaches. And nowadays in many countries clubs are coached by trainers who have either worked in the leagues mentioned above or are in fact natives of those countries.

All-round ability – the hallmark of the player of the future

The demands made of top players today are always increasing. Discussions with coaches and observation of matches and training sessions showed that more and more emphasis is being placed on versatility. A player must be able to attack as well as defend, in cases of need he must be ready to understand or even play in different positions. There is still room for the out-and-out specialist who does one job well and is not assigned any other duties (e.g. Suker, Vieri, Ronaldo), but he must keep on doing that job so well that the coach cannot do without him. If his performances drop off then a more versatile player will soon be in the team in his place.

The victorious French coach Aimé Jacquet stated on a number of occasions that the versatility of a player was at least an equal factor in his mind when he was selecting his squad. And France in particular had to contend with a

Korea’s goalkeeper, Kim Byung Ji, clashing with his Belgian counterpart Yande Walle: the workload of a modern-day goalie becomes more and more diversified. In some situations, it is now the order of the day for a goalkeeper to foray into the opponents’ penalty area.
number of absences during the tournament — without the versatility of the players still available they would not have been able to compensate anywhere near as well as they did.

The special importance of the central axis

In all the most successful teams, the central axis — goalkeeper, defensive organizer, central defensive and offensive midfielders and the striker — was made up of outstanding players. A look at the French team illustrates this. In goal they had Fabien Barthez, the best keeper of them all. In defence, Desailly was clearly the leading figure, and in front of him captain Deschamps was an unobtrusive but immensely valuable defensive midfielder. Their attacking midfielder was Zidane and practically every move went through him. Only up front did they have problems, where Guivarc’h and Dugarry were suffering from the effects of injury and did not reach the expected form. Brazil too had a clear leader in each area, with Taffarel as a safe figure in goal (penalty shooting), Dunga in defence and in defensive midfield, Rivaldo as the offensive midfielder and Ronaldo up front.

More play down the wings

While play down the wings made a comeback as an attacking strategy, there was no renaissance of what could be called the typical winger. Roberto Carlos, Cafu, Lizarazu and Thuram certainly have all the skills that would be needed in this position (speed and the ability to provide a variety of types of shooting), but they were not employed as purely attacking players; they also had defensive roles to fulfil. Using players in this double role puts a heavy demand on their fitness and also carries an element of risk, since a counter-attacking team will be waiting eagerly for an attack to go wrong so that they can take advantage of the hole left at the back.

Of all the teams present, only Holland, Nigeria, France and Mexico (partly) used real wingers in their system. Otherwise hardly any team operated with three strikers.

Different playing systems — flexible interpretations

No coach brought a team to this World Cup with a new playing system. The familiar 3-5-2, 4-3-3, 4-4-2 etc. were all on view. But interpretation of these systems has become more flexible. The more successful teams were able to adapt whatever system they were using according to the state of the game. A 4-3-3 would become a 3-4-3, or a 4-4-2 would change to a 4-5-1, etc. This switching around needs excellent preparation, an instinct for the right moment to implement the changeover and the self-confidence to make it work. Holland for example played on the defensive with a 4-man block, but when they got possession one of the outer backs would move into midfield to support an attack, and similar flexibility was seen in most of the best teams. Thus it was not so important which system a team used, but how it was interpreted. Players must (and will) be trained by their coaches to make decisions themselves and to accept the responsibility involved. The coach's interpreter on the field (e.g. Dunga for Brazil, Matthäus for Germany, De Boer for Holland or Boban for Croatia)
is the kind of player that is becoming increasingly important.

A look at the individual team blocks

The main defensive formations were a three or four-man in-line chain or a libero with two man-markers. Which system will be the one for the future cannot be discerned definitely at the moment. The two finalists both used a four-man chain, and three of the four semi-finalists. But there were different variations from this formation, such as the advancement of a wing back into midfield when the team was in possession. In the case of four-man blocks, the central defenders would alternate between going forward and covering at the back. The three-man chain seems to have gained popularity since 1994. Teams using a libero with two man-markers had the free player only slightly deep of the other two or even in line with the two stoppers.

In the central defensive zone the following systems were observed:

The square system, with two central defenders and two central midfielders (e.g. France, England, and Spain).
- The diamond, with one libero behind and another in front of the two man-markers (e.g. Germany, Japan, and Korea).
- The triangle, with two central defenders and one defensive midfielder (anchor man) (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Argentina).

In terms of technical skills, defenders showed an improvement. This is related to the sharpening up of sanctions against wild tackling, but is also a consequence of the fact that a modern team cannot afford to have players who can only perform defensive duties. Defenders today must still have all the ability to stop opponents that has always been part of the job, but in addition now have to be able to read the game well, deliver accurate passes and join in when the team is attacking.

The triangle with two man markers had gone forward in 1994. Interestingly, it was observed that a modern team could only perform defensive duties. Defenders today must still have all the ability to stop opponents that has always been part of the job, but in addition now have to be able to read the game well, deliver accurate passes and join in when the team is attacking.

A look at the individual team blocks

The main defensive formations were a three or four-man in-line chain or a libero with two man-markers. Which system will be the one for the future cannot be discerned definitely at the moment. The two finalists both used a four-man chain, and three of the four semi-finalists. But there were different variations from this formation, such as the advancement of a wing back into midfield when the team was in possession. In the case of four-man blocks, the central defenders would alternate between going forward and covering at the back. The three-man chain seems to have gained popularity since 1994. Teams using a libero with two man-markers had the free player only slightly deep of the other two or even in line with the two stoppers.

In the central defensive zone the following systems were observed:

The square system, with two central defenders and two central midfielders (e.g. France, England, and Spain).
- The diamond, with one libero behind and another in front of the two man-markers (e.g. Germany, Japan, and Korea).
- The triangle, with two central defenders and one defensive midfielder (anchor man) (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Argentina).

In terms of technical skills, defenders showed an improvement. This is related to the sharpening up of sanctions against wild tackling, but is also a consequence of the fact that a modern team cannot afford to have players who can only perform defensive duties. Defenders today must still have all the ability to stop opponents that has always been part of the job, but in addition now have to be able to read the game well, deliver accurate passes and join in when the team is attacking.

The triangle with two man markers had gone forward in 1994. Interestingly, it was observed that a modern team could only perform defensive duties. Defenders today must still have all the ability to stop opponents that has always been part of the job, but in addition now have to be able to read the game well, deliver accurate passes and join in when the team is attacking.

Having conceded only two goals in seven matches, France’s defence was the best of the tournament. One of the prime architects of this defence was Marcel Desailly (8), the full-time organizer and conductor of his team’s defensive tactics. He is pictured here in aerial action against the Dane, Rieper.

Midfield

In modern football, midfield is divided into two sections. One has the task of strengthening the defence by supporting at the back and by trying to stamp out an opposing attack in its early stages. This is done by making space tight in midfield and attempting to stop, or at least hinder, an attacking move within 10 to 20 meters of the halfway line. These are the players who dictate the moment and pace of the switch-over from defence to attack. The range of skills they need is considerable: good reading of the game (anticipation), positional sense, good tackling, and the ability to play accurate decisive passes. Good examples of players in this mould are Desailly and Frank De Boer (both capable of operating either as a central defender or as a defensive midfielder), Deschamps, Dunga, and also Cesar Sampaio, Almeyda and Ince.

The offensive midfielder acts as the link man between midfield and attack and his is a vital role. He takes advantage of space created by the strikers, with the aim of going for goal himself (e.g. Rivaldo for Brazil or Zidane for France), or playing a one-two or a triangle combination with the strikers to get one of them clear (e.g. Ortega for Batistuta in the Argentina side).

The flank midfielders were also of major importance, since they not only had to cover with their advancing wing backs but also to combine with them when wing backs advanced and were caught out of position.
fielders who were successful (e.g. Zidane, Ortega, Rivaldo) but also those more concerned with defence. Cesar Sampaio (Brazil) scored three goals, Holland’s Ronald de Boer two, Prosnec (Croatia) and Petit (France) also two. More proof of the all-round talent of the modern player.

Of course, both of these midfield blocks work together and merge automatically when required. Forwards help out in defence too as the situation demands. The offensive midfield is the first line of defence. On the other hand, the defensive midfield are involved in attacks and offer support up front. More all round talent is required. There is no escape from the fact that the player of today and even more of the future will have to be able to attack as well as defend.

**Attack**

The most frequently observed attacking variations were:

a) The steady build-up from the back, with short or long passing combinations. Accurate diagonal passes generally caused trouble, and the Brazilians and the Dutch were outstanding in this respect, scoring a number of times after such actions. A diagonal pass put a whole defence off balance. But another favoured way through was the deep pass from midfield, particularly if a team had speedy forwards ready to outpace their markers.

b) The quick long pass right through to the strikers. For example, most of Morocco’s and Croatia’s goals came in this way. This needs a good eye for the opening, the ability to pinpoint the long pass and of course the striker up front, who is quick enough and tricky enough to get past the last defender and put the ball away.

As mentioned earlier, few teams used real wingers. Their functions were largely carried out by advancing defenders or midfielders. Only Overmars for Holland, Diomede or Henry for France, Finidi for Nigeria and the Mexican Bianco could really be described as wingers. Most of the teams had two strikers in their line-up, but their duties were very varied. In some teams both strikers would aim at getting into scoring positions themselves and take advantage of opportunities created by their midfielders or outside backs. In this category we can include Bierhoff/Klinsmann (Germany), Ronaldo/Bebeto (Brazil), Bergkamp/Keuvert (Holland). In other teams only one of the forwards was an out-and-out finisher, his partner a creator of free spaces, passes and chances. This was the set-up for Chile (with Salas and Zamorano), Italy (with Vieri and Del Piero or Roberto Baggio) or Croatia (with Suker and Vlaovic or Juric). One thing became clear at France 98, today’s striker must be able to dribble, to make chances for others and also to take them himself. The position of striker remains in a special category; if a player can display the qualities just mentioned he does not have to defend. If the goals keep coming, everyone will be satisfied.

With five goals to his credit, Christian Vieri (ITA, 21) shared the championship’s second best goal-scoring honours with Batistuta from Argentina. It was largely thanks to him that the Italians began to believe in an equally successful outcome for the team as that in 1994.
The goalkeeper's job is not an easy one

Naturally there were many examples of positive effects of specialised goalkeeper training. For example, Taffarel often played out of goal in certain training exercises to polish up his ability to come out of his box. Only when there were specific routines for goalkeeper training would he return to his normal position. Both France and England had former national team goalkeepers as specialist coaches (Bergeroo and Clemence), and their training schemes were efficient, varied and game-oriented.

Playmakers / Personalities

The trend in this respect that has been seen in international competitions in recent years continues. The typical playmaker, who organises and directs his team's strategy, who pulls the strings in every attack and also helps out in defence, is a figure of the past. The range of activities he would have to perform is now too great for one player to cope with. Also the pace of the game today would make such a role impossible.

In modern football, the aim is to make every player take on responsibility. In midfield for example there are now defensive and offensive organisers. Each is the boss in his own zone, but expects his colleagues to share responsibility. The ability to read a game is now a skill that every player involved in top level football must have or at least develop.

But still there were some outstanding personalities in France. The Technical Study Group saw two different categories here, the «human» and the «tactical» leaders.

The tactical leader is the one who sees to it that the coach's instructions are put into effect on the field. Players in this category would be (for example) Hagi, Klinsmann or Zidane.

In the other group, there seemed to be more players who dominated in terms of human leadership qualities.

After being suspended from two matches (expulsion in the match against Belgium), the Dutchman, Kluivert (9) soon rediscovered his old touch, scoring two crucial goals for his team (1-0 against Argentina in the quarter finals and (pictured here) the equaliser for 1-1 against Brazil).
than ever before. Players like Durig, Chilavert, Matthäus, Frank de Boer or Deschamps (to mention just a few) demonstrated the ability to motivate, criticize, encourage and spur on their team mates. They enjoyed a special status within their teams.

Youth coming through

Encouragingly for the future of the game, a number of coaches chose young players for their squads and also played them in matches. Glenn Hoddle for example promoted Michael Owen to his starting line-up from the third game onwards, and the young man justified this confidence by scoring two goals (the solo against Argentina being one of the most memorable moments of the tournament). Aimé Jacquet used his not yet 20 year-old protégés Henry and Trezeguet as much more than jokers. And then there was the 20 year-old Benedict McCarthy of South Africa, celebrated already as a star back home and transferred last year to Ajax Amsterdam in Holland. He is already a key player in the national team, and coach Troussier used him from the start in all their matches. All these young players were in their country’s youth teams at the WYC in Malaysia in 1997. Cameroon has always been known for its youthful national teams and again this time the West Africans were by far the youngest squad.

The difference between winning and losing

Most of the 32 teams were so close in the standard of their football that in many cases only tiny details decided who would win and who would lose a game. Collective play and thinking was the guideline for most of the teams, with individual efforts in the background. And oddly enough, for this very reason, it was often an individual touch of brilliance – from Ronaldo or Zidane, a cool head in a critical moment from Suker, or a stroke of genius, say from Bergkamp, that decided a match. The right moment for playing a decisive pass is still a vital factor. Holland had this skill down to a fine art; often a matter of millimetres kept the ball away from an attempted intervention and steered it to its intended destination.

Another factor that could tip a finely balanced match was the coach’s tactical decisions. For example, in the Austria-Chile match, the Austrian
coach sent on Vastic as a substitute and he scored the equalizer for 1:1 in stoppage time. Mexico’s coach Lapuente also seemed to have a magic touch with his substitutions: sending on his joker Pelaez against Korea was a masterstroke; it was this player who scored the goal that made it 1:1 and which signalled the turn of the match. It was the same substitute who also got the valuable goal against Holland to pull the score back to 1:2.

Quick and efficient counter-attacks also brought success in a number of instances. Croatia were the masters of this style of play. Not only was it this ‘hedgehog’ tactic that earned them victory in the play-off for third place against Holland, but it had also brought them success earlier against Germany. Coach Blazevic was fortunate in having talented counter-attackers like Asanovic, Jami and Boban in his side, and his tactics made excellent use of their ability.

**Statistics**

There were 171 goals in all, which averages out to 2.69 per game, almost identical to the USA figure of 2.71. The contribution made by goals from set pieces was 62, slightly higher (36.3% compared to 32.6% in the USA). Considerably more goals came after corners than last time, 21 (or 33.9%) in France against 7 (15.2%). This can be traced back to some refined corner strategies as well as some poor defensive organization. During corners it was noticeable that hardly any team had two players on the goal-line (one at the near post, one at the far) – one of the few exceptions to this being Croatia. The figures for free kick goals show a less dramatic change,

As in the USA three matches went to the penalty-shooting stage (Argentina – England, France – Italy and Brazil – Holland). One match was decided by a Golden Goal – Laurent Blanc having the honour for France against Paraguay.

The importance of scoring the first goal was not as marked in France as it had been in the USA. In the 59 matches that did not end goal-less (including the Golden Goal encounter), only 38 times did the team that scored first go on to win the match (in the USA it was 36 times out of 52 matches). 15 others ended in a draw (USA 8) and in the remaining six it was the other team that won (USA 5). In this respect, Mexico were superb at coming from behind; finding themselves one or two goals down in each of their group games, they came back each time and were undefeated (victory over Korea, draws against Belgium and Holland). Nigeria too were twice trailing against Spain and yet emerged 3:2 winners in a close match.

On ten occasions goals were scored by full teams playing against ten men, and five in matches in which both teams were a man down. Two games were won by a team with fewer players left on the field and five by a team of 11 playing against 10. 97 goals (16%) were the result of quick counter-attacking raids, clearly above the 1994 figure, when only 15 (11%) of the 141 goals came in this way.

The area between the goal area and the penalty spot is still the most fruitful for scoring goals, with 64 (37.4%) coming from this region. Within the goal area itself, far more successes were registered this time (41, or 24.0%) than four years ago (20, 14.3%). The reasons for this could be that strikers, or advancing players from the back, get through more often, that defenders do not offer enough protection to their goalkeepers or possibly that referees are less strict in stopping play for challenges within this region. Goals from a longer range (outside the penalty area) were not all that frequent, there being just 20 of them (11.7%) compared to the USA figure of 27 (19.1%).

As for the timing of goals, 45 were scored within the last fifteen minutes of regular
Brazil's captain, Dunga, tried every trick in the book to ward off defeat in the final against France. His disappointment was all the more bitter when, on 12 July 1998, he realised that his perseverance had been in vain.

On a number of occasions, coaches demonstrated a lucky touch in sending on substitutes. Aimé Jacquet brought on Dugarry during France’s first match against South Africa, having to replace the injured Guivarc’h. Just six minutes later the fresh player scored the important first goal. Austria’s coach Prohaska had a similar experience against Chile, sending on Vastic 90 minutes before the end, his decision was proved right when this player scored a splendid equalizer. And Mexico’s ‘super sub’, Pelaez, showed his gratitude for being sent on two occasions, needing just 5 minutes on the pitch to obtain an equalizer against Korea and a little bit longer (90 minutes) to pull one back against Holland.

Positive evaluations for the referees

The Referees’ Committee evaluated the performance of the match officials very highly on the whole. In comparison to 1994 an improvement was noticeable, in particular among the assistant referees. There was general agreement that the basis for the appointment of referees needs to be reviewed. Looking at some specific instances, the banning of tackles from behind worked very well, but what needs to be improved is the punishment of shirt-pulling. On countless occasions this type of foul was noticed, without the referee doing anything about it.

Mexico’s goalkeeper, Jorge Campos, defended his goal immaculately up to the 74th minute in the second round game against Germany. Only then did he and his team crumble under pressure from the favourites. Here he is clearing the ball away from the top German goal scorer, Bierhoff.
Two players who were awarded the highest honours: Ronaldo (Brazil, pictured below) voted the best player of the championship (Golden Ball) and Davor Suker (Croatia) the top goal scorer (six goals, Golden Shoe).
Unfulfilled hopes

After 17 days and 48 matches, the wheat had been separated from the chaff. The new modus with 32 teams separated into eight groups made the cut-off very clear—only the first two teams in each group went through. All the calculations and speculations of the old system, when there were 24 teams divided into six groups, and the four best third-placed teams qualifying along with the top two, were made redundant.

For group A, Alfred Hitchcock himself could not have written a better script for the last round of matches. Morocco were leading Scotland 3-0 fifteen minutes before the end, and with the Scots already having lost twice and with little left to play for there seemed to be no obstacle in the way of the Africans’ qualifying for the last sixteen, for the second time since 1986. Their hopes were based on Brazil’s 1:0 lead over Norway at the same moment in Marseille. When the whistle blew the Moroccans all embraced each other with smiles of joy, but these quickly turned to tears of sorrow when their coach, the Frenchman Henri Michel, had to tell them that Norway had managed to turn the game and had won 2:1, snatching qualification away from the Africans at the last second. Brazil themselves remained unchallenged at the top of the group despite the defeat, and Scotland were at the bottom, having failed to get further than the group games even at the eighth time of trying.

Italy’s passage into the next round was more of a problem than the bare results would suggest. Only against Cameroon, who played much of the match with 10 men, did they put on a convincing performance, winning this encounter 3:0. Otherwise they had to work hard for their points.

Against Chile (2:2) it needed a Roberto Baggio penalty late in the second half to get them back on equal terms, and against Austria the 1994 finalists looked uncertain. Austria had the chance here to do more than go down to an honourable defeat, but when they did score (Herzog via a penalty very late in the game) there was not enough time left for them to do any more and it remained 1:2 until the whistle. This opened the door for Chile, taking part in a World Cup final round for the first time since 1982.

A 1:1 against Cameroon was sufficient to see them undefeated (three draws) on their way into the last 16. Cameroon themselves had failed to take advantage of their superiority over Austria and put the game beyond doubt, allowing the Europeans to equalize seconds before the end.

France came through the group games with maximum points (only Argentina matched them in this respect) and a goal line of 9:1. This was a lot of surprise, since the French had to compensate for the handicap of a lot of injuries, especially in attack. But early on it was clear that the real battle in this group would only be for second place, top spot being taken. Even Denmark, who finally finished second, had to wait until the last game to be mathematically certain of qualifying. South Africa still had a theoretical chance at that stage of staying in the competition, but things would have had to go very much their way. As it happened they did not, and a draw in a disappointing last match against Saudi Arabia (three of the four goals here coming from penalties) saw the team on an early flight back to Africa.
The failure of Spain to come through in Group D was one of the bigger surprises of the tournament. While there was no argument about this being a strong group, with Nigeria, Paraguay and Bulgaria making up the four, the European team were reckoned strong enough to earn one of the two top places. However, individual mistakes in the opening match against Nigeria saw them give away the lead on two occasions, and finally they went down—a defeat that few would have predicted. Then a draw against Paraguay and a runaway victory over Bulgaria gave them four points, but this was not enough to make up for that poor start, because Paraguay overcame the already-qualified Nigeria with a 3:1 win in their last game. Bulgaria were the real disappointment here and bore no resemblance to the semifinalists of 1994. With only one point to their credit (from a 0:0 against Paraguay), and also only one goal on the positive side of the scoresheet they went out with hardly a murmur. Nigeria's two opening wins meant that their place among the last 16 was secured early on, but against Spain in particular their success was a long time coming, and after failing to look convincing for much of the game the 3:2 win has to be described as a bit lucky. In the next two matches they seemed content to do what was necessary and little more.

Three teams in Group E ended up undefeated, and so there were a number of possible permutations before the final matches started. A draw would have been enough for Mexico and Holland, as long as Belgium did not beat the already-eliminated Koreans by a margin of more than three goals. With Mexico two down at half time and Belgium one up, things were still wide open, but just as they had done in earlier games, the Mexicans pulled level. So did the hardworking Koreans, celebrating their goal in a manner that would have b efitted winning the World Cup itself, and so in the end the teams that had been most favoured before this final round of games were actually the one who went on.

While Germany and Yugoslavia were seen as the clear favourites in Group F, and indeed took the top two places, the gap between them and Iran and the USA at the bottom was not as wide as the table might suggest, and Iran's chances of qualifying were intact until the very last game. Their match against the USA showed that sport and politics can be separated. Played on the very day designated as FIFA Fair Play Day (21 June 1998) this was an engaging duel, with the Iranians' intelligent countering tactics earning them victory. Germany won the group ahead of Yugoslavia on the ground of their superior goal difference, and so they avoided an early meeting with Holland in the next round.

The course of Group G ran much according to prediction, with Romania and England proving too strong for the outsiders from Colombia and Tunisia. The South Americans seem to have reached a plateau in their development and nearly every move went through midfielder Valderama, who will soon be 37. Thus there was little in their play in the way of a surprise element, and their actions were all too stereotyped. Tunisia managed to emerge with some honour by earning a draw against Romania, but at this stage the Romanians were already certain of winning the group. England made a sound impression in all three games, losing only to the East Europeans by the narrow margin of 1:2. This defeat cost them the number one place in the group and set them up for a confrontation with Argentina in the next round.

And this would be against an Argentina that had comfortably won all three matches, like the French. They beat the other three teams in the group, Croatia, Jamaica and Japan—all World Cup debutantes—without conceding a single goal. But there was only one team in it for second place too. Croatia were clearly too strong for the twoJs, and there was never a chance that either of these would cause an upset. Finally the Reggae Boys beat the Asians, with Japan not being effective enough in front of goal to turn their superiority over the rest of the pitch into tangible rewards.

The following is an analysis of the 16 teams that did not make it into the second round, dealing with each confederation in turn.
Africa

Africa wanted to prove that the successes they have achieved in FIFA competitions for the younger age groups are beginning to have an effect at the highest international level. Hopes were high, but reality showed that the African teams, many of them with a number of players under contract to European clubs, still lag behind the established names of world football in terms of tactical maturity and team compactness. For some of them qualification for the second round at least seemed a strong possibility. The following analysis will try to explain why they did not do quite as well as expected, although some of them only just failed to achieve their ambition.

Morocco

Final ranking: 18th place
Coach: Henri Michel, France

This was the fourth time that Morocco had qualified for a World Cup, following 1970, 1986 and 1994. Only once had they managed to get as far as the second round, that was in Mexico in 1986. To repeat this achievement was the aim of their French coach Henri Michel, who had been in charge of a four-team tournament with France, Belgium and England also taking part, the third was in France. Out of the final 22 selected, 16 were players who earn their wages abroad, and of the home-based players only one, the goalkeeper, was in the regular starting line-up.

Morocco used a classic 4-4-2 system. The defensive block played in line, applied zone-marking tactics, but did not make use of the offside trap. The first-choice back four were El Hadriou (left) and Saber on the flanks, Rossi and the defensive leader Naybet in the middle. Rossi and El Hadriou were replaced by Triki and Abrami for the last group game. The most effective attacking help was provided by Saber who penetrated down the right wing. In midfield, El Khalej played just in front of the defence, Chiba on the right (he was more offensive, but following two bookings he missed the last game and was replaced by Amzine) and Chippo on the left, the latter taking on more defensive duties. The fourth midfielder, Hadji was not expected to do any defending, his task being to operate just behind the two strikers Bassir and Hadda. Between them, these three scored all five of the team's goals.

The Moroccan team had been excellently drilled by Michel in terms of tactics, and they played to his plan both in defence and in attack. But Michel also wanted them to play attractive football and he succeeded in this aim too. The way the team delivered surprising long through passes up to the speedy forwards was both effective and interesting to watch. Almost all the goals were created in this manner. The skills the players displayed (dribbling, passing, heading, shooting) were of the highest quality in many cases — little wonder that most of them have been snapped up by clubs abroad. The most outstanding of them all were El Khalej with his accurate and well-timed passes, the spectacular Hadji with his wonderful dribbling, and the two strikers Bassir (often lying deep and then surging forward) and Hadda (a classical and untiring goalmouth worker).

They were an attractive team, disciplined, aggressive but in a controlled fashion, and always thinking about attack. Defence, midfield and the forward line combined well together. They had outstanding individual players but these put their talents at the disposal of the team. Among the weak points were the goalkeeper's lack of dominance in the area (although he was good on the line) and some inadequate defensive covering at times.

A qualification for the second round would have been a just reward for their efforts, and only a few minutes separated them from this success. As it is they can hold their heads high and look back on France 98 with pride.
South Africa

Final ranking: 24th place
Coach: Philippe Troussier (France)

South Africa's emergence has been rapid - African champions in 1996 and qualification for the World Cup two years later. They had an intermediate opportunity to test their current form at the African Nations' Cup (CAN) in Burkina Faso in January, and their hopes were given a boost when they reached the final again (but lost it this time - to Egypt, who would not be going to France).

At that stage they were coached by Jomo Sono, a native South African, since their choice as trainer for the World Cup, Philippe Troussier, was not available until March 1998. He had previously been in charge of the Nigerian national team and then looked after Burkina Faso at the CAN.

Troussier arranged training camps in South Africa, Switzerland, Germany and finally France, so that he could look over the players available and re-organize the squad as necessary. In the end he chose 15 of the players who had been involved in Burkina Faso.

When the group draw was made it aroused mixed feelings in South Africa. France were certainly favourites and would be hard to beat. Denmark would not be easy but a result was possible, while Saudi Arabia would have to be overcome. What looked like the key match against the Danes ended in a draw, and the one point earned here would have been very valuable had they not lost 0-3 to France and then failed to achieve anything more than a 2-2 in the final match against Saudi Arabia. Two points from three games was never going to be enough to take a team into the second round.

The 3-5-2 system the South Africans played consisted of a libero covering at the back, two stoppers and two wide players who would operate in defence or midfield as the situation demanded. Two of the central midfielders were responsible for creating attacks and the third played right in behind the two strikers, who repeatedly created spaces for attacks to come through from behind.

South Africa did not look as if they were quite ready for the match against France. The defenders did not seem to be well enough tuned to each other's play, and for long periods there would be little happening in attack so that the home team completely dominated the game. Individual mistakes in defence led to a clear defeat, the three goals conceded here signifying already that it would be difficult to qualify for the second round.

Against Denmark there was no cohesion within the team, Troussier having made several changes which seemed to have a positive effect. But it was a lack of cool heads in attack this time which meant that a 1-1 was all they got from the game. Theoretically the situation before the last match against Saudi Arabia was that they were still in with a minimal chance, but they did not seem to believe it. Despite taking the lead they never settled down and finally they had to consider themselves lucky that a penalty in stoppage time earned them at least a second draw.

The positive performances in the team were provided by Benedict McCarthy, who had been with the youth team a year earlier in Malaysia, a very mobile striker with good technical skills, Mark Fish, a central defender strong in the tackle and in the air, as well as providing forward drive, and Nyathi as left wing back with his healthy aggressive attitude and his desire to get involved.

Despite their continental successes, South Africa still have some catching up to do at international level. This was clear in the games against established and well-organized sides like France and Denmark. But as they take part in more intercontinental competitions, the gap between them and the world's best should soon start to close.

At the age of 21, Benedict McCarthy (here challenging Zubromawi from Saudi Arabia) is already regarded as a superstar in South African football and has already created a niche for himself in the elite Dutch team, Ajax Amsterdam, since joining the club in 1997.
Cameroon

Final ranking: 25th place
Coach: Claude Le Roy (France)

From left, back row: Song, Kalla Kongo, Wome, Angibeaud, Songo'o, Omam Biyik; front row: Simo, Mboma, Njanka, Ipoua, Ndo

Cameroon’s aim was to wipe out memories of their poor showing at USA 94. To make this possible they appointed Claude Le Roy as their coach after the African Nations’ Cup had finished. The Frenchman is something of a hero in Cameroon, having steered them to their last major success, the title of African champions in 1988.

His plan for their preparations saw them travelling to France, Italy, Luxembourg and Denmark starting in the middle of May, with several matches being played against club and national teams in the course of their tour. Some new players were introduced who had not taken part in the African Nations’ Cup in January, but they were unfortunate in losing Marc Vivien Foe, one of the team’s stalwarts, due to injury. The young team could have used him. The adaptations that Le Roy wanted to make had to be carried out in a very short, in fact too short, time.

With the youngest team of all (average age only 24 years and one month), Cameroon played attractive attacking football, and apart from the match against Italy which went totally off course, they gave promising performances. Both Austria and Chile were dominated for periods of the game, and only a poor utilisation of chances prevented them from achieving anything better than a 1:1 in either of these matches. Particularly against the European side, a bit more experience in looking after a lead would have seen them through (Austria equalized in stoppage time). But experience was the one thing that these youngsters obviously lacked.

Le Roy lined his players up in a 3-5-2 system, with Kalla Kongo as libero (after his expulsion against Italy, Njanka took over the role). The two man-markers were Njanka (later Pensee) and Song, both technically skilled, strong headers and uncompromising in their tackles. They had support in defence from Ndo (right) and Wome on the flanks, as well as from Angibeaud as the most defensive of all the midfielders. Olembe and Mboma were the attacking midfielders, backing up the strikers Job (or Ipoua) and Omam Biyik, one of the few names that has been around for while.

Another of the experienced players was goalkeeper Songo'o, who was actually taking part in his third World Cup. He has all the attributes of a first class keeper, and his steadiness and calm manner helped to stabilize the team. Other key figures were Omam Biyik, strong in the air and a talented dribbler, his partner up front, Job (quick and unpredictable), and the attacking midfielder Mboma (creative, and also a good header and dribbler).

Cameroon had faith until the very end that they could make it into the second round. But their failure to get there was not really due to the result of the last match against Chile, it had been practically assured when they lost two valuable points in the last minute of that game against Austria. A brief lack of concentration cost them their chance.

At the ripe old age of 28, midfielder Patrick Mboma (here tackling Reyes from Chile) was one of the most experienced players in the championship’s youngest team, Cameroon (average age 24 years, 1 month).
Tunisia

Final ranking: 26th place
Coach: Henry Kasperekzak (France/Poland)

It was exactly twenty years between Tunisia’s first and second appearances at the World Cup. In 1978 they had created a bit of a surprise by beating Mexico 3:1 and drawing with Germany 0:0. They had been beaten in that tournament by Poland, and as fate would have it their coach this time had been a member of that Polish team, Henry Kasperekzak. He has been in charge of the Tunisian national side since 1994.

With the team having secured the qualification for France very early (June 1997), Kasperekzak had plenty of time to get them ready for the big event. One of the steps along the way would be the African Nations’ Cup. Closer to the opening of the World Cup they had two training camps, one from 14 to 21 May in Castelfranco (Italy) and the other from 22 May to 4 June in Albertville (France). They only travelled to their tournament headquarters on 9 June.

In view of the strength of their group opponents, their performances can be viewed as quite satisfactory. Neither against England (0:0),

Within their difficult group they showed what they had been allowed to show. Before the tournament began only four of their players were engaged abroad (and of these three play in lower leagues). If one compares that statistic with those of other teams (not just the Europeans and South Americans) then their lack of experience comes as no surprise. What was a surprise was the releasing of Kasperekzak from his contract after the second defeat. He probably would have gone after the World Cup anyway (he has in fact signed for the French first division team Bastia), but this kind of action on the part of the Tunisian association raises questions about their idea of respect and fairness.

Mehdi Ben Slimane (18) slips through the Romanians, Dumitrescu (17) and Galca (5). Under contract with FC Freiburg in Germany, he was one of four players in the Tunisian squad who were playing for European clubs before the World Cup.
The pleas and cries from goalkeeper Songo'o (Cameroon) were not always heard by his defenders (five goals conceded in three matches).

Two goals in three matches: a good result for the Moroccan striker, Hadda (here he is seen winding his way around the Norwegians, Johnsen (3) and Eggen).
Njanka from Cameroon (6, here confronting Polster from Austria) landed one of the most stunning goals of the tournament (for 1-0 against Austria), finishing off a solo streak down one half of the pitch with a perfect shot straight into the net.

In their first group game South Africa were running round in circles against the hosts, France. Their strikers (Fortune pictured below, left) were more often seen in their own penalty area than in the opponents'.

Tunisia struggled most of all in the game against England. Their true grit (here captain Sami Trabelsi confronting Scholes) was not enough to topple the English wall.
In the year 2002 the FIFA World Cup will be held in Japan and Korea. Both these countries had qualified for France 98 and naturally wanted to put on a good show as early advertising for the big event coming up back home. But once again not only they, but all four Asian teams, went out after the group games. And while patience is supposed to be an Asian virtue, there were signs that it was lacking before and during this competition. If success did not come quickly then action had to be taken, in the fashion that is becoming too much of a habit in football – by sacking the coach. Of the four Asian teams in France, two (Saudi Arabia and Korea) applied this measure during the World Cup, while Iran had used up several during their qualification and Japan had brought in a new man after their qualification had been achieved. This is a trend that needs careful consideration and which rather flies in the face of any idea of continuous development.

It was also still apparent that the Asian teams lacked international experience. One reason for this is that in most countries there is no strong league system exists, and another is that not many Asian players are engaged in European, south or central American clubs. There are also few trainers from these parts of the world engaged in Asia, the exception being in the J-League in Japan. Thus there is not much prospect for knowing how to be passed on where it is very much needed. In addition, Asian players are schooled to follow the coach’s instructions exactly and are thus not used to taking on any responsibility themselves. But if the coach has insufficient experience then a danger is inherent in this system.

**Iran**

*Final ranking: 20th place*

*Coach: Jalal Taleb*

From left, back row: Mohammadkhani, Nakisa, Daei, Estili, Minavand, Zarincheh; front row: Bagheri, Pashazadeh, Mahdavi Kia, Khakpour, Azizi

In terms of results, Iran managed to salvage some honour for Asian football. They came out on top in the prestige duel with the USA with a 2:1 win, which gave them three points and put them in 20th place overall, the best ranking of all four Asian representatives.

Before they arrived in France, the Iranian players had come through some troubled times. After their qualification they continued to work at first under their Brazilian coach Valdir Vieira, but he was soon replaced as national trainer by the Croatian Tomislav Ivic. He in turn lasted but a few weeks, until some disappointing results in friendly matches saw him out the door and another new man in; this time the Iranian Jalal Taleb. He remained in charge throughout the tournament. Thus a steady preparation was hardly a possibility for this group of players.

After Taleb was appointed, the team went through their pre-tournament training, at first in Iran and then in Italy and France. Under the new coach they played two friendly matches against Inter Milan and Croatia, before moving on to France on 7 June.

Their three group games went pretty much as might have been predicted. They lost 0:1 to Yugoslavia, but only to a free kick goal, they beat the USA as mentioned above, 2:1, and against Germany they went down, although it looked for a long time as if they might pull off a surprise. But in the second half, the eventual group winners upped the tempo and ran out 2:0 winners.

Depending on the opponent they played with or without a libero. Against the stronger teams, Yugoslavia and Germany, they preferred to have a player (Khakpour) covering at the back. Against the USA however the defence played in a line, but did not use the offside trap. The two central midfielders worked together with the two centre backs to form a solid defensive block. The wing backs however helped a lot in attack and created a number of scoring opportunities, particularly down the right wing. In attack they had the two ‘overseas’ players, Ali Daei and Azizi.

The Iranian strategy was only to disturb an opponent’s attack well inside their own half, but as soon as they got the ball they would be away, with two or three
passes creating a counter-attack. Both goals against the USA were accomplished in this way.

The strengths of the team lay in their technical skills (above all Mahdavi Kia and Azizi), their quick and efficient countering, the uncompromising tackling in defence and their staunch team spirit. As individuals, those who earn a mention were: goalkeeper Abedzadeh (absent through injury from the first match against Yugoslavia), central defender/libero Khakpour (quick and with good positional play), the right side midfielder Mahdavi Kia (good shot, scorer of a fine goal against the USA) and Bagheri (the playmaker and free kick specialist) as well as the two strikers Ali Daei (strong header) and Azizi (fine dribbler).

What they lacked was creativity in attack whenever they were unable to play their counter-attacking style, and their change-over from defence to attack was sometimes too slow. They also lacked decisiveness in their defensive organisation when they were under heavy pressure. At such moments some of the defenders would tend to panic, and this led to desperate efforts or to their conceding free kicks (especially in the match against Germany).

Iran showed that they merited a place among the 32 best teams in the world. Despite the difficult conditions preceding the tournament, the team demonstrated that it had character, and they were also mentally strong as a unit. With a number of players being transferred to Europe they should be able to make even more progress in the next few years.

Iran lasted out well against Germany for one half time but the outsiders then gave way to the Europeans' physical superiority: Zarincheh (17) seen here in a clinch with the kicker of Germany's second goal, Klinsmann.
Saudi Arabia

Final ranking: 38th place
Coach: Carlos Alberto Pareira (Brazil)

Saudi Arabia seemed to believe that after having engaged the World Cup-winning Brazilian coach of 1994, Carlos Alberto Pareira, as their national trainer, they would have little to do themselves except sit back and enjoy the repeat of their own success in the USA, on which occasion two wins in the group games had taken them into the second round. But when it became clear that this was not going to happen in France, the association's leaders put all the blame on the Brazilian and dismissed him while the tournament was still going on. This way of trying to force success is hardly likely to have the desired effect.

The Asian Cup winners of 1996 brought eleven of their 1994 squad with them to France. A significant intermediate test was the Confederations' Cup which they hosted in December 1997. Here they were clearly beaten by Brazil and Mexico but they did manage a win over Australia, who ended up rather surprisingly in the final. Further preparation for France took place at first in Saudi Arabia and then in Europe. They took up residence in their tournament headquarters near Paris very early, on 28 May.

Their three games produced results that were in line with realistic expectations. Against Denmark they had a chance to achieve a draw, but weak finishing cost them that opportunity. Against France they seemed to be struggling unhappily uphill from the very beginning. After just a quarter of an hour Al Khilawi was justifiably sent off. Thanks to keeper Al Daeyea they kept a clean sheet for a while, but then the French ran away with the match. They rehabilitated themselves to some extent against South Africa, with two penalties earning them a share of the points.

Saudi Arabia were able to keep up with some of their opponents as long as their strength lasted. The defence was well organised, compact and uncompromising in the tackle. Their preferred tactic of counter-attacking was efficient, and they had the necessary speed in their forward line to create several chances with this kind of move. The technical skills of some of the players must also be listed among the positive features of the side.

On the other hand, a lack of physical fitness and speed, insufficient harmony between the blocks (especially between midfield and attack) and some over-the-limit tackling are faults that will have to be corrected. In addition, they lacked international experience and this will be impossible to compensate for as long as Saudi Arabian players are not allowed to play abroad.

Khamis Dossari (16) grappling with Brian Laudrup from Denmark. Scoring only two goals in three matches (both converted penalties) was not enough for Saudi Arabia to spring a surprise similar to the one they had pulled off four years previously in the USA.
A well-poised aerial combat between the American, Stewart, and the Iranian, Mahdavi Kha; in the end the Arabs managed to squeeze a 2-1 win over the USA with cunning counterattacks.

Khodadad Azizi from Iran (here harassing the Yugoslav, Stojkovic) was one of three Iranian sharpshooters who had already been playing for the German league before the World Cup.
Korea Republic

Final ranking: 30th place
Coach: Cha Bum-Kun

Since 1990, the Koreans have been in regular attendance at World Cup final rounds. They managed their 1998 qualification very convincingly, dominating the Asia group to the extent that they lost only one game, and that was to Japan after their own place in France had already been secured.

As co-organisers of the World Cup 2002 they wanted to do well this time as a bit of early advertising for their success of their own competition. For this reason, their preparation was very carefully planned. No fewer than six training camps were arranged for the players, on different continents, and a total of 18 trial matches were played before they arrived in France. But in contrast to their top of the list position in Asia, they have never yet managed to win a game at a World Cup. This remained true for 1998, even though the association's officials had hopes of a possible surprise here or there. In their first game, the sending-off of the very player who had just scored their opening goal (Ha Seok Ju) weakened the team so much that at the end they went down 1:3. Holland next proved to be simply out of their class and raced away to a 5:0 win. In the last match, Belgium had to win in order to reach the second round and the start of the game reflected their determination to do so, with Korea hardly ever getting out of their own half. The expected goal came too, but the unbreakable spirit of the Asians was rewarded in the second half when their captain Yoo Sang Chul got the equalizer with a spectacular volley and the score remained at 1:1 until the end. The point the Koreans earned was celebrated as if they had won the trophy.

The strengths of the team lay in the good physical condition of every player, their strict adherence to the coach's instructions, the shooting ability of some of the forwards, and their quick and effective counter attacks. On the negative side must be listed the lack of compactness within the different blocks, the inability to change pace, their lack of creativity in attack (on the occasions when they could not use their countering tactics), and their tendency to fall back too far to be able to take action themselves. Plus the lack of international experience that is the usual part of the downfall of Asian teams (not one of the 22 players is engaged outside Asia). And although the coach himself had played in Germany (Bundesliga) and undergone the training for his coaching diploma there, that was not a substitute for first-hand experience among the players. Korea was another association that blamed the coach for their lack of success and Cha Bum Kun was dismissed in the course of the competition.
Japan

Final ranking: 31st place
Coach: Takeshi Okada

From left, back row: Nakayama, Nakanishi, Jo, Soma, Kawaguchi; front row: Narumi, Narahashi, Yamaguchi, Nakata, Akita, Ihara

For the first time in their history, Japan qualified for the final round of the World Cup, and this was fortunate for the association since it would have been hard for them to accept that their co-organisers for 2002, Korea, were taking part while their own team were not.

Their place among the top 32 was secured when they beat Iran in a play-off match in Malaysia. Thanks to their superior physical condition, they came out just ahead at 3:2.

They too took great pains to organize their preparation down to the last detail. Two training camps were arranged in the month preceding the tournament, one at home and one in Switzerland. The announcement of the final squad was postponed until the last minute. The name of star striker Miura was not on the list and this caused some heated discussions up and down the country.

The group Japan were drawn in contained two other World Cup debutantes in Croatia and Jamaica, as well as one of the hot favourites, Argentina. They ended up losing all three games, but only by a margin of one goal in each case. They were never outclassed by an opponent and Argentina and Croatia had to work hard for their points. Against Jamaica in the last match, the Japanese had more of the play, but their poor utilization of chances brought them nothing better than a 1:2 defeat.

Their defensive set-up was a three-man block playing practically in line, with libero Ihara sometimes lying a little deep. Two wing midfielders helped out in defence but they were more concerned with their attacking roles. There were three other midfielders in the centre, one of whom played as libero in front of the defence, the other two lending weight to attacks.

Their outstanding player was Nakata who was active just behind the two strikers. He was the pivotal point of the team, especially in attack. Of the entire Japanese team he was the only one who could truly be described as creative. As a team, what impressed were their fitness and their all round technical skills. Their mental attitude was right too, geared towards attack, which they did with good play down the wings or via coordinated positional changes in midfield.

Too much haste in finishing was what stopped them from making better use of their chances. In addition they were incapable of changing the pace of their game, always going at the same high speed. They had a tendency to find a complicated way of doing things instead of a simple one, which often led to loss of possession (sometimes at decisive moments).

But their enthusiastic style of play was a bonus for the tournament. They were a well-prepared team with a great deal of potential, and if they continue to follow their chosen path they could make a lot of progress before they play as hosts in 2002.

Japan held their ground well against every opponent but failed to finish off their golden opportunities. Here, Shoji Jo is trying to break through the Croatian defence.
In the last group match versus Belgium, the Koreans landed an admirable score of 1-1: Choi Yong Soo (10) jousting with Deflandre.

The Japanese goalkeeper, Yoshikatsu Kawaguchi, positions his wall for an imminent free kick. He first aroused world attention at the Olympic Football Tournament in Atlanta in 1996.
In spite of dominating most of the play and the pitch, Japan lost their third game in a row, this time to Jamaica: Narahashi (9) winning a spar with Simpson.

One of the most talented stars in Japanese football: soon after the World Cup, Hidetoshi Nakata (below, left) switched to Perugia in the Italian first division.

Noh Jung Yoon (8) injured himself in the first group match against Mexico so badly that he was out of the game for the rest of the championship.
North, Central America and Caribbean

In addition to Mexico, whose performance has been analysed in detail in another section, the Concacaf representatives at this World Cup were the USA and Jamaica, the latter having made it for the first time. Wherever the Caribbean team appeared there was colour, music and a festival atmosphere. The USA had a highly competitive and technically skilful team, but they had tough group opposition in the form of Germany and Yugoslavia. In the end the Americans were not very successful, while the Jamaicans showed that they have more to offer than just reggae music.

Jamaica

Final ranking: 22nd place
Coach: René Simoes (Brazil)

From left, back row: Goodison, Whitmore, Lowe, Earle, Cargill, Barrett, staff member; front row: staff member, Gardner, Hall, Sinclair, Burton, Simpson

Until now fans of the Reggae-Boys had had to be content with minor success (winning the Shell Caribbean Cup in 1991 was their major accomplishment). But qualifying for the World Cup understandably released an unprecedented wave of support and enthusiasm for the island's football team. At last they were able to show that Jamaicans can be successful in sports other than cricket and athletic.

With the appointment of the Brazilian René Simoes as national coach in 1994, a more professional atmosphere came into Jamaican football. The aim they set for themselves was a place at France 98, and they achieved that after a total of 20 qualifying matches, when a goalless draw against Mexico at home in Kingston saw them through. As might be expected from a Brazilian trainer, he took the team to his homeland and prepared them there for the big adventure. They played no fewer than 17 international matches against club and national teams between January 1998 and the start of the World Cup.

Jamaica's pattern of play was a simple one. Out of a massed defence they would launch counter-attacking raids, either by playing passes through the middle or long balls down to the two strikers. At the back they had a three-man block with Sinclair, Lowe and Goodison, from left to right. They were supported by Dawes in central midfield, Gardner (left) and Malcolm (or Earle), while Simpson and Whitmore (scorer of both goals against Japan) were responsible for organizing attacks. Hall and Burton (or Gayle) were the two forwards.

On the international scene Burton is the best-known Jamaican player, under contract with Derby County in England. But he did not fully live up to his reputation. It was rather Whitmore who is still home-based and Simpson (Portsmouth, England) who caught the eye with their good distribution of the ball in midfield and their ability to go for goal themselves. But despite the many warm-up games, it was clear that as a team they still lacked international experience. They showed this in several ways, for example by taking unnecessary risks in defence, thus giving away dangerous free kicks and by being too open in their defensive formation in midfield (leaving space for an opponent to manoeuvre). In addition they were stretched beyond their physical limits. The pace of warm-up matches is not the same as that of World Cup battles.

But despite this criticism they were more than just a decoration for the tournament. Their delight in playing football and the open enthusiasm of their fans added an extra element, and in addition they achieved some success on the pitch too.

Jamaica's defence was particularly vulnerable against Argentina: Goodison (5) trying to escape the clutches of the South American striker, Lopes.
USA

Final ranking: 32nd place
Coach: Steve Sampson

From left, back row: Keller, Pope, Regis, Reyna, Burns, Stewart; front row: Dooley, Wynalda, Deering, Jones, Maisonneuve

A major test in the USA team's build-up to France 98 was taking part in the Gold Cup, a chance to do well and thus boost confidence for the task ahead. They passed the test with flying colours, defeating Brazil in the semifinal and only losing 0-1 to Mexico in the final.

After this confirmation that they were on the right track, they played a number of warm-up matches, at least one every month. They sought out opponents from Europe and the Arab world, since this would be the type of opposition they would face within their group, with Germany, Yugoslavia and Iran draw against them. Between 11 and 30 May they attended training camps in San Diego, San José, Portland and Washington before arriving in France on 5 June.

Despite the tough draw, the usual American optimism was voiced in seeing themselves qualify for a place in the second round. It was thus all the more surprising that in the first half against Germany they seemed to lack self-confidence, had very little of the play, and when they got the ball they let themselves be robbed without much of a fight. The second half was better and they had chances to equalize, but the impression remained that this was a team not playing up to its full potential.

A major problem within the side came to light in the match against Iran, when despite territorial superiority and some excellent chances they managed to score only one goal and that was just before the end. This was too late to raise any hopes of a place among the last 16, and in the final match against Yugoslavia they showed the same inability to use their chances, losing again although they were by no means outplayed.

Their game plan was to use a 3-5-2 system with Regis and Pope as man-markers, and Dooley as libero in line with the other two defenders. Dooley was the tactical leader, organized the defence well and directed the positional play of his team mates. He was also involved in the start of most attacks and went forward often himself, particularly for set pieces. Of the five midfielders, Reyna was operating from a central position and distributing the ball to his team mates. The two flank players, Hejduk (right) and Jones, were geared towards attack and delivered countless crosses between them. With their speed they were able to get behind the defence time and again. The other two midfielders were Moore, who worked totally for the good of the team, and Ramos, who was more of a soloist (replaced on occasion by Maisonneuve). The two forwards, selected from McBride, Stewart, Wegerle and Wynalda, received too few direct passes, even though their variation was practised frequently in training. Many attacks went down the wings (there were some 80 crosses played in the three matches), but not many of them were accurate enough to be productive.

The strengths of the team were their positive attacking attitude, their efficient covering, good physical condition all round and the fine skills of some of the players (dribbling and short passing). On the negative must be listed their poor use of chances and the imbalance in the level of quality between the different blocks.

The bare figures do not truly reflect on the Americans' performance, they deserved better than to go home with three defeats on their record and only one goal to their credit. Against Germany and Yugoslavia they will have gained valuable experience, which should help them do better in the future.

Full back Frankie Hejduk (2) was a source of constant pressure with his sprints down the right wing. He is pictured here pulling a fast one on Mahdavi Kia from Iran.
A hive of activity in the American penalty box: goalkeeper Brad Friedel clears a potentially explosive threat from midfielder Jokanovic.

Jamaica's midfielder, Ricardo Gardner, finds a gap between the two Japanese, Narahashi (2) and Soma (3).
South America

Of the five South American teams in France only Colombia failed to live up to expectation. In addition to Brazil and Argentina, both Chile and Paraguay earned a place in the second round. Why Colombia failed to join them, despite the potential in their ranks, is a question we will try to answer in the following analysis.

Colombia

Final ranking: 91st place
Coach: Hernán Dario Gomez

The delegation arrived in France on 4 June. Although coach Hernán Dario Gomez was expressing satisfaction about the way the warm-up games had gone, there seemed to be tension within the delegation. Asprilla, who was substituted off shortly before the end of the first match against Romania, was public with his criticism of the coach and he was punished by being excluded from further participation.

The Colombians' play was by no means up to expectations. As always they had some exceptional players in the team but they never blended into a harmonious unit. The internal quarrelling left its mark on the players - they were easy to provoke and some of their actions showed that they were close to losing control.

They stuck with their usual 4-4-2 or 4-4-1-1 formation. The defensive block used man-marking and were one of the few to set up an off-side trap, though admittedly not often. Two central midfielders supported the defence, with the two wide midfielders being more engaged in attacking moves. Right at the front they would use two strikers, or sometimes just one, with the other in a deeper, supporting role.

The centre of their defence was strong, with two stoppers and a defensive midfielder, all equally capable individuals and at least at the start of the tournament looking as if they wanted to win. But not much of this attitude remained visible for the last match against England, even though a result would have given them a chance to make further progress. The weaknesses of the team were in the inadequate physical condition of some of the players and their overdependence on the performance of the key figures (e.g. Valderrama, Rincon, etc.).

After 1994, this was another disappointment for Colombia. The talent within the team was only seen in flashes and against opponents of the quality of Romania and England that is simply not enough. The association needs to take a close look, not only at the performance of the team but also at the whole atmosphere within the delegation, in order to draw the right conclusions for improvement in the future.
Europe

With 15 teams taking part the European contingent was by far the largest. But their dominance was not only in terms of quantity—they also proved to have the best quality. Ten of the 15 qualified for the second round, six for the quarterfinals, and they ended up taking three of the top four places.

But not all the reports about the European performances were positive; why this was the case will be seen in the following analysis, where we look at the five teams that finished in the lower half of the list, in positions between 17 and 32.

Spain

Final ranking: 17th place
Coach: Javier Clemente

From left, back row: Nadal, Zubizarreta, Morientes, Hierro, Luis Enrique, Alkorta; front row: Aguilera, Sergio, Alfonso, Amor, Echeverría

History does repeat itself. Never has Spain’s performance as a country matched the achievements of their top club sides. A reason for this may well be that in the club teams key positions are taken by foreign players, but this is not an argument that will prevent a Spanish fan from hoping that this time his country is going to hit the heights.

Spain came through their qualifying group unbeaten. Strong teams like Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic or Slovakia proved no hindrance to their progress—another reason why some experts had Spain on their list of potential World Cup winners.

And while the outcome of the tournament is well known, the figures alone do not reflect the performances this team gave—they deserved to stay around longer than for just the three group games they played. The basic system was 4-2-3-1, and in the first half against Paraguay Clemente’s line-up was even more defensive, since he saw that a second defeat here would put paid to all their hopes after just two matches (they had already lost the opening game to Nigeria, despite having twice been in front; some unforgivable individual errors saw victory snatched from their grasp). The defence used zone-marking and played in line, but never used the offside trap. The dominating figure in their play was midfielder Hierro, who was supported alternately by Amor or Nadal. Spain mostly played a quick short-passing game and made good use of space, particularly down the wings. Both wing backs, Amor (right) and Sergio, were adept at spotting moments when there was a free passage down the flank and they were effective in supporting attacks.

The weaknesses of the team are hard to pinpoint, being different from one game to the next. It was noticeable that Clemente made a number of changes in his starting formation, as if he was not satisfied with either his players’ individual performances or their collective play. Their attacks were often too transparent and lacked the element of surprise. Overall there were not

enough ideas; even set pieces were often easy for the opponent to read and neutralise.

Spain rehabilitated themselves with a splendid 6:1 win over Bulgaria, but with Nigeria surprisingly losing to Paraguay at the same time it was all in vain and failed to bring much joy to the team’s fans. From a purely footballing point of view this was one of the best matches of the tournament, and Spain showed qualities that certainly should have earned them a place among the top 16 teams at this World Cup.
Belgium

Final ranking: 19th place
Coach: Georges Leekens

Since 1982 Belgium have had a season ticket to all FIFA World Cup final rounds and have always managed at least to qualify for the second round. Their greatest success dates back to 1986 when the «Red Devils» ended up in 4th place after losing to France in the play-off for bronze.

Georges Leekens took over the national team in January 1997 and brought them successfully through the qualifying round. They held four training camps in preparation for France, only one of them outside Belgium and that was in Morocco.

But this time they failed to reach the second round, despite being unbeaten in all three group games. Holland and Mexico finished up with better records and went through. One of the basic reasons for their early elimination was a lack of effectiveness in attack, where Oliveira failed to provide the expected impulses and Niils played too deep. Their defence was solid, with either De Wilde or Vandevalle in goal, giving the team security in that department. The back four were a well-harmonised block, and the only trouble they had was in the second half against Mexico when the central Americans were trying to catch up from a 0-2 deficit, at which time the Belgians had lost their numerical superiority following the sending-off of Verheyen. Still there at 37, Van der Elst was a key figure in the match against Holland, thanks to his experience and his knowledge of the opponent. His tactical guidance of his team mates meant that the «Oranges» hardly ever created a dangerous attack. Enzo Scifo, another veteran, was the most effective player in midfield, which makes it all the more surprising that he was not used in the opening game and taken off in the third – the decider – at a point when Belgium were leading 1-0 (a scoreline that would have seen them into the last 16). He was the only one at that stage of the game who was settling the team down, distributing the ball well and varying the pace of his team's play. Wilmots proved to be the one who did most for the side; he was to be found everywhere, creating chances and taking them himself on two occasions.

Tactically the team had been very well prepared. Coach Leekens' instructions were put into practice most effectively during the Holland match and during the first half against Mexico.

In the game against their Low Countries rivals a win would have been possible with a bit of luck, and Mexico were clearly dominated in the first half. Only when Mexico got a goal back did Belgium's organization start to crumble, but even the 2-2 in this match was a good result in view of making further progress.

In the final game against Korea it became clear that the Belgians could not dictate a game themselves and for this reason they went out – undefeated yes, but disappointed; they have only themselves to blame.

Goalkeeper Philippe Vandevalle did justice to his coach, Georges Leekens, for having selected him for the last group game versus Korea.
Austria
Final ranking: 23rd place
Coach: Herbert Prohaska

Austria's qualification for France was achieved by a surprising dominance of the group. Teams like Scotland and Sweden (third at the World Cup USA '94) who were in with them were left trailing. So they came to play in the final round with high hopes.
Coach Prohaska announced his team selection quite early, on 11 May. The squad was thus able to concentrate on its preparation without having the distraction of speculating about who would or would not be in the final 22. They attended a training camp at home in the Sportschule Lindabrunn from 20 May to 2 June, during which time they played one final preparatory game against Tunisia. The delegation took up residence in their headquarters in Margaux near Bordeaux on 7 June.
Their unique role at the World Cup was to be the "team of the last minute". In all three of their group games they scored shortly before the final whistle. Against Cameroon it was Polster who got the lucky equalizer for a 1:1, and against Chile the substitute Vastic performed the same feat. Finally against Italy it was Herzog's turn (via a penalty), but this only made it 1:2 and so they were out.
They played with a classic 3-5-2 system, with libero Feiersinger showing good overview and organizing the defence well. The two stoppers, Schöttel and Pfeffer, were sound and reliable, while defensive midfielder Mählisch made space tight for opposing attackers. In central midfield Pfeifenberger pulled the strings, supported by Cerny (who was replaced by Mählisch in the last game, with Reimayer coming in behind) and Wetl on the flanks. Kühbauer was the link man with the two strikers Polster and Vastic (or Haas). Andreas Herzog saw surprisingly little of the action; he was taken off shortly before the end of the first match against Cameroon and was then only used as a joker.
The group Austria were in was a tough one, with all the teams being fairly evenly matched. With a bit more readiness to take a risk they might have caused an upset in the last match against Italy, but there can be no talk of luck being against them — a team that equalises twice in stoppage time has had a fair share.
Anatoli Nankov (Bulgaria) steals the scene dramatically from the Paraguayan, Sarabia (11).

Kevin Gallacher from Scotland storms past Kjetil Rekdal (10), who is bent on reaching the Norwegian goal.

Spain's twofold goal scorer Hierro (6) attempting to shoot past Paraguay.
Mario Haas (7, in close grips with Reyes from Chile) is regarded as the rising star (and successor to Toni Polster) in Austrian football.

Marc Wilmots (7, tilting at the Mexican, Villa) was not only a precious team-mate but also a successful goal digger (two goals in three matches).
Scotland

Final ranking: 27th place
Coach: Craig Brown

Scotland have qualified for every World Cup since 1974 (except 1994) – an impressive record. What is less impressive is the fact that every time they have been eliminated after the group games, and for 1998 their chances of breaking the ban did not look that much higher.

Coach Craig Brown named his selection on 19 May and took them shortly afterwards to New Jersey in the States, where they played two warm-up matches against Colombia and the USA. After a short time with their families, the players reassembled and travelled to their base for the World Cup in Provence.

They were the only team to use full pressing tactics for the entire 90 minutes of a match. This kind of play requires tremendous physical fitness and they showed that they had it in plenty during the first two matches. Only against Morocco did the efforts that they had made begin to tell, and they paid the price with a clear 0:3 defeat.

As usual the Scots were an exemplary fair team (despite Burley’s red card against Morocco). There was an air of comradeship and solidarity among the players, plus lots of fighting spirit. Their fans were also totally friendly, wherever the team played, huge numbers arrived and a football party was guaranteed. Whether the team did well or not the supporters were happy, and spurred the players on. What was most impressive was the way in which they consoled the broken-hearted Moroccan players after the last match, when it seemed that the Africans had qualified for the second round only to be informed by their coach that Norway’s late winner against Brazil had snatched this prize from them.

As individuals deserving a mention, Lambert and Collins directed the team’s play in midfield and Durie up front was a tireless worker.

Scotland have always been a team that put its heart into every game and not one to play with a view to saving strength for the future. Little wonder that, despite the rest days between matches, their energy showed signs of running out towards the end.

Also a lack of technical refinement on the part of some team members prevented them from playing a smooth combination game.

But Craig Brown’s players, and their fans, can be praised for having made a major contribution to the success of France 98 as a football festival, which is what it was supposed to be. The team will now have four years to wait to see if they can do better at their next attempt.

Scotland had the honour of contesting the opening match against defending champion Brazil. Colin Jackson (10, being watched by Roberto Carlos) and his team very nearly upset the apple cart at this point.
Bulgaria

Final ranking: 29th place
Coach: Dimitar Penev

Bulgaria came to France with the load on their shoulders of having to confirm their achievement of reaching the semifinals in 1994, before that never having survived the group games.

Coach Dimitar Penev, in his playing days a top class striker and still capable of showing excellent ball skills, organized a training camp in Germany (24-30 May) and another in Sofia (2-6 June). In between he had announced his team selection, and they were the ones who took part in the final session to polish their skills. Two trial matches were played, against the German league champions, 1. FC Kaiserslautern, and the Algerian national team. On 8 June the delegation arrived in France.

Neither Bulgaria nor Paraguay wanted to risk losing the opening match, and with this safety first attitude in mind it was not surprising that the game ended goalless. In their second match, against Nigeria, the Bulgarians were outclassed, especially in the first half. They were always a step behind, slow to react and they wasted the few chances they did manage to create. The second half showed an improvement, but not enough of one to correct the scoreline, which stayed at 0-1. This meant that the Eastern Europeans were already out. That left one more match, and despite their having no hope of making further progress, more resistance would have been expected from the Bulgarians. As it was Spain gave them a demonstration of how the game is played and the brutal 1.6 result was a fair reflection of the match.

Bulgaria played without fire or motivation. The delight they had shown four years earlier was gone. Players like Stoitchkov, Balakov and Iliev never approached their best form. The only ray of hope in the team was provided by Borimirov (who replaced Iliev in the second match) and goalkeeper Zdravkov, who stopped what was unstoppable. All the pride and passion and the technical refinements of USA 1994 were missing.

What can be rated on the positive side was the public relations work of the delegation. No training session of the team was closed off from the public, and the players had their photos taken with children from local teams, gave autographs freely and were generally very friendly. Their contacts with the media were cheerful occasions too. Thus it was a pity that this delegation did not have a longer stay.

From left, back row: Ivanov, Zdravkov, Kischischev, Petkov, Jordanov, Penev; front row: Iliev, Nankov, Stoitchkov, Balakov, Yankov

Krassimir Balakov (10, in the match versus Nigeria), like the rest of his Bulgarian team, failed to live up to expectations.
France 1998 was not a World Cup that caused any huge surprises. This was true of the group games and in the next two rounds as well. Even though some of the favourites had to work hard for their success, they were almost without exception the ones that got through. For example, Brazil's disappointing showing against Norway in the last group game gave Chile hopes of upsetting the South American hierarchy in their second round match, but Brazil brought them quickly down to earth, especially in the first half (two goals following free kicks and one from a penalty), and there was no way back after that.

Italy's efforts in their first three games also led Norway to believe that they could create a surprise, but an early goal from Vieri forced the Scandinavians to abandon their own preferred counter-attacking style and to make the play themselves. This showed up their own limitations – not enough ideas or penetration – and when they did put a promising move together, Pagliuca was in top form to end their hopes, especially with one semi-miraculous save from the best chance of all.

The Nigerians were so full of confidence before their match with Denmark that they did not waste a lot of breath on this game, their sights already being set on the next one, probably against Brazil. This was all to the advantage of the clever Danish team whose lightning start to the game destroyed the Africans' ideas of invincibility. With goals from Møller and Brian Laudrup putting the Europeans 2:0 ahead after just 12 minutes, the game was practically decided. The Nigerians tried to get back into the game, but mostly via individual actions and these were competently dealt with by the Danish defence. When Babangida did score to salvage some honour, there were already 4 goals on the other side of the score-sheet.

Although France had made a study of the reasons behind Paraguay's defensive strength, they were still unable to achieve a breakthrough within normal playing time. It took a crisp shot from Laurent Blanc in the 94th minute of extra time to get the Golden Goal that saw France into the next round. Until then, Paraguay had pinned their hopes on getting through to a penalty shoot-out, where they fancied the chances of the exceptional prowess of Chilavert tipping things in their favour. And until the 114th minute this plan seemed to be working, but Blanc's shot gave even this keeper no chance (Chilavert was nonetheless voted into the All-star team).

Against Mexico, Germany wobbled but did not fall. With the Central Americans providing unexpectedly tough opposition, it took goals from Klinsmann and Bierhoff and a determined team effort all round to get the European champions into the last eight. Before this game Mexico had never been ahead in any match, and suddenly finding themselves in this position in this vital game, they seemed unable to hold on to their lead.

In their match in Toulouse, Yugoslavia were not adventurous enough to pose a real threat to Holland. Even if the result (2:1) looks very close, the Oranjes were never in any serious danger of losing. Only when Mijatovic took a penalty (and hit the bar) with the score at 1:1, did there seem to be any possibility that the Dutch might falter.

The final team to qualify for the quarter-finals was Argentina, who at the end of an entertaining, up-and-down game with England, finally got through on penalties after a 2:2 draw. When Beckham was sent off early in the second half, the 1966 world champions were in a difficult position. But their usual fighting spirit, backed up by some good ideas and technical skill meant that the result was open until the end, and either team could have gone on to win.

The quarter-final line-up looked just as it had four years earlier – an exclusive European/South American affair. Six to two was the ratio in basic figures, but in terms of the number of teams per confederation at the start of the tournament, it was balanced, each getting 40% through to this stage. The classic battle...
Then things got hectic. A confrontation in the Dutch goal area saw Ortega dismissed with a red card for an attack on goalie van der Sar, and almost in the next move Frank de Boer hit a wonderful pass of around 60 meters. Bergkamp controlled it masterfully and shot his team into their third semifinal in World Cup history.

Paradoxically, while Germany had not looked very convincing in earning their place among the last eight, having got there they put on one of their best performances against Croatia – and lost. No ifs and buts about the scoreboard, it was 0:3. The reigning European champions generated a lot of pressure in the first 40 minutes and limited the Croatians to sporadic counter attacks. But just before half time, two events happened that decided the game. First, Germany’s Wörm was justifiably sent off for an unnecessary and harsh foul, and a few minutes later, Jarin put Croatia into the lead. Despite a great effort after the break, Germany did not manage to get back into the game and the other two goals from Vlaovic and Suker sealed the fate of the three-times former world champions.

Brazil and Holland were definitely among the most skilful sides in the competition, and so their semifinal encounter was anticipated eagerly as a match of great potential. And it proved to be just that, especially during the second half and in extra time, captivating the 54,000 spectators in Marseille. The match went into extra time after Kluivert had equalized the goal that Ronaldo had scored with the first attack after the interval. While both teams had chances to end the match before the 120 minutes were up, neither managed to do so, and the third penalty-kick decision became necessary.
unforeseen absences; three key players were sent off at various times, Zidane against Saudi Arabia, Blanc against Croatia and Desailly in the final, but the team never lost its harmony when changes had to be made.

In the following section, there is an analysis of the 16 teams that qualified for the second round (in alphabetical order). This is based on observations made by members of the Technical Study Group during matches and training sessions, and also includes information gathered during discussions with coaches of the participating teams.

This was Taffarel's big moment, as he kept out attempts from Cocu and Ronald De Boer. With van der Sar less successful in his efforts, the Brazilian keeper emerged as the matchwinner for his team.

It had probably never occurred to Lilian Thuram before the World Cup started that he would be the one to score two goals in one match (his first ever for the French national team) and earn his country a place in the final. But he did just that in the second half against Croatia, who had taken the lead with a Suker strike just after half time. The answer was not long in coming, as almost in the next move Thuram got his first, and then the second sealed the fate of the Eastern Europeans who had no answer once the French had gone into the lead.

The same score (2:1) was on the board at the end of the play-off match for third place, in which Croatia beat Holland, the Dutch seeming less than fully motivated on this occasion, and earned themselves bronze medals on their first-ever appearance at a World Cup final round.

«Le jour de la gloire est arrivé!»: probably no other sports event in French history has been a more appropriate match for this line from the «Marseillaise» than the victory of the tri-colour team in the new Stade de France as a climax to the World Cup France 98. On the day, the French, led by their playmaker Zinedine Zidane, produced some wonderful moments of football against a surprisingly passive Brazilian side. And not only did Zidane organize his team's attacks, he scored goals himself. Well screened by the unsselfish play of Petit and Deschamps, this talented player of Algerian descent shocked the Brazilians in the 27th minute with a headed goal, and then put in another one during the first half stoppage time. Although they were reduced to 10 men when Desailly was sent off after 68 minutes, the French not only managed to contain the Brazilians for the last part of the game but in fact went further ahead when Petit scored via a counter-attacking move. The final whistle from referee Belqola (Morocco), the first African ever to officiate at a World Cup final, sent the whole of France into a frenzy of delight. On the Champs Elysées alone, over a million people celebrated right through the summer night until the next morning.

The architect of the French victory was coach Aimé Jacquet. But in line with the proverb that the prophet is not listened to in his own country, his tactics did not always meet with approval in France. Yet in the end the win over Brazil, and in particular the decisive way it was achieved, proved him completely right. His accomplishment was to select the right balance from his squad of 82 players for every match, and to have a plan in mind that would compensate for
Argentina

Daniel Passarella, captain of the Argentina side that won the World Cup in 1978 and the most prolific goalscorer by far of all defenders (over 180 goals, including 24 in international matches) became coach of the national team in September 1994. It would be his task to lead Argentina back to the very top, after the World Cup 1994 had been anything but a satisfactory episode. Could he take his team back to the former days of glory? Things began well with a silver medal at the Olympic tournament in Atlanta in 1996, and it was no surprise that a good number of the players successful on that occasion were included in the newly assembled World Cup hopeful team.

But their qualification for France 98 did not start as well as they had hoped. An opening win against Bolivia was followed by dropping points against Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay. Passarella found himself coming in for heavy criticism from the demanding Argentine public. Then an impressive undefeated run in the remaining qualification games (five wins and two draws) quietened the critics and allowed the team and the association to prepare for France with some optimism.

Finally 14 players from the Olympic squad were selected, and seven of them were first team choices. Their preparations were all carried out at home, there was a training camp in January in Tandil (a province of Buenos Aires), then a number of friendly matches were played against European opposition. In April Passarella assembled his players in the Argentine Association’s training centre and on 19 May he announced his final selection.

Argentina used a 3-4-3 as their basic formation but this was variably interpreted. In defence they had libero Ayala playing slightly deep of the two man-markers Sensini and Chamot (in fact Sensini had to contend with a series of minor injuries and was replaced by Vivas in the matches against Jamaica, Croatia, and England). Ayala’s strengths were his clever positional play, his exact long passing and his power in the air. Sensini and Chamot are two highly experienced defenders, both having played in the USA in 1994. Sensini had a good overview, liked to go forward into attack and was able to tackle hard but fairly when he had to, while Chamot was also a firm tackler, fast and possessed of good technical skills.

Under pressure, the defence would be supported by the four midfielders. Almeyda, as libero in front of the defence, had a special function to fulfil in trying to disturb an opponent’s attacks as early as possible. Then they had Veron in the middle, Zanetti on the right and Simeone on the left in midfield. Veron was the team’s playmaker. His accurate passing set up chances for the strikers, while his hard and precise shooting made him a threat up front as well. Simeone brought experience from a number of FIFA competitions with him (he first played on the international stage at the WC in Saudi Arabia in 1989). As captain he was a real leader and a motivator for his team. Zanetti was notable for his physical ability and his surprising and effective forward surges.

The attack consisted of Batistuta, Lopez and Ortega, three quite different types of player. Batistuta is a classical goalscorer and always on the lookout for the direct route
to goal. His dynamic pace and his instinct for being in the right place made him a constant threat. The hat-trick he scored against Jamaica was his personal high point in France. Lopez was also quick, and his speed made him a typical counter-attacker. He liked to be set off with a through pass and then he was very dangerous. The calm way he scored the equalizer against Holland was most impressive. Ortega ranged between midfield and attack, always changing his position according to the state of the game. He too was quick off the mark and also a tricky dribbler, making him a handful for any defender.

Argentina had all that it takes to play attractive football. They were quick, they combined well together, they were creative. They liked to attack, were mobile and persistent when they went forward. The well-planned free kick variation that brought them the 2:2 equalizer against England was a masterpiece. With their good organisation and their tactical discipline they were one of the best teams in the competition. But they lost the discipline for a short while in the quarterfinal against Holland, and this lapse was decisive and responsible for their elimination. After Ortega had quite rightly been sent off, their opponents from the final of 1978 calmly took advantage of Argentina's disarray and scored what was not an undeserved winning goal, but it was hardly expected at this stage of the game.

The outstanding players in this strong all-round side were Veron, the thinker and the director in midfield with his powerful shot, Ortega, despite his lapse against Holland, and of course Batistuta. In the next bracket follow the young Gallardo, not often used but clearly very talented, Almeida as the stabilizing force in defence, and libero Ayala who will be wearing the colours of AC Milan in the new season.

But despite Almeida and Ayala, the defence was the weakest part of the team. Even goalkeeper Roa, who was only promoted by Passarella to the no. 1 spot shortly before the World Cup began, was not totally convincing, despite his performance during the penalty-shooting versus England. In defensive midfield there was too much space available for opposing attackers (Owen's goal in the second round). Partly responsible for this shortcoming were the three forwards who hardly ever involved themselves in any defensive actions.

Argentina were a team that came to France with aspirations to the title. They played an attractive style of football with quick accurate combinations, and their individual players all showed fine skills. Only lapses of concentration at decisive moments led to that fact that once again the Argentine Association will not be very happy with their team's performance.
Argentina was faced with greater problems than they had expected from Japan. Batistuta is seen trying to forge his way past Akita.

The Argentine squad tangoed around World Cup newcomers Jamaica to win 5-0. Lopes (7) is seen here dancing his way through the entire defence but failed to stake a claim in the goal scorers' list.
Mario Zagallo, one of the very few people to have won a World Cup title both as a player and as a coach, took over the "Seleção" from Carlos Alberto Parreira after the success in 1994. Not an easy job to step into, since the Brazilian fans expected nothing less than a repeat of that triumph this time and tend to be very sensitive when their team's performance is not in line with their hopes.

But Zagallo had enough experience to know that it is far harder to defend a title than to win one in the first place. In fact this feat has only been accomplished twice, before in football - by Italy, in 1938 following 1934 and Brazil, in 1962 following 1958. They are also the only non-European side to have won the cup at a tournament on the old continent (Sweden 1958).

Since Brazil had automatically qualified for France 98 as title holders, they took advantage of invitations to play friendly matches and to enter into tournaments. In 1997 alone they played 24 international matches (among them the Confederations' Cup and the Copa America) with varying levels of success. After winning the Copa America and the Confederations' Cup (December 1997, in Saudi Arabia), they were upset early in 1998 in the Gold Cup, when they lost to the USA in the semifinal, which of course did not please the fans at all.

Brazil arrived early in France, on 23 May, to carry out their final preparations on the spot. They chose as their headquarters a chateau with a practice pitch adjacent, in a small town not far from Paris.

The standard of comfort and functionality left nothing to be desired.

Brazil came through the group games comfortably, despite losing to Norway, their bogey team, in the final match. By then they had earned six points with wins over Scotland and Morocco and were sure of a place in the second round. Then in succession it was Chile, an unexpectedly strong Denmark, and Holland who tried to stop the champions' progress towards the final.

But none of them succeeded. However, Brazil had to give everything they had, particularly against Holland, and Taffarel's great performance in the penalty shoot-out stood between them and elimination.

The result of the final against France is well known, but the reason for the surprisingly weak performance from the South Americans remains a mystery. Rumours about Ronaldo's health were still circulating weeks after the event, and even we cannot shed any light on the matter. It is hard to imagine that a team of the quality of the reigning world champions would be so affected by the health of one player, even if that player was Ronaldo, or that their game would suffer so much.

The Brazilians used the same system that had brought them success 4 years earlier (basically 4-4-2, switching to 4-1-3-2 when the opponent had the ball and to 2-4-4 when they were in possession themselves). Taffarel, Aldair, Bebeto, Cafu, Dunga and Leonardo were all back again from the 1994 team. In goal Taffarel was calm and effective, showing good reactions, while in front of him Aldair and Junior Baiano were the central defenders and they were not always convincing. In the air their height made them formidable, but on the ground and in overall defensive play (positioning, tackling, speed) they were less impressive.

On the flanks they had two
Goalkeeper Taffarel, organizing his defenders: again his talent sparkled in penalty shoot-outs (parrying two penalties in the semifinal against the Netherlands), as it had done four years previously in the 1994 World Cup.

Cesar Sampaio (5) netted the first goal of the World Cup in the game against Scotland. Altogether the defending midfielder found the net three times, all of which resulted from set pieces.

Ronaldo (9, page 74) shimmies around the Scotsman, Hendry. Although he failed to score in the opening match, he ended up as his squad's top goal scorer with four goals (including a penalty) to his credit.
outstanding players in Roberto Carlos (left) and Cafu (right), though both were better in going forward than in defending. Both were fast and skilful, both could hit accurate passes and in addition Roberto Carlos had a powerful shot. However their sorties down the wing left holes at the back, and these were not always blocked off well enough, neither by the midfielders nor by their defensive colleagues. Sharp counter-attacking teams like Denmark, Norway and Holland too were able to take advantage of these gaps.

Compared to 1994, Dunga took on a different role. He went into the position that Mauro Silva had occupied, that of "windscreen wiper" in front of the defence. He was the undisputed boss of the team, directing, criticizing and motivating his team mates. Cesar Sampaio played in the other defensive midfield position and oddly enough he was second highest goalscorer with 3 successes (all following set pieces), only just behind Ronaldo with 4, and level with Rivaldo and Bebeto. In the attacking part of midfield it was Rivaldo who was in charge, offering service to Ronaldo and Bebeto up front as well as using his deadly left foot to good effect. Parallel to Rivaldo on the left there was Leonardo on the right. After a disappointing season with AC Milan, he improved from game to game and was the ideal complement in this area.

The two strikers were Ronaldo and Bebeto. While Ronaldo would often drop back into midfield and then use his speed off the mark and his dribbling ability to penetrate, Bebeto remained up front, ready to pounce at the right moment. Ronaldo was also more prepared to get involved in tackles and to challenge for possession if the ball had been lost.

Compared to 1994, this Brazilian side was of a more homogeneous standard. This can be seen in one respect in that four years ago the two strikers (then Romario and Bebeto) were serviced almost exclusively with long balls, with the expectation that these two exceptional players would be able to make something out of the situation. This time there was more play through midfield. In Dunga and Rivaldo they had two playmakers to get the rest of the team into the action. While it is true that there were not more names on the list of scorers in 1998 (four, as against five in 1994) this time they all got roughly the same share of the goals (Ronaldo 4, Cesar Sampaio, Rivaldo and Bebeto 3 each). Last time Romario (5) and Bebeto (3) had got the lion's share with the three other players on one apiece.

Attacking down the flanks was an important part of Brazil's strategy, with Roberto Carlos and Cafu, the two wing backs, being very effective in this role. Both could hit accurate passes on the run and this meant trouble for any opposing defence. Brazil's style has gone more from the romantic towards the pragmatic. This trend was noticeable in 1994 and it was more pronounced this time. The current realistic, efficient system offers fewer moments of magic, and this would not get an overwhelmingly positive vote from the fans – what they really want to see is swashbuckling attacking play.

With all the individual talent available, Brazil were still a compact team unit. In a strong all-round side, Dunga played a key role: whenever the team was faced with a problem he would be the one to take the initiative and get things moving positively again.

The team had problems when they were behind, and they found themselves in this unusual position against Norway, Denmark and France. And it was only against the Danes that they managed to come back and win the game. Their defence was a problem too, the two central defenders looked a bit slow, were not always clever in their positional play and did not seem to be in top form in terms of fitness either. Particularly in the final against France they were outpaced several times or by-passed with some sharp passing. But they alone cannot be held responsible for the defeat. The whole team was off the boil that evening and never reached their customary level.

The Brazilian Association and the team's officials will certainly investigate very closely.

---

**Career as a player:**
- 1953–1955: Flamengo
- 1961–1963: Botafogo

**Career as a coach:**
- 1971: Flamengo
- 1978–1979: Kuwait national team
- 1980: Vasco da Gama
- 1984: Flamengo
- 1989–1990: UAE national team
- 1994: Brazil national team

Successes:
- (as a player): 1955, 1962: World Champion
- 1955 and 1958: World Champion
- 1961: Brazilian Champion
- 1970: World Champion
- 1994: World Champion
- 1997: Winners of the Copa America
- 1997: Winners of the FIFA/Confederations' Cup

---

Mario Lobo
ZAGALLO
9.8.1931
Then, in the second round they were quite hopeful of upsetting Brazil. But three goals following standard situations settled their fate before half time. Before that they had started well, keeping possession of the ball and creating several good chances.

Their 3-5-2 was interpreted flexibly. Libero Fuentes always played behind the two stoppers who used zone marking to keep their opponents in check. The defenders were hardly ever seen in an attacking move. In midfield, the two flank players Rojas (left) and Villarroel (right) helped out equally in attack and defence. In the middle of the park, Acuna took on the role of team captain.

From left, back row: Margas, Fuentes, Reyes, Parraguez, Acuna, Tapia; front row: Estay, Villarroel, Zamorano, Rojas, Salas

This was the first time that Chile had qualified for a World Cup final round since 1990. For a long time it looked uncertain as to whether they would make it or not, but finally two comfortable wins over Peru and Bolivia earned them their tickets to France. This success is related to the continuous development work that has been done in Chilean football. A lot of work has been done at the junior level, and Chile’s appearances in the last U-20 and U-17 world championships were among the rewards for their efforts.

Although these young teams were not very successful, a number of talented players have come through and this gives the association cause to be optimistic for the future. Their preparation for France was carried out in several stages. Following three short training sessions in Chile they undertook a 17-day trip to Asia, Oceania and Europe, during which they played 6 friendly matches. Before they finally flew off to France, coach Acosta had his team together from 8–13 May 1998 in Coquimbo, at the Complejo Deportivo Puerto Velero.

Their three group games all ended in draws, although victory in one or more of these games would have been possible. A lack of concentration late in the game (particularly against Austria, who were allowed to equalize in stoppage time) meant that their qualification for the second round (for the first time since 1962) remained uncertain until the very last moment.

Nelson Parraguez (7) was one of three players suspended from the Chilean team in the quarter final, considerably weakening their firing power.
organizer, supported by the strong tackling Paredes. Estay (or Sierra) played behind the two strikers, Zamorano and Salas and completed this part of the team.

Chile's strengths lay in their good organization, their tactical discipline, their compactness and in the individual skills of practically every player. A special mention must be made of the two strikers, Zamorano was the ideal provider for Salas who scored four goals. These two managed to turn a number of forward moves into real scoring opportunities.

Among the weaknesses of the team must be mentioned their lack of physical fitness. The results of this were a drop in performance during the second half in each of their group games, leading to goals being conceded late on, as mentioned above. Against set pieces their defensive organization was less than fully effective (two goals conceded following free kicks against Brazil). In addition, they lost possession too often in midfield and this gave the defence extra work to cope with.

But having succeeded in reaching the finals after an absence of 16 years, they went on to attain a place in the second round for the first time in 36 years. No-one really expected them to defeat Brazil in the next match and so their minimum realistic aim had been achieved. If their association continues to work at developing the game then they can raise their ambitions a notch or two higher for the future.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nelson Acosta</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career as a player:</td>
<td>1969-1971 Huracán Buesso (Uruguay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975-1976 Peñarol (Uruguay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1977 Everton (Chile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1978-1981 O'Higgins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1982-1983 Fernandez Vial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career as a coach:</td>
<td>1984-1987 Fernandez Vial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988-1991 O'Higara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992 Cruz Azul (Mexico)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993-1996 Unión Española</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996- National team of Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successes (as a player):</td>
<td>1973-1975 Triple champion with Peñarol (Uruguay)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was anything but easy for captain Ivan Zamorano (9) in the second round game versus Brazil. Here he is seen pitting himself against Roberto Carlos.
From left, back row: Boban, Ladic, Blic, Soldo, Stani<, Asanovic; front row: Jarni, Suker, Prosinecki, Maric, Simic

By qualifying for the World Cup finals, Croatia achieved their second notable success since the country became a member of FIFA in 1992. And this time, hoping to improve on their performance at EURO 96, the players had ambitions of doing more than just reaching the quarterfinals. In Miroslav Blazevic they had a coach with well respected credentials.

Blazevic was optimistic that his team could have a good run in this tournament. He based this positive outlook on the range of talent he had available and the national pride that players and coaching staff would have in representing their country in France. 14 of his 22 players, and 9 of the starting line-up, were engaged outside Croatia (England, Italy, Spain and Germany). There was no shortage of international experience, without which it is difficult to succeed at the top level.

Most of their preparation was carried out at home in Porec. Blazevic assembled a group of 25 players there on 23 May, prior to announcing his final selection on 5 June. They played 6 friendly matches against relatively weak opposition. The easy wins they earned were not much of a surprise, but a few eyebrows were raised when they lost 1:2 against Slovakia. But in retrospect, losing that game was not a bad thing to happen to them.

Their tournament began according to the book. Starting off with two wins (Jamaica 3:1) and Japan (1:0) they were assured of a place in the second round. Argentina seemed more motivated for the final group game (hoping to avoid another meeting with Romania in the next round, after the USA encounter with this opponent), and this perhaps was the reason why Croatia did not come through the group matches undefeated. Second place in the group set them up for a meeting with Romania of course, and a penalty from Suker just before half time proved to be the decider in this game, although with more concentration in front of goal they could have made the margin wider. Then against Germany in the quarterfinal they exacted revenge for their defeat at EURO 96, thanks to their efficient counter-attacking tactics. This win put them among the last four, and against France they took a 1:0 lead, giving them perhaps brief hopes of a place in the final, but the French equalized almost in the next move. They finally earned bronze medals, thanks again to their brilliant counters and an optimal utilization of chances, plus what was probably goalkeeper Ladic’s best performance at the tournament. The 2:1 victory over Holland was duly celebrated as the greatest success in the young association’s history.

They used man-marking around their own penalty area and zone-marking in defensive midfield, where they concentrated on holding the centre of the pitch. With Stimac as libero they used Blic and Simic as man-markers, while Soldo as their defensive midfielder took care of the opposition’s playmaker (Hassler for example in the match against Germany). Neither Stimac nor Soldo took much part in attacking moves. In midfield they had Stani< (right) and Jam< (left) on the flanks, both of whom had defensive as well as attacking responsibilities. In midfield it was Boban and Asanovic who provided the creative impulses. The midfield block was compact, disciplined in their defensive duties and provided pace
Two players largely responsible for Croatia’s surprise capture of the bronze medals: captain and midfield playmaker Zvonimir Boban (10) and top goal scorer Davor Suker (9).
Croatia's manager, Miroslav Blazevic was justified in feeling happy with his team's performance.

and ideas for the team's attacks.

Croatia were at their best when they were allowed to use their counter-attacking skills. If they could intercept an opponent's attack in their own half, they would send their two superb strikers Suker and Vlaovic away. Vlaovic had plenty of pace and lots of tricks, while Suker had excellent dribbling skills, fine ball control and the talent for being in the right place at the right time – always a threat near the opponent's goal. The two flank midfielders, Janic and Stanic offered strong support with their forceful runs, while in the middle Boban and Asanovic provided accurate and dangerous through passes for the strikers.

Coach Blazevic was clear about his team formation from the very beginning. He made hardly any changes to the side and only used 14 players on a regular basis. This could be due to the fact that there was a gap between the quality of players 1–14 and 15–22, but it is more likely that the 14 players used were those that best fitted the coach's concept and that he would only use others in case of injury.

The strengths of the team began at the back with the four-man defensive block (all strong headers). Here they used one libero behind and another in front of the two central defenders. In midfield they had the skills of Boban and Asanovic, while up front Suker was capable of turning a game by himself. Add to this the strength of Janic and Janic on the flanks and a powerful team emerges. Their counter-attacking play was their trump card, backed up by their team spirit and the pride they displayed in playing for Croatia. Prosinecki seemed to be a bit lacking in these qualities (in the coach's view at least), otherwise it is hard to explain why a player with his talent would only be used sporadically, especially during decisive phases of the tournament. Goalkeeper Ladic too deserves a mention. Against Germany, and later against Holland in the 3rd place play-off, he saved the team a goal or two with his lightning reactions.

In general the team did not defend compactly enough. While they were sound in the middle, opponents often seemed to find space to penetrate down the wings. The team was also not capable of dictating the course of a match. Anything other than counter-attacking was not their style. France took very little time to come back after being 0:1 down, and Holland were allowed to equalize too although it took a little longer.

But despite this list of weaknesses, Croatia were the big surprise of the tournament. From the start it was known that they had some exceptional talent available, such as Suker, Boban and Asanovic, but that they would harmonize so well as a team was a complete surprise. Coach Blazevic could even allow himself the luxury of leaving a player like Prosinecki on the bench for three matches in a row. Why the trainer only brought on the former European Cup winner just one minute before time in the semifinal, following Boban's departure, is a question that is hard to answer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career as a player: 1954–</th>
<th>FC Dinamo Zagreb, Rijeka, Sion (Switzerland), Vevey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career as a coach:</td>
<td>Vevey, Sion, Lausanne (Switzerland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rijeka, Zagreb (Croatia), Grasshoppers (Switzerland), Nantes (France), OAK (Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successes: (as a player) 1954</td>
<td>National champion with Dinamo Zagreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National championship and cup competition in Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grasshoppers (Sion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two times champion and cup competition winner with Dinamo Zagreb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Denmark

A

though their results in preparatory games before the World Cup began were not too promising (defeats against Norway, Sweden and Cameroon), Denmark's Swedish coach Bo Johansson was convinced that his team would do well in France. Between 18 May and 5 June he assembled the players at four training camps in Denmark and Sweden, these sessions including some international friendly matches. They arrived in France on 7 June.

The group matches did not produce wonderful results – 1:0 against Saudi Arabia, 1:1 against South Africa and 1:2 against France – but showed a steady improvement. Next on their agenda came Nigeria, who had begun well but had then gone into a decline in form, and the Danes simply outplayed them with their exciting football. Then Brazil spelled the end of the line for them, but coach Johansson was more than satisfied with his team, not only with their results but also with the attractive football that they had played, which won praise from their own fans and from a lot of the French spectators as well.

They used a 4-man defensive chain (from left to right Heintze [although Schjönenberg was in this position for the first two games] Hogh, Rieper and Colding), three midfielders, of whom two (Jorgensen, left and Helveg, centre) were concerned mostly with defensive duties while Nielsen on the left did more for the attack. Michael Laudrup played as a deep-lying forward while his brother Brian and Sand (or Møller, in the last two games) were the strikers.

The way they played in the group games cannot be compared with their performances in the second round and the quarterfinal. Only in the knockout games did Johansson find the perfect strategy to make optimum use of his team's talents. Thanks to their good defensive organisation, the technically brilliant midfielders and the two quick and tricky forwards they were able to cause surprises, especially for Nigeria. In this match they did not attempt to intercept the opponent's attacks deep in their half as

Now virtually a veteran with the elite club, Manchester United, Peter Schmeichel was the stabilizing anchor man in the Danish defence.
they had done in the group games. Instead their defensive bulwark was set up well before their own penalty area so that the Nigerians could find neither time nor space to build up a careful attack. In tackling, the Danes were the equal of any opponent that came along.

One of their specialties was the quick execution of free kicks. They achieved two successes in this way (one was against France when the move led to the awarding of a penalty) and the other the 1-0 opener against Brazil. They made good use of their chances (Brian Laudrup), had several players with good shooting skills (both Laudrup and Möller), plus excellent tactical understanding and lots of experience. Not surprising, since many of their players are engaged by clubs in Europe's top leagues.

Goalkeeper Schmeichel, dominant and safe himself, directed the defence well. He and the defensive boss Högh, plus Jörgensen on the right in midfield (doing lots of running and making himself valuable both in defence and attack), were among the best in the team. The Laudrup brothers had a great tournament, Michael with his wonderful overview, Brian a master dribbler and a deadly finisher. Möller and Sand, the two strikers also deserve a mention; they were used as alternates, but immediately integrated. Johansson also showed a fine touch with his substitutions (Sand and Möller both came on and scored).

No fewer than eight Danish players got their names on the list of scorers. This made it hard to predict where the danger would come from, although many of the moves went through one or other of the Laudrups.

What caused them some trouble was when they had to dictate the pattern of a game themselves, as was the case in the first two group games, against South Africa and Saudi Arabia. Too much was then left to the Laudrups to do and they were held in check by the opposing defence. This lead to a lack of creativity up front since there was not enough support coming from behind.

Coach Johannson's achievement was to get the best out of the team. After the group games no one would have expected such a positive performance against Nigeria and certainly not against Brazil. Although they were among the older teams in France, with an average age of 29 years and 3 months, they improved as the competition went on and were certainly one of the positive surprises.
England

In 1990 England had not been far away from winning a medal in Italy, but four years later they failed even to qualify for the tournament in the USA. This time the World Cup winners of 1966 were expected to come closer to repeating their great success – at least by the members of the association, who continued to put their faith in Glenn Hoddle after the team's unlucky elimination by Germany in the semifinal of EURO 96.

Their preparation consisted of three phases: a week at home was followed by a week in Spain, and then on 3 June Hoddle's chosen 22 were assembled at home again for another week. The short trip to France was left until just a week before their first World Cup match.

The team came to France with serious ambitions. Hoddle had chosen an ideal mixture, some of the players very young, others seasoned by years of international campaigning. Yet there are always critical voices ready to disagree with whatever choices are made. But the group games, while not overwhelmingly positive, from a results point of view – 2-0 win over Tunisia, 1-2 defeat against Romania, 2-0 win over Colombia – showed clearly what potential there was in this team. Their elimination in the second round, in what was one of the best matches of the whole tournament, was due less to a drop in performance than to the luck that can make or break a team in a knockout competition. Beckham's being sent off for a momentary lack of control, Campbell's (rightfully) disallowed goal with the score at 2-2, and then defeat on penalties after 190 minutes of play – this was a sequence of events that meant that not the poorer team had lost, just the unluckier one.

As noted above, the squad contained a blend of young and old, and after two disappointing performances from Sheringham, the young Michael Owen was given a chance to prove himself. Just a year earlier in 1997 he had been with the youth team in Malaysia, now here he was seizing his big opportunity and scoring two goals in as many games, one of them the magnificent solo effort that gave England a 2-1 lead against Argentina. The unlucky Beckham is only 23, Gary Neville and Paul Scholes not much older.

England used a classic 3-5-2 system with the very experienced Tony Adams as a steadfast libero, Gary Neville (in the first match Southgate) and Campbell in the defence. All three of these players would go forward when given the chance. Defensive midfielder Ince offered support at the back, but also was the starting point for attacking moves. The other two midfielders, Scholes and Beckham were both geared towards attack; (although the latter's place was taken by the defensive Batty against Tunisia and Romania). They were individually strong, had a good eye for the state of the game and could hit clever long passes. On the flanks in midfield were Anderton (right) and Le Saux, who generated a lot of pressure down the wings but did not neglect their defensive duties.

In attack Shearer and Owen were constantly on the move, with Owen more prepared to go back and get the ball himself from midfield, while Shearer was the typical goalmouth striker.

England were a side that had to make the running. They always tried to be the active team and to get the opponent to play at their
Sol Campbell in a clinic with Gabriel Batistuta. It was bad luck for him that his goal for 3-2 in the second leg had been committed seconds before.

Not yet 20 and already a bright star sparkling in the English firmament: Michael Owen.
pace. They were well organized and always dangerous, thanks to the quality of the midfielders and the forwards, backed up by the surprising and unpredictable forwards surges of the defenders. Traditionally English players are strong in the air, and such was the case with this team too, both in defence and in attack.

The team also showed tactical discipline and good organization, both in defence and in attack. They were united in their efforts and determined to win; they thought as a team, and both the players and the team's officials were always fair in their words and deeds (despite Beckham's red card). It was no accident that they won the Fair Play prize (jointly with France). In a strong collective team Adams, Scholes, Owen and Ince were the ones who deserve a special mention.

No serious weaknesses were to be seen in this team. Perhaps they were not always scrupulous in their tackling, especially near the penalty area, and did not look too secure against some free kicks (especially the one that led to Argentina's 2:2 equalizer).

Overall, Hoddle is to be congratulated for his courage in using all these young players in the World Cup. This is a team with a future; they will be a force to reckon with in the next major international competitions.

Paul Scholes curving in a long shot for 2-0 against Tunisia: at the tender age of 24, he is another player regarded as a future rocket in the English regiment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glenn HODDLE</th>
<th>27.10.1957</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Career as a player**
- 1975–1987: Tottenham Hotspur
- 1987–1990: Monaco
- 1993–1995: Chelsea
- 1996–: National team of England

**Career as a coach**
- 1993–1996: Chelsea
- 1996–: National team of England

**Successes (as a player)**
- 1981–1982: English FA Cup with Tottenham Hotspur
- 1988: French League champion with Monaco

---

86
France

From left, back row: Guivarc'h, Blanc, Thuram, Desailly, Petit, Zidane; front row: Henry, Djorkaeff, Deschamps, Lizarazu, Barthez

The last big triumph achieved by the French national football team dates back to 1984, when they won the European Championship, which they hosted that year. 14 years later they were again the hosts for a major competition, and their fans were full of hope of once more winning the title, this time the World Cup.

The French association is known for the emphasis it places on the development of youth football, and their recent successes at the U-18 level (European champions 1996 and 1997) were among the rewards for their efforts. However, it has taken the FFF a long time to come up with a national team that would match the one from the golden era of Platini, Giresse, Tigana and Rocheteau. They had not in fact succeeded in reaching the final round of a World Cup since 1986, and their first return to the international scene was at EURO 96, where they failed to reach the target they had set themselves (losing on penalties against the Czech Republic in the semifinals).

But in 1998 things would all be different. Aimé Jacquet and the FFF analysed the team's performances before and during EURO 96 very carefully and tried to make plans that would avoid committing the same mistakes again. First step was to increase the number of coaching staff (adding assistant coaches, goalkeeper trainer, etc.) and then defining everyone's role more precisely.

Jacquet stressed the importance of choosing eleven strong substitute players and making sure they would be ready to take their place in the first team. Finally he put a lot of effort into improving the players' physical and mental condition, an important factor in view of the fact that the tournament would last for more than 4 weeks.

Their team's immediate preparation for the competition took place in four stages. They had a regeneration session after the long season, in the mountains near Tignes from 11 to 16 May. Then they got back to some physical workouts in a second training camp at the FFF Training Centre in Clairefontaine (18-25 May). The team's harmony in playing together was honed in a tournament in Morocco (matches against Belgium and Morocco) as well as another game in Finland. Then they returned to Clairefontaine to go over the fine details of their tactical plan (from 8 June until their first match on 12 June). They kept Clairefontaine as their headquarters during the whole tournament.

They played positive (i.e. attacking) football of a very high standard. In the centre of the defence they had Desailly and Blanc, both strong in the air and on the ground. They alternated in going forward with attacks (Blanc getting the Golden Goal against Paraguay in the second round on one of his forward expeditions). Both Lizarazu (left) and Thuram made surging runs down the wings to provide extra width for attacks, both delivering good crosses and Thuram going for goal himself when he saw an opportunity. Captain Deschamps was aided by Petit in organising the defensive part of midfield, while Karembeu (or Henry) and Zidane were responsible for the creative elements in
In this case, Zidane began when Zidane earned a substitute a goal in the Saudi Arabia match. He was suspended for two games and either Pires or Djorkaeff tried to take over his role, but not with the desired level of success. Zidane is an exceptional player, full of ideas and creativity, a hard man to replace. He can decide a game all by himself and things were not the same during his absence. Later on Jacquet's policy of paying close attention to substitutes proved valuable, when Blanc was sent off in the semifinal against Croatia. This is case, Leboeuf proved to be a very capable substitute for the final.

France used the basis of their solid defence to launch attacks with quick and accurate passing. Offensive moves usually started in the centre of defence via Blanc, Desailly or Deschamps. Using Thuram and Lizarazu down the flanks was one variation and these two were capable of providing good service to the forwards, or in the case of Thuram going for goal himself (he scored twice in the semifinal – his first-ever goals in the national team). In midfield, Zidane was the dominant figure. Screened by Deschamps and Petit who worked unselfishly for the team, he was the focal point of the action. He would collect the ball in midfield and then try to set up chances, either for himself or for his team mates.

The weaknesses of the team were their homogeneity, the quality of their substitutes and the individual skills of Zidane. All the players were above average in their technique, which enabled them all to take part in quick, accurate, passing moves. In defence, the heading of the central defenders was outstanding, up front it was the finishing power and dribbling skills of Zidane, Henry and Djurguty that deserve a special mention. Goalkeeper Barthez was voted as the best keeper of the tournament. He was very secure in his interventions on the line, confident in his control of the penalty area and also capable as a field player when he came out, providing quick accurate passes. One of these efforts, in the game against Saudi Arabia, earned him an assist point, when he launched Thierry Henry with a long pass for the third and final goal.

The weaknesses were in attack. Despite the creativity of Zidane only two goals were the result of an attacking build-up, the others all came following set pieces. They simply lacked a goalscorer in the classic mould. Guivarch, Dugary and Trezeguet are all capable forwards, but they did not have any penetration. Djorkaeff acted as a supporting striker lying a little deep and had trouble finding the right position. Almost all attacks ran through Zidane.

This would seem to make the team's moves predictable, but he was so creative that his ideas were always turning up new surprises.

The French team had to live with the pressure of their own expectations, as well as that of the public, and they managed it. Thanks to the lessons they had learned from previous mistakes, their preparation had been spot on, and with a very balanced squad and a good team of assistants they reached their aim. They go down as the seventh nation to win the World Cup and the sixth to do so in their own country.
Central defender Laurent Blanc scored the golden goal in the second round match of the 1998 World Cup final, which had been struggling to find the net for 94 minutes of extra time.

Captain Didier Deschamps (here clashing with Bebeto of Brazil) ruled as a rock in the midfield.

Thierry Henry was more than a mere alternative to Zidane, Guivarch, and Dugarry; a 21-year-old, he was a big man.
Fabien Barthez was voted into the World Cup All-Star Team – and rightly so – alongside Zinedine Zidane (10), the wheeler and dealer in the French squad.
Germany

From left, back row: Bierhoff, Kohler, Wörn, Heinrich, Reuter, Möller; front row: Klinsmann, Jeremies, Thon, Köpke, Hässler

Having won the European title in 1996, Germany were reckoned among the favourites for winning the World Cup. The relatively high average age (at over 30 it was the highest of all the teams present) caused some speculation, but the general opinion was that the traditional German virtues, plus the vast amount of experience within the team, would see them once again among the close contenders for the title.

Coach Berti Vogts announced his 22-man selection on 18 May. They were assembled for a short training session in Finland, plus training camps directly before playing friendly matches against Colombia and Luxembourg. They arrived in their headquarters in the south of France on 7 June.

They came through the group games pretty much as everyone had expected. A comfortable victory over the USA was followed by the first real test, in the form of Yugoslavia. Thanks to gearing up a notch in the second half they came through, but at 2-2 it was a close thing. Then came Iran, and again two goals in the second half, the only ones of the match, earned them another 3 points. As group winners they would go on to meet Mexico in the second round. Some luck, coupled to their unflagging spirit, saw them through this match, but they came close to elimination.

Mexico had what amounted to a matchball in the second half, and had they taken this chance, life would have been hard for the Germans. As it turned out, the next match would be the last, Croatia, whom they had defeated on their way to the EURO 96 title, proved to be too much for the overall disappointing Germans. Despite putting on their best performance of the whole tournament, they were beaten 3-0 – a result which was a bit on the high side, and very painful. The verdict on the match was clear: the Germans had been the victims of a classical counter-attacking team, who really dominated the scene in the second half. To explain the defeat as the result of Wörn's expulsion just before half time with the score at 0-0 would be too easy and misleading.

Germany used a traditional 3-5-2 system with at first Olaf Thon and then Lothar Matthaus as libero, usually playing level with or even slightly forward of the two stoppers, Wörn and Kohler (both strong tacklers and good in the air). In midfield Hamann and Jeremies made sure things were safe at the back, while Heinrich (right) and Tarnat (or Ziege) played on the flanks and were active both in attack and defence. Hässler was involved in every attacking move and had no defensive duties. At first Vogts played Hässler together with Möller, then Möller without Hässler. Neither plan worked too well, so that in the last matches only Hässler was in the line-up (except for 30 minutes in the second round game against Mexico).

The forward partnership was Bierhoff and Klinsmann in every match.

Most attacks went down the wings, from where either Hässler or one of the two wide midfielders delivered high crosses to the strikers. Both Bierhoff and Klinsmann were very mobile, changing positions frequently and showing excellent positional sense; their reward was three goals apiece. An alternative move would be to attack down the middle, but this was not too successful, especially against teams that were very compact defensively.
Overdoing the aggression in tackling, depending too much on Bierhoff and Klinsmann in attack, and the failure to create many surprises in the build-up of a move were the Germans' weaknesses. It took Vogts a long while to get the best formation together. Players like Thor, Reuter and Moller found less favour as the tournament went on, and they were replaced by Tarnat, Ziege, Harmann and the surprising Matthaus, who had only been called into the squad at the last moment.

Thus the Germans were not able to compensate for their early elimination from the World Cup four years earlier. Their customary strengths, the will to win, physical and mental toughness and discipline, were not enough this time to get them further than the quarterfinal. Some rethinking is necessary; many of the players in France will not be available in the future and a rejuvenation of the team seems inevitable.

Klinsmann (18) and Bierhoff (keeping the Yugoslavian defence busy in the picture) complemented one another superbly in attack, netting together six of the eight goals for Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career as a player:</th>
<th>until 1979</th>
<th>Borussia Monchengladbach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career as a coach:</td>
<td>1970–1990</td>
<td>Youth national teams of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>National team of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successes: (as a player)</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>World champion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 x UEFA Cup, 5 x German champion, 1 x Cup winner with Borussia Monchengladbach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(as a coach)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>96 appearances for German «A» team European Champion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Italy

Cesare Maldini, who has been employed by the Italian association since 1980, partly as assistant trainer to Enzo Bearzot and also as coach of the U-21 national team, was appointed to the position of head coach at a time when the "Squadra azzurra" had already played their first World Cup qualifying matches and were about to face their first real test – an away game in England. A 1:0 victory here got him off to a good start. But things did not continue so well and the Italians eventually had to face a play-off match against Russia before definitely booking their tickets to France.

The direct preparation for France '98 started on 22 May in the association's training centre in Coverciano. During an 11-day period, they trained twice a day on 5 occasions, underwent medical testing and also played two easy training matches; that was the extent of their build-up for the World Cup. Careful attention was paid to working with the nominated substitute players. Maldini wanted to be sure that in case of need these could be smoothly integrated into the side. Every position was doubled up – the risk of injury or absence for other reasons is very high during such a long tournament.

Italy started off their group games with a libero, two man-markers, two wingbacks, three midfielders, one forward lying deep and a striker. After the disappointing opening match against Chile, Maldini made some alterations. Now he kept Costacurta at the back (although he would move forward later to replace the injured Nesta as a man-marker, with Bergomi coming in to take his place) and used three man-markers, (left to right) Nesta/Costa-curt, Cannavaro and his son Paolo Maldini. In midfield Di Biagio (replacing the disappointing Di Matteo during the first game) and Dino Baggio were responsible for defensive security. Albertini or Pessotto (left) and Moriero (coming on as a substitute too, for Di Livio) had both offensive and defensive duties, although Moriero was much more to be seen going forward. Further advanced Del Piero played just behind the single striker Vieri.

Gianluca Pagliuca was promoted to permanent goalkeeper after Peruzzi had been injured, justifying his coach's choice with consistency and competence.
Maldini’s system was founded on a strong defence. With the exception of Chile in that opening match, neither Cameroon, Austria (their only goal came from a penalty), Norway or France found a way through this fortification. Up to eight players were involved at times, but this concentration at the back naturally led to a lack of impulse up front.

Del Piero did not play to the expected standard, still appearing not to have recovered full fitness after his injury. Roberto Baggio only came on when Del Piero was not on the field, and while Moriero put in a strong effort on the right he lacked players in free spaces to pass to after he had done some good creative work. Luckily Italy had Vieri in the side, he scored five of the eight goals.

Arrigo Sacchi (World Cup 1994) and Cesare Maldini (1998) have two totally different approaches to the game. While Sacchi favoured an offensive style with pressing, and was prepared to run some risks, Maldini’s first priority was safety. His team had to be a goal down before they would go seriously on to the attack. They created very few chances, with their attacking moves largely limited to playing long passes from the defensive midfield area up to the quick and strong dribbling Vieri. Only when Roberto Baggio came on the pitch did the Italian team seem different. He brought with him creativity, ideas and imagination. But the coach did not want to play him as well as Del Piero, otherwise he would have been a man short in the defence department.

Experience, tactical discipline and good defensive organization were the strengths of the team, which had some outstanding individuals on view, but their skills were to be sublimated to the good of the team in Maldini’s philosophy. Thus they failed to play any spectacular football of the kind that Italian club teams are known for and which one would have expected just reading down a list of all the talented players in the squad.

| Career as a player: | 1953–1954 | Triestina Calcio |
|                    | 1954–1956 | A.C. Milan |
|                    | 1966–1967 | Torino Calcio |

|                   | 1974–1976 | Foggia Calcio |
|                   | 1976–1977 | Taranto Calcio |
|                   | 1978–1979 | Parma Calcio |
|                   | 1986–1996 | Italian under-21 national team |
|                   | 1996–1998 | National U-21 team |

| Successes: (as a player) | 1962–1963 | 4 times Italian champion |
|                        | 1972–1973 | UEFA cup of champions with A.C. Milan |
|                        | 1990–1996 | 3 times winner of the U-21 European championship |

| Successes: (as a coach) | 1962–1963 | 2 times Italian champion |
|                        | 1972–1973 | UEFA cup of champions with A.C. Milan |
|                        | 1990–1996 | 3 times winner of the U-21 European championship |

Roberto Baggio restored his reputation after missing the net in the 1994 World Cup, by hammering in his penalties in the first match against Chile (picture) and in the quarter-final shoot-out against France.
After some disappointing results during the final matches of their qualifying round (at which time they had already earned their qualification for France 98), the Mexican association found themselves under pressure from the media and the fans so that they felt it necessary to take action and replace the coach Bora Milutinovic after a number of years of service. They appointed the relatively little known (certainly unknown in Europe) Manuel Lapuente. The first opportunity he had to see how his team measured up on the international scene was at the Confederations’ Cup in Saudi Arabia in December 1997. They achieved one win (against the host country) and suffered defeats against Australia and Brazil. This was not the strongest possible Mexican team, since Lapuente did not have the services of first choice players such as goalkeeper Campos, García Aspe, Arellano, etc., for one reason or another. The second big test came in the form of the Gold Cup, the Concacaf championship, which Mexico won for the sixth time, defeating the USA in the final.

Their immediate preparations for the World Cup started at the beginning of May when they visited Europe (Italy and France). They played friendly matches against a number of clubs and some national sides, with results that were not all that promising. Mexico played a 3-4-3 system when they were attacking and a 4-3-3 on the defensive. The defenders played in line and used zone marking. The two centre backs (Suárez and Davino) directed the block and coordinated the offside trap, which the team used occasionally. The two wing backs assisted in attacking moves, with only one going forward at a time, guaranteeing at least three men at the back at all times.

In midfield, García Aspe was the dominating figure. A playmaker with a strong left foot, he was able to provide a stream of ideal passes for his teammates. Around him were Ramírez (until his expulsion shortly before the

Mexico's top goal scorer, Luis Hernández, was the power behind the goal that put his team ahead of Germany. Not content with that, he soon had another chance of making it 2-0 but failed to finish it off.
end of the match against Holland, Ordiales, Villa, Luna or Palencia. Coach Lapuente did not seem certain which combinations to use and made several changes. They affected the front line too, where Ordiales was sometimes to be found (or Palencia), on the right wing. Whichever one was there was likely to be replaced in the second half, either by Arellano or the joker Pelaez. Blanco was a fixture on the left, as was top scorer Hernandez in the middle.

In attack the Mexicans had their major strength. Their quick inter-passing game (only rarely did they use the long ball) was very effective, as were the numerous attacks down the wings. Whoever was working out on the wings was sure to be quick and tricky and cause trouble for the opponent’s defence. The constant interchange of positions among the three forwards created spaces for advancing midfielders in the centre or for the wing backs down the flanks. Lapuente showed a lucky touch in his use of Pelaez as a substitute. Against Korea and Holland he scored shortly after coming on (getting the 1–1 against Korea and pulling one back against Holland to make it 1–2).

As individuals the players who stood out were goalkeeper Campos, playing the keepe/r/sweeper role that he enjoys and carries out efficiently, Garcia Aspe in midfield, Hernandez in attack (a fast, spectacular player) and Blanco (very skillful in his play out on the left wing).

But Mexico had trouble when the other team were dictating the play and putting pressure on their defence. Yet paradoxically they played better after they had conceded a goal and were trying to get back on terms than they did when they themselves were in the lead. Against Germany they scored the first goal and then lost the match. In the matches in which they fell behind, they always managed to earn at least a draw. The defence was the weak part of the team in general – not compact enough and liable to take risks near their own box. Another negative factor was the lack of pace on the part of the midfielders.

Mexico acquired the reputation of the come-back kids. In their match against the Netherlands they again borrowed their way back into the game to level the score after being two goals down. Blanco (11) and Hernandez (15) are seen threatening goalie van der Sar and his line of defenders.

Their aim of getting past the second round was not achieved once again. But they played a style of football that was a pleasure to watch and their overall performance augurs well for the future. The quality of their attacking players could bring them greater success, but on the defensive they will have to learn how to hang on to a lead once they have earned one.
A lot of gossip has circulated about the Dutch team, about who is not speaking to whom, who won't pass to whom, which players won't travel together on the same bus or on the same plane. All rumours have been welcomed by the press and met with incomprehension by the fans. How would a team like this, counted among the close favourites, actually perform in the battle for the World Cup?

Their preparation consisted of several phases. From 7 to 18 May a squad of 25 players (without Davids and Seedorf, who were still engaged in the Champions' League) travelled to Florida (USA). Then they returned to Europe for a short spell in Switzerland. Shortly after this, coach Gus Hiddink announced his definite 22-man selection during a final session in Holland.

Their preparatory matches seemed to be a very good omen, with two 5-1 wins over Paraguay and Nigeria, both World Cup participants themselves. While such victories cannot be relied upon too heavily as a guide to form, they were a morale booster for both the Dutch team and their fans.

Their first opponents were arch-rivals Belgium. The «Red Devils» were aiming for nothing more than a goalless draw, and their defensive tactics posed problems for the «Oranjes». The situation became worse when Kluitert was sent off for attacking another player, and earned a two-match suspension. But the team pulled itself together for the next match and demolished Korea. Then they set the seal on their qualification for the second round with a 2-2 against Mexico (only a draw, despite having been 2:0 ahead at one stage). The victory over Yugoslavia was clearer than the score would indicate, but they had a bit of luck here when Mijatovic hit the bar with a penalty with the score at 1:1. The hardest test so far would come with Argentina in the quarterfinal. This was a rousing game, with a dramatic finish when Bergkamp scored a masterful goal following a long pass from Frank de Boer. Then came 190 minutes of battle against Brazil which ended in defeat at the penalty-shooting stage. After this disappointment, they were unable to motivate themselves fully for the 3rd place play-off against Croatia and ended up conceding the bronze medals to the Eastern Europeans.

Holland were certainly one of the most attractive teams at this World Cup. They had a clear structure in their play, based on the method that has been taught in Dutch clubs and teams for the last 25 years. While players have become more versatile over the years, the Dutch philosophy has remained the same. Their players seem to love football. It never ceases to amaze how well young players immediately integrate into an established team. This time it was the barely 22-year-old Zenden who was introduced and immediately showed his class, especially with his superb goal against Croatia.

Their 4-3-3 line-up was flexibly interpreted, becoming a 4-4-2 when they lost possession, by means of one of the three forwards dropping back into midfield. On the attack, one of the outer backs would move forward into midfield, in an attempt to achieve superiority in numbers. Frank De Boer and Stam alternated in going up to join in an attack. In midfield Hiddink tried at first to manage without Davids but he saw that he would not get far with that plan. Davids became the dominating figure...
Points of excellence in the team were the accurate, well-timed and often surprising passes from the De Boers, plus the play of Davids and Overmars who were often just that fraction faster than their opponents. The forwards were constantly interchanging their positions in order to create room for players coming through from behind. The Dutch often seemed to play the ball into an apparently crowded area, but then used a one-two or a triangle combination to create a space for somebody. They made great use of the length and the breadth of the field, with Overmars and Ronald De Boer a constant threat on the flanks.

Yet with all this individual talent it was the team that came first. Collective play was the main feature of their performance, and there was no sign of any of the earlier dissent that had been talked about so much. The tactical plan the coach had formulated was followed carefully. The players on the bench were of top quality, with names like Aron Winter and Champions' League winner Clarence Seedorf only getting the occasional chance.

It was interesting to observe how closely linked to a game coach Gus Hiddink and his assistants ran their training sessions. It was always clear to see how an exercise related to a match situation.

The lack of creativity apparent in the first game proved to be a bit of a puzzle. Probably the reason is that both teams know each other so well, having been drawn together in countless competitions. But Holland seemed to be vulnerable to the quick counter-attack. Against Croatia the two goals they conceded were achieved with only a couple of passes.

Holland have never enjoyed the greatest luck at major football championships. Their only appearances in World Cup finals ended in defeat, 1974 in Germany and 1978 in Argentina, both times against the home country. But during these tournaments they had been the team which had put on the best performances during all the previous games in the competition. So after a longish spell without success, 1998 seemed to offer them a chance of glory at last. Sadly, the lucky colour this time was not orange either, and history continues to record their missed opportunities.

|                    | 1975      | Washington Diplomats (USA) |
|                    | 1977      | San José (USA) |
|                    | 1978–1981 | Nijmegen |

| Career as a coach: | 1980–1990 | PSV Eindhoven |
|                   | 1990–1991 | Fenerbahce Istanbul (Turkey) |
|                   | 1991–1994 | Valencia (Spain) |
|                   | 1995–1998 | Dutch national coach |

| Successes: (as a coach) | 1988 | UEFA Champion cup with PSV Eindhoven |
|                       | 1986–1989 | Four times Dutch champion with PSV Eindhoven |
|                       | 1988–1990 | Three times Dutch cup winner with PSV Eindhoven |
The role of the assistant
back into the tournament and Edgar
second part of the
field, his game in the
above (left) Spain
scored! Patrick Kluivert
be this squad's top goal
(above) Two out of
injury? Dennis Bergkamp
the game: despite initial
the Dutch team's attack;
Netherlands
players who were
Nigeria came to France as the great hope of African football. As two-times African champions (1980 and 1994) and Olympic champions in 1996 they arrived with a good record. Would they be the first African country to win the World Cup itself?

But, unfortunately, there seems to be a trend that is developing in Africa, as well as in other continents, that the coach is replaced after qualification for the World Cup has been secured. That changing trainers is also going to mean changing the team’s playing system, their tactics, etc., is somehow not seen as part of the picture. But Nigeria followed this fashion. Of course the country still has a wealth of individual talent available (most of them graduating from the victorious Olympic team), but they did not have much time to adapt to the style of play that new coach Bora Milutinovic planned for them and there was quite a bit of criticism during the build-up to the World Cup when a number of friendly matches ended with very unpromising scorelines.

In addition, Nigeria were drawn in the strongest-looking of all the eight groups. Spain, Paraguay and Bulgaria would be their three opponents. While the Africans were still counted among the favourites for the title, it was a bit of a surprise when they beat Spain in their opening match. Twice they were a goal behind and having caught up to 2:2, a magnificent drive from Oliyeh won them the game. Yet they had found it difficult to get the rhythm of their own game started. The automatic understanding that a well-tuned team shows was missing, and they were not a compact unit at all in the first half. But they improved after the interval to earn the three points. Against Bulgaria in the next match a problem in their play became apparent, one that would eventually cost them dearly, and that was an over-confidence verging on arrogance. True they did (just) beat the Bulgarians who had finished 4th in 1994, but they never showed the style that would indicate they were going to go a long way in this tournament. In the last group game against Paraguay, Milutinovic made a number of substitutions for a variety of reasons, and it was no surprise that they lost this encounter 1:3 against a team still having to fight for a place in the next round.

Now they had to face Denmark, but instead of concentrating on this game they were already talking about the one after that which would be against Brazil. But they never got that far since the Danes had the right answer to Nigeria’s imagined superiority, and hardly had the game begun before it was decided. Playing as a real team and making efficient use of their chances the Europeans made the African team look quite second rate.

Obviously one of their problems was the late replacement of the coach. The new man basically had too little time to get the players fully adjusted to the style of play he wanted. Another was that they seemed simply to behave like 29 individuals, more concerned with their own careers than with putting their skills at the disposal of the team. They appeared to have overlooked the point that when a team is successful the players in it will be seen in a positive light too. The third and perhaps most critical problem was the over-blown expectations of all concerned. Talk was always about being in the final or at least the semifinal, little was heard about how they would actually get that far.
A run down of some of their individual performances — goalkeeper Rufai never reached the level that had made him one of the best keepers in 1994. He seemed unsure in his actions both on the line and coming out into the penalty area. In the four-man defensive block, West and Uche alternated as libero, both of them strong in the air and both powerful in going forward. As wing backs they had Adepoju (right) and Babayaro doing both defensive and offensive work. In midfield two players stood out — Oliseh was the rearmost of the two, directing and organizing at the back, while Okocha was the playmaker and practically every dangerous forward move saw him involved. Oliseh had a hard powerful shot (see the third goal against Spain) while Okocha was a wonderful dribbler and also liked to shoot, but he was not as successful. With two talented wide midfielders, Finidi (right) and Lawal, the option of attacking down the flanks was frequently chosen. In four games over 60 crosses were played into the centre (not counting corners), with two of them leading to goals. Of the forwards only Ipekeba commanded a regular place. His usual partner Amokachi was injured at the beginning, Kanu only came on as the tournament progressed and Yekini was used as a joker. Okocha, Oliseh, Adepoju and the two central defenders West and Uche were the strongest players during this tournament. It was mostly due to them that the team at least had phases in which they looked a very capable side.

Nigeria will have to give some thought to the future. Talent alone is not sufficient at the highest level. Their new coach must be given time to build up a team that can be guided slowly towards the apex of world football. Short term solutions will not enable the association to realise its objectives.
Norway

From left, back row: Rekdal, Tore Andre Flo, Havard Flo, Eggen, Johnsen, Berg, Solbakken; front row: Riseth, Bjarnebye, Grodas, Strand

Norway came through their qualifying group unbeaten (six wins and two draws) to get to the final round of the World Cup for the second time in succession. Their aim was to do better than they had four years earlier when they had ended the first round level on points with all the other teams in their group only to be eliminated on the court of fewer goals scored.

Their preparation consisted solely of a number of friendly games (against, among others, Denmark, Mexico and Saudi Arabia). They did not arrange any training camps, but spent time analysing their own performances and putting the players through tests, as well as studying their group opponents (Brazil, Morocco and Scotland) very carefully. Nothing was left to chance.

The delegation arrived in France on 4 June, which left just a week to get the fine-tuning adjusted before their opening match against Morocco. The squad contained 10 players who had been there in 1994, six of them being first choices, one a regular substitute. The other "old hands" were only used sporadically, if at all.

While things were tight in their group again, this time luck was on the Norwegians' side. After drawing their first two matches, 0:0 against Morocco and 1:1 against Scotland, they found themselves in the position of having to beat Brazil in order to qualify. But they had in fact overcome the world champions in 1997, admittedly playing at home in a friendly match. In Marseilles it looked as if 0:0 would be the outcome for a long time. Brazil were already assured of top spot in the group and Norway were not creating much in the way of chances. But the game got going 15 minutes from the end when Bebeto put Brazil in front. For the Scandinavians it was now all or nothing. It turned out to be all; first T.A. Flo got the equalizer and then just six minutes later referee Baharestan (USA) correctly awarded a penalty when Junior Balano grabbed Flo's shirt in the box. Rekdal converted safely. But their first match in the knockout round was their last. Italy scored in the first half and all the Norwegians' efforts to come back were in vain. In contrast to the Brazil game they were unable to find a way through.

What chances they did create were acrobatically dealt with by the Italian goalkeeper Pagliuca.

Norway used a classic 4-5-1 on the defensive, a 4-3-3 when developing an attack and a 4-2-4 when they were in full attacking flight. The four-man defensive chain played in a line and were one of the few defensive blocks to use the offside trap. As usual in Norwegian teams the two central defenders were very tall (Eggen 1.92 m and Johnsen 1.90 m) and accordingly strong in the air. High balls were never a problem for this defence, but long through passes were more successful. Four of the five goals conceded coming via this kind of attack.

The five players in midfield were responsible for being the first line of defence. They made space tight for an opponent, and the centre of the field was firmly guarded. Rekdal (10) was Norway's playmaker. He was involved in most of their attacks which were often in the form of long passes or high crosses.

Up front Tore Andre Flo was left isolated quite often. What support he did get came from Havard Flo or Riseth on the wings, with Flo...
on the left being the more active of the two. When Tore Andre Flo roamed out to the wings, Leonhardsen and Mykland (or Strand) would come through down the middle.

The Norwegians’ strongest point, in both defence and attack, was their heading. Their shooting was not as dangerous. Only Tore Andre Flo and Riseth did much dribbling. The team’s overall organization, their tactical discipline and their physical condition were all impressive. It was clear who had been assigned what role and each player knew exactly what he had to do. Their style of play was geared to the talents of the players available and relied a lot on quick counter attacks. They were also efficient in their utilisation of set pieces. In this respect, Morocco were on the receiving end of some well-practised moves, twice conceding goals to free kicks from the edge of the penalty area which were played high into the middle.

Their attacks were not all that creative and tended to be stereotyped, and not all the players had skills of the highest international standard. Against long balls played from a deep position and also against quick inter-passing moves, the defence did not look totally secure.

The most impressive players in the team were wing back Bjørnebye with his variety of passing (also during set pieces), playmaker Rekdal with his good ball skills, and Tore Andre Flo, very determined and hard to dispossess.

Thus Norway achieved the aim that they had set themselves. They came through in a difficult group and then against a defensive Italy they could have fared better. But they stuck with their counter-attacking tactics that time, even after falling behind and that was not enough to see them through.

Tore Andre Flo (9) was the only official striker in the Norwegian plan of attack. He kicked the crucial equalizer against Brazil, turning the game in Norway’s favour and, consequently, opening the door to the second round.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career as a player:</th>
<th>1958–1974</th>
<th>Østfold IL, Vålerenga IF, Sarpsborg FK, Frigg FK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career as a coach:</td>
<td>1978–1979</td>
<td>Coach of various Norwegian clubs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979–1985</td>
<td>Norway U-21 national team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Norway Olympic team (assistant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Norway Olympic team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990–1998</td>
<td>Norway national ‘A’ team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successes (as a player)</td>
<td>16 appearances with the Norwegian national ‘A’ team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Paraguay

France 98 was Paraguay's first return to the World Cup since 1986. The foundation of this achievement was laid in the early stages of the qualifying round when they went nine games without defeat (7 wins) after an initial loss against Colombia. They actually headed the group for a long time. Their preparation started with a visit to Japan to take part in the Kirin Cup (16 to 23 May). Then they travelled to Holland (Eindhoven) where they remained until they moved on to France on 7 June. They played a number of warm-up matches, but the results were not good enough to raise any great hopes. In addition they were drawn in what was seen as the toughest group of them all with Bulgaria, Nigeria and Spain.

Their Brazilian coach Paulo César Carpegiani was not disturbed by all this and stated repeatedly that the team had everything to win and nothing to lose. In fact they ended the group games unbeaten, with a goal-line of 3-1, and thus found themselves among the last 16. But there it would be the first-ever Golden Goal in the history of the World Cup that would put them out. Paraguay based their strategy on a strong defence, which at times contained as many as 7 players (three defenders and four midfielders). With the outstanding Chilavert in goal, Sarabia, Ayala and Gamarra were the three permanent defenders. None of them was really a libero; they concentrated on zone-marking and inter-changed positions as necessary. This style of defensive play demands perfect organization and coordination between defence and midfield. But the drawback was that very little offensive drive came from the back.

In general there were 5 players in midfield. The two flank players had a double role to fulfill: a) to close down space on the wings and b) to work with the central midfielders in a zone-marking scheme. Only one of them was active in attacking moves, with the result that in the first two games and in the second round match their attack was practically non-existent. When they did go forward it was either

José Luis Chilavert’s versatility both in goal and on the field as a leader and motivator made him one of the championship’s most memorable personalities.
using a short-passing game or via long through passes and high centres. They failed to create any goals via a build-up of their own; the goals that came were either the result of regaining possession thanks to pressing near the opponent's penalty area (the three against Nigeria) or followed a set piece.

Paraguay's game was based on discipline, faultless defensive behaviour and excellent positional play. Cooperation between midfield and defence functioned extremely well. They were also a team with the right mental attitude - ready to work hard and not accept defeat. And in goal they had the exceptional José Luis Chilavert - player, leader, motivator and coach all in one. Their strategy in the knockout game against France was clear - hang on until the penalty shoot-out and there Chilavert would make the difference. He was a truly dominating figure, and a free kick he took against Bulgaria was almost successful. It would not have been his first.

Others who caught the eye were - Benitez in midfield, the only creative player in the team; Arce out on the left in midfield with his long passes and precise centres; central defenders Ayala and Gamarra who were both calm and effective.

Had Paraguay been as strong in attack as in defence they would have been very serious contenders for the title, but they put all their emphasis on preventing the other team from scoring and so their own efforts up front were lacking in ideas and penetration. Carpegiani knew exactly what skills he could count on within his squad and chose his tactics accordingly. By doing so he achieved the maximum possible.
In the qualifying round for the World Cup, Romania almost came through without dropping a point. Only in the last match did they fail to win, earning a 1-1 against Ireland (who themselves went on into the play-off round and were defeated there by Belgium). All the same, this was a very impressive performance.

Their preparations were carried out at home from 15 to 26 May. Coach Iordanescu invited 24 players to attend a training camp, and he made the cut down to the regulation 22 on 1 June. On 3 June they played Paraguay in Romania as a last serious test before they moved on to their headquarters in France.

Apart from the final group game against Tunisia, at which time their qualification for the second round was assured, Iordanescu always used the same starting formation. He knew his players thoroughly and was convinced that he had found the best system for using them. The team played a 1-2-5-2 system, with a libero, two man-markers, two wide and three central midfielders, of whom one was geared more towards defence, one more towards attack and one (Hagi) was relieved of all defensive responsibilities. He was left free to use his talents in whatever way was best for the team. The two strikers were Ilie and Moldovan.

At the back Filipescu and Ciobotariu were the two central defenders and they man-marked their opponents. On the flanks Petrescu (right) and Munteanu used free spaces.

Viorel Moldovan scored the first goal against England. Romania’s ultimate victory ensured them an early ticket to the second round.

down the wings to lend support to attacking moves. As long as his condition held out, Hagi was to be seen everywhere, in the middle, out on the right, trying to escape the attentions of his markers. He was the dominating figure, the driving force and the playmaker all in one.

Romania’s attacking moves were most effective when they played diagonal passes or short combinations through the middle. Some of their wing play was also dangerous as they tried to get the ball to Moldovan in the penalty area. His partner Ilie played a little bit deeper and from this area he scored one of the best goals of the tournament (against Colombia).

Who to play in goal had been a problem for Iordanescu...
Having struggled for years to find a worthy goalkeeper, Romania came up with a world-class goalie in time for the World Cup: Bogdan Stelea pictured in spectacular action against Vlaovic from Croatia.

Stelea at the World Cup in 1994 and at EURO 96. In France he made Stelea his definite first choice, and the keeper justified the selection by showing hardly any uncertainty. Especially in the second round match against Croatia his almost miraculous saves staved off total disaster. In this game the signs that things were not going well that had been seen in the last group match (Tunisia) became more apparent, and Romania went down without much of a fight. Only Stelea offered real resistance.

In addition to the goalkeeper, players who earned high marks were libero Popescu, Petrescu on the right flank, where he did valuable work both in defence and in attack, Hagi of course, and the young Ilie, only 24, who was a clever dribbler and capable of ending a run with a strong shot. His movement off the ball was also a positive feature of his play, and he was a handful for any opposing defence.

The impression they made in their first two group games of being a very talented team was only partly confirmed. Some of the players were indeed above average, but as a team they did not blend together sufficiently. In addition some of them seemed to have trouble keeping up with the physical demands of a tournament like this, and so lapses of concentration crept into their game at times. After their fine start they fell away – their early qualification for the second round may well not have been without its negative side.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1982–1984</td>
<td>OF Crete (Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984–1986</td>
<td>Steaua Bucharest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career as a coach:</th>
<th>1994–1996</th>
<th>Steaua Bucharest (playing as coach)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996–1998</td>
<td>Steaua Bucharest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999–2000</td>
<td>APOEL (Cyprus)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Successes (as a player)</th>
<th>1985/86</th>
<th>European Championship clubs’ cup with Steaua Bucharest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986–1993</td>
<td>three national championships and two cup trophies with Steaua</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Yugoslavia's last success on the international scene dates back to 1987 in Chile, when they won the World Youth Championship. Since then they have made one fringe appearance when they finished 5th at the World Cup-Walcup '90. Coach Slavjan was motivated to think that better things might be possible by his team's two sweeping wins in the World Cup qualifying play-off matches against Hungary (7-1 and 5-0).

The team's preparation consisted of three phases: first a training camp at home in Belgrade, to which 24 players were invited, followed immediately by a friendly match against Nigeria in Belgrade. Then they moved to Switzerland for a second camp (1-9 June) during which they played further friendly matches against the host country and Japan. Finally they moved on to France. Since their first match was scheduled for 15 June they did not arrive there until just one day before the official opening ceremony on 10 June.

They qualified comfortably for the second round, earning wins over Iran and the USA (both 1-0), and a 2-2 draw against Germany. Despite collecting seven points they were not top of the group, and they can only blame themselves for that; they were 2-0 up against the reigning European champions but failed to defend their lead until the end. They suddenly seemed to become too defensive, as if they were afraid of winning, and became very nervous when the Germans pulled a goal back in a lucky manner. It looked only a matter of time before the equalizer came along. And it would be the same shakiness that caused their undoing in the second round. From the start they were dominated by a strong but not all-powerful Dutch team. That the result was only 0-1 at half time was due more to a lack of opportunism on the part of the Dutch than to any stout defending from the Yugoslavs. In the second half they improved, looked more aggressive and seemed to have re-discovered their confidence in their own ability. Their equalizer was well deserved and more seemed to be possible when the Spanish referee Garcia Aranda awarded them a penalty. But Mijatovic only hit the bar and it was all over with the re-found self-confidence. They finally went down 1-2, although the winning goal came only in stoppage time. But on the basis of play it could have come earlier; it was not bad luck that cost the Yugoslavs this game.

Yugoslavia favoured a flexible 4-4-2 system or a 4-1-3-2. The four-man defence used zone marking, with the two central players (Djurovic and Mihajlovic) alternating as libero behind the block. On the wings Komljenovic (or Mirkovic) on the right and Petrovic were very efficient, both in their defending and their attacking play. The defence got steady support from midfield. Jokanovic played as a second libero in front of the back four and closed off space for the opponents, as well as trying to start attacking moves. Stojkovic and Jugovic were the attacking midfielders, while Brnovic (or Stankovic) in the fourth midfield position shuttled back and forth between defence and attack. The two strikers Milosevic (or Ognjenovic) and Mijatovic were brought into action via short passing combinations or by deep passes from midfield. They often roamed out to the wings to create space for the advancing midfielders, and also helped out in defence, one or other
Savo Milosevic shoots past Dooley from the USA towards goal. His reliance on a permanent niche in the team soon gave way to the occasional appearance on the orders of the Yugoslavian coach, Santrac.

of the two dropping back into midfield when the team lost possession.

All the players had polished technical skills; no problems for them either in controlling the ball or in hitting short or long passes exactly where they wanted them to go. Mijatovic and Mihajlovic were skilled marksmen, and the heading of Komjelenovic both in defence and in attack was in a special class. The two young players used, Ognjenovic (striker) and Stankovic (midfield), showed their talent when they were given a chance, and at 21 and 20 respectively they look good prospects for the future. Goalkeeper Kralj was sound at the back, confident on the line and in the penalty area. However, his positional play was a little shaky on a few occasions, and these lapses were costly (the first goal against Holland).

This was a promising team with a lot of fine individual players. At the moment they seem to lack the self-confi-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career as a player</th>
<th>1959–1960</th>
<th>Takovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960–1965</td>
<td>Veljevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1965–1973</td>
<td>OFK Beograd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973–1976</td>
<td>Grasshoppers Zurich (Switzerland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976–1977</td>
<td>OFK Beograd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981–1983</td>
<td>FK Gelenika</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Career as a coach | 1994– | U-21 national team of Yugoslavia |
|                   |       | Yugoslav national team |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Successes (as a player)</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>Yugoslav cup winner with OFK Beograd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Yugoslav champion with OFK Beograd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
High standards

By Volker Roth (Germany), member of the FIFA Referees' Committee.

The 34 referees at Manoir de Gressy, their headquarters during the 1998 FIFA World Cup. Because of injury, the Swedish referee Anders Frisk (third from the right, back row) had to be replaced by the Polish referee Ryszard Wojcik (not in the picture).
To keep in step with the increase in the number of teams from 24 to 32, the number of match officials had to go up too. In all 34 referees and 33 assistant referees were invited by FIFA to take part. They were divided among the confederations as follows: AFC 4 referees and 5 assistants, CAF 5/4, Concacaf 3/4, Conmebol 6/5, OFC 1/1 and UEFA 15/14.

With these 67 officials coming from 52 different countries, some problems might have been expected. Differences in character, culture, religion, sporting and political viewpoints, eating and living habits, not to mention language, were all factors that might have led to problems and which had to be considered. That the Referees' Committee did not once in the course of the tournament have to resort to the slightest disciplinary measure speaks volumes for the behaviour of all concerned. The atmosphere among the group was relaxed and friendly, with no rivalry apparent – in short it was all very sporting.

Some of the credit for this must go to the excellent treatment they received from the Fédération Française de Football (FFF), with Michel Vautrot and Joel Quiniou constantly looking after the welfare of the refereeing group and making sure that their every wish was satisfied. Certainly another factor that contributed to the feeling of well-being within the group was the fact that FIFA had chosen as their headquarters the "Manoir de Gressy". Gressy en France is a small village of some 900 inhabitants to the south of Paris and about 30 km from the Paris Charles de Gaulle airport. There are hardly any shops, just a shopping centre somewhat out of town. This was an ideal spot, located in open countryside, with a river and lots of woods in the vicinity, attractive houses and friendly people in the village – a guarantee for peace and quiet. A better place to prepare for the difficult assignment ahead could hardly be imagined.

The FFF arranged a detailed programme of leisure activities too, and a number of visitors, including the press, came to Gressy to see the site. A preparatory course for the referees and assistants was held from 22 to 27 March 1998, during which they underwent fitness testing and were given a thorough grounding about their responsibilities by means of lectures from members of the FIFA Referees' Committee and by participation in discussion groups. The physical limits set, 2 x 50 m in less than 7.5 seconds, 2 x 200 m in less...
A total of 250 yellow cards were shown during the 64 matches.
firm and consistent from the beginning were the ones who had the fewest problems. The assistant referees were one of the success stories of the tournament: they were observant, focussed on the job, friendly, sporting, and with very few exceptions correct in their decisions. The idea of making this function a specialised one in its own right has proved its worth. The use of beep communicators between officials was a great help, and the electronic board used for substitutions was also used for indicating how much stoppage time would be added on - which meant that both teams were completely aware of the situation, and thus protests were totally avoided.

Public opinion about the refereeing seems to be divided into two camps, but on the whole it can be said that the standard of officiating - viewed objectively - has risen. The level of preparation, performance and post-match analysis have all reached a very high standard, and, as the final showed, the so-called minor football nations have joined the top ranks in this respect – a very encouraging development.

A serious warm-up is also a must for the trio of referees before a match.
Healthy condition

By the FIFA Sports Medical Committee

In many respects, France 98 reached new levels in the history of the World Cup. The highest ever number of participating teams made the organisation disproportionately harder, from the medical as well as from many other points of view. This report was prepared by the members of the Sports Medicine Committee who were present at the tournament.

Organisation

Medical facilities were organized on three levels:
- at the 10 venues
- at each of the teams' headquarters, where there were doctors from the French Football Federation (FFF)
- at the centres where FIFA/CFO were located, with members of the FIFA Sports Medical Committee working together with doctors from the French Football Federation.

Every team doctor was able to call on support supervised by a doctor from the FFF, before, during and after matches. Specialists were available in many fields, e.g. internal medicine, sports medicine, orthopaedic surgery, ear, nose and throat, stomatology, ophthalmology, radiology, cardiology, as well as podology and oral surgery in cases of emergency.

These services were requested on a number of occasions, especially by the teams that spent a longer period of time in France. In every case an appeal for help was met with appropriate action.

For the possible medical needs of referees and assistants a special plan had been drawn up on 23-27 March, which was put into

The top strikers were often the target of hard and sometimes unfair attacks.
At every venue, physiotherapy facilities were available for referees, so that their recuperation between matches would also be optimal.

For members of FIFA's own World Cup staff in France, medical assistance was available at every venue from both FFF doctors and also from members of FIFA's Sports Medicine Committee. In every case of need help was quickly on hand. And in fact there was some need, since at FIFA headquarters in Paris the working environment (non-opening windows, air-conditioning and adverse atmospheric conditions) led to a number of respiratory ailments and conjunctivitis among the already stressed members of staff, requiring medical assistance on a number of occasions.

Doping controls

Before the World Cup began guidelines for doping controls were set up, and the list of banned substances was brought up to date. The team doctors of the participating countries were informed of the Anti-doping Policy in a pre-competition workshop. The regulations were sent to all the national associations involved, and before the first game acknowledgement of and agreement to these regulations was requested from each national association by the President and the General Secretary. By taking this step, FIFA wanted to ensure the officials responsible for each delegation had studied and accepted the conditions contained in these regulations. In this way, possible misunderstandings were avoided right from the start.

The Laboratoire Nationale de Depistage du Dopage in Paris (Chatenay-Malabry) was designated as the official centre for doping controls. The members of the FIFA Sports Medicine Committee were distributed among the different venues. The doctors designated by the French Ministry of Youth and Sport were responsible for assisting the FIFA doctors in carrying out doping controls, and help was also provided by the FFF, so that for every control the legal responsibility of the Ministry and the support of the FFF and the local organizing committee (CFO) were guaranteed. Cooperation between the members of these different groups ran very smoothly, and the practical side of carrying out testing was simplified by using a standardised procedure. After an average of 8 hours,
Injuries during the tournament

The 64 matches were analysed within the framework of the F-MARC programme, with respect to the nature and causes of the injuries. The results were recorded in the form of the number of injuries occurring, the circumstances which led to them, the type of injury and the connection between fouls and the injuries resulting from them.

Every team doctor was asked to fill out a sheet for each match, on which the diagnosis and a description of the injury was noted, as well as the time at which it occurred. In cases of doubt, the team doctor discussed the matter with one of the FIFA medical team.

A video recording was made of every match and each interruption due to injury was noted to the minute. In this way an analysis is possible of the cause of an injury and also of the connection between fouls and injuries, so that the results of this study can be published later.

Nature of frequency of injuries

In all 106 injuries were suffered, and the part of the body affected in each case was noted (see Fig. 1). The most common area of injury was the knee joint (95% of all cases), with most of these being dislocations or contusions. In three cases the damage was severe enough (crucial ligament) to put the player out of the tournament.

With 20% of the total the thigh region was the second most common area to suffer damage, usually pulled muscles or contusions. Some of the injuries here were simply due to over-exertion.

Head injuries were surprisingly only noted in 15 cases (15%). Most of these were cuts caused by direct contact and could be stitched. There were fortunately no serious head injuries at all.

The remaining types of injury can be seen in Fig. 1.

Injuries due to fouls

19 injuries or 20% of the total can be viewed as being typical results of a foul. The Sports Medicine Committee is carrying out an investigation in this respect.
Injuries and the number of matches

- the average was 1.65 injuries per game over the 64 matches
- four teams played seven matches and averaged five injuries each
- four teams played five matches and averaged six injuries each
- eight teams played four matches and averaged six injuries each
- sixteen teams played three matches and averaged 3.5 injuries each
- teams that were eliminated after the first round averaged 3.5 injuries each, those who went further in the competition had each
- Figure 2 shows the injuries among the 32 teams, with one team having 12 at the top and four teams with four each at the end. The overall average was 3.3 per team.

On the whole the frequency and the seriousness of injuries in this tournament can be described as moderate. What was a surprise was the fact that the number of thigh and head injuries was greater than the number in the ankle region. The knee was the most affected area, with three cases being serious, which averages out to one per 21 games. Twenty percent of the injuries were the result of fouls, a point that must be investigated further.

On average there were 1.65 injuries per match and 3.3 per team.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the analysis of injuries and the promotion of measures that lead to their prevention will continue to be a priority for FIFA and the Sports Medicine Committee; this is a matter whose importance must not be ignored nor under-estimated.
The organisation of security

By Walter Gagg, Director of FIFA Sports Division

The security arrangements for the World Cup in France 1998 moved into totally new dimensions. The provisions of the «Schengen Agreement» regarding the free crossing of borders within Europe led to a unique level of security measures being taken. As we reported back in 1995, the French government appointed a special commission at a very early stage in the planning, whose mandate was to work with the CFO and FIFA to study and analyse all aspects of the security side of the organisation of the World Cup and to produce a feasible plan for their implementation.

What might have been considered as just a routine exercise was quite frequently anything but a straightforward and uncomplicated assignment. Often long and hard negotiations were required to come up with reasonable solutions to some of the problems, that would be acceptable to all parties involved.

Under the leadership of an official from the Ministry of the Interior, meetings involving everyone concerned with the different aspects of security were held in all the venue cities during the months.

The game between Iran and the USA was classified as a particularly high-risk match. The fair behaviour demonstrated by the players spilled over to the spectators with the result that a so-called «high-risk match» was transformed into a footballing feast.
The special training of the unarmed security staff (stadium guards and stewards) required excellent long-term planning. These officials shouldered their responsibilities seriously and effectively, and the result was that during the total of 64 matches no more than half a dozen spectators actually found their way onto the pitch. This was an achievement to be proud of.

But unfortunately, the hooligan element made its presence felt a few times during what on the whole was a superb, fair and colourful World Cup competition. Before the England versus Tunisia match in Marseilles there were violent confrontations between some English hooligans, North African youths and the security forces. The result was a number of injuries ranging from light to quite serious and property damage running into the millions; hundreds of arrests were made for disturbance of the peace or assault and the detainees were only released again after interrogation.

Even worse were the events in Lens, on the very day that had been designated «Fair Play Day» - 21 June 1998 - before, during and especially after the match between Germany and Yugoslavia. The confrontations between German youths, who had come to France without tickets, and the local police and security forces escalated from hour to hour and culminated in an unprovoked and mindless attack on a gendarme, Daniel Nivel. He was so seriously injured that after being transported to the University-Hospital in Lille, he remained there in an artificial coma for 7 weeks. Even though his condition has since improved, it is doubtful whether he will ever regain full use of all his faculties.

Germany were deeply moved by this tragic event and throughout the country movements were started to help out in this situation, which reflects very positively on the whole German nation, trying to compensate for the inane actions of the few.

With memories of such tragic events hard to erase, it will be a main task for FIFA in the future to try to prevent such outbreaks of hooliganism. The aim will be to take such steps that violence is finally removed from the football stadium and kept far away from the sporting scene, where it has no place.

The FIFA team responsible for matters of security - Horst R. Schmidt, Cees de Bruin, Ernie Walker and Leon Walker - are an efficient unit with years of experience behind them. Their permanent contacts in all directions which included the writer of this report and extended as far as the CFO director for security matters Dominique Spinosi, and to Georges Querry, the security officer for the Ministry of the Interior, made it possible to deal with the daily problems that arose in an efficient manner, which received a lot of praise from all sides. Every match which was seen as being of special importance, or as likely to be accompanied by a high risk of violence, was analysed on the spot in advance by FIFA's security officials, and precautions were taken after careful consultation with local security agents. With these agencies working together, match day security measures were set up and carefully enforced during the course of the match.

With the exception of Marseilles and Lens, as mentioned above, this World Cup was a success, not only on the sporting side but also in terms of safety and security.

For FIFA, security will remain a central point of the organisational programme for any of its football competitions in the future as well.
Is Fair Play realistic?

By Keith Cooper, FIFA Director of Communications

Try as one may to define and to quantify it, Fair Play will always remain largely a subjective notion. There needs to be some kind of consensus found between those of high ethical principles who consider any act of good sportsmanship no more than what should be the norm, and for whom therefore every act of bad sportsmanship or gamesmanship is utterly contemptible. On the other hand, there are the modern realists who maintain that in the fiercely competitive environment of professional sport anything that is not explicitly illegal is permissible, and that gestures of generosity may be admirable but are also a sign of weakness.

If we subscribe to the latter philosophy, then there can be little hope left for the future welfare of the game. But if we adhere too religiously to the former, we are unlikely ever to acknowledge the significance of such gestures as true sportsmen continue to make despite all provocation and incitement to the contrary.

An assessment of the level of Fair Play at France 98 has therefore to be seen in this context of idealism against realism. And not surprisingly on such a premise, the conclusions are twofold.

France 98 reached new heights – or depths – with regard to what is generally referred to as the professional foul: players covertly pulling at shirts, falling over in the pretence of having been fouled, demanding that the referee show a card to an allegedly guilty opponent, feigning injury, and so on. But no matter how much the defenders of such actions may seek to wrap them up in euphemisms, they all amount to one thing: cheating.

Fortunately, commentators in the media and elsewhere have become increasingly ready to call cheating by name. Unfortunately, however, not even the concerted media pressure has had the desired effect of shaming the culprits into refraining or of persuading them to ignore their coaches’ instructions to indulge in the cheating game.

The 21st June 1998 was Fair Play Day – a sign of friendship and mutual respect. The Iran and USA teams get together for a group photo session.
It is more than sobering to hear experienced coaches condone acts of deception, especially when perpetrated by fresh young players, and then praise their charges for their «professionalism» or «craftiness». And how often do these same coaches and players then, in the same breath, castigate the referee for being taken in by the same kind of trick executed by their opponents!

If this was the least savoury feature of France 98, and one that FIFA is resolved to act quickly and effectively to expunge, then behaviour of the other extreme may, mercifully, be regarded as one of the most gratifying characteristics of the tournament.

Those who may have wondered if the joyous atmosphere that surrounded the games in the United States in 1994 could be reproduced by a similar «feel-good» factor in France can only have been delighted with what they witnessed in the French stadiums. As four years previously, fans of all nations united in a pageant of colour and noise that bonded them together in the proverbial spirit of fraternity and helped transmit an image of sportsmanship and good humour alongside the matches themselves.

It does not really matter whether the good nature of the fans influences the players or the good nature of the players infects the fans: the end effect is the same. And the rapport between fans and players was at times palpable, the ones encouraging the others to behave, to entertain, and to enjoy.

FIFA's various Fair Play activities also made a major contribution to the positive atmosphere. Peripheral as some of them may appear to have been, together they helped create a feeling where the Fair Play message could no longer be ignored: the distinctive Fair Play flag march-in before each match, the shake-hands between the teams before kick-off, the referee's Fair Play coin to help choose ends, a yellow Fair Play patch on the referee's sleeve, Fair Play logos integrated into the perimeter signage, a Fair Play highlight at the end of every television transmission, and so on.

In complement to the regular repetition of the Fair Play message in these and other ways, FIFA also chose to schedule its second annual World Fair Play Day right in the middle of the tournament. The date selected was 21 June, a natural choice because being a Sunday helped gave the theme added exposure worldwide, with four of the six continents known to be represented in the three matches played that day.

One of the matches, by coincidence, was one which had been widely touted in the media as a special confrontation: Iran against the United States, and no matter how much the two sides rightly tried to insist that it was a football match like any other, the inescapable political background gave the encounter an added dimension.

Earlier in the day, the players of Germany and Yugoslavia and then those of Argentina and Jamaica had mingled together in joint pre-match photographs that had been specially prescribed for the occasion. When the Americans and Iranians did the same, before their evening match in Lyon, as well as exchanging gifts, the image of friendship and sportsmanship was carried by television cameras and by popping flashbulbs to all corners of the globe — an immensely effective statement of the power of football to overcome political and cultural barriers.

The spirit of 21 June — Michel Platini's birthday, for good measure — persisted through much of the rest of the tournament. Seldom was it better embodied than by a moment in the France-Italy quarter-final, when Emmanuel Petit deliberately put the ball out of play when in a promising attacking position, because an Italian opponent lay stricken on the turf, needing attention.

Are such gestures losing currency in today's game? Or should they merely be accepted as nothing more than an expression of what sport is really all about?

Regardless of one's philosophy, one can only rejoice in those moments at France 98 when Fair Play really was the name of the game.
France 98 was a competition that will remain firmly in the memories of all those who had the privilege of being present. This was a colourful and eventful tournament and in addition one which did a lot to establish links between people of different nations, as well as showing that French hospitality, which had been viewed rather sceptically before the competition started, was up to its reputation. In this respect France and the French people stilled the voices of the critics and pessimists.

Apart from what happened on the pitches, we will remember the fantastic atmospheres in the stadiums, not just in the Stade de France - in Saint Denis, but also in the fabulous Velodrome oval in Marseilles and the refurbished stadiums in Bordeaux, Montpellier, Toulouse, Lyon, Nantes and the Parc des Prince in Paris - all new wonderful sporting arenas. Thus it was a pity that St. Etienne and Lens did not go with the trend and remove their 3 m high fences - if they had done, the events there would have been even more spectacular.

Special thanks must go to all the groundsmen involved in preparing the playing surfaces; every pitch was in excellent condition, one more reason why almost all the matches were able to reach a technical standard that had not been seen before. A top level game can only be played on a surface that enables the players to demonstrate to the full the level of skill that they bring with them on to the pitch.

The 64 matches in the 10 different cities were all sold out, with a total of 2.5 million spectators attending, giving an average of about 39,000 per game.

The standards of security and comfort in every stadium were of a high level, so that there was no danger at all for spectators of either sex, or for children who came to watch the games. In fact, the ladies turned out in record numbers; never before have so many come to watch football matches, making our president's statement - «The future is feminine» - start to come true in the stands already. Football as a social phenomenon had taken another step forward; the host country's passion for the game was absorbed by the visitors and this generated a superb atmosphere for the competition.

France 98 was a short-travel World Cup, an advantage for the organizers as well for the teams and the fans who went with them. Even the longest stretches between venues could be covered in less than 90 minutes by plane, although many of the cities were linked by TGV as well. With the exception of a few games, the weather conditions were practically ideal; there were no great differences between venues, nor was any of the oppressively high temperatures such as had been experienced in the USA in 1994. Under these conditions there was less physical and mental strain on the players and their back-up staff, and the matches benefited from this in that every player was able to give his best.

The organizational arrangement was that no team would play all its games in one city, and so they all had to travel the day before a game, which was fair all round in that no team was put at a disadvantage by this schedule.

The differences between teams in terms of rest and recuperation days or slight differences in travelling times had no important influence on the success or otherwise of any team. The playing schedule for Japan/Korea 2002 will certainly be tightened up a bit, with 5-6 games being played on match days; current TV technology will be able to handle this programme without difficulty.

Living up to its reputation as a country that welcomes visitors, France offered the 31 incoming teams unique and perfect accommodation arrangements, most of the teams having training facilities very close at hand with all the necessary infrastructure.

A final word about CFO and its small army of volunteer workers who very quickly identified with the task they had to do and established good relationships with FIFA and the participating teams.

Five years of painstaking, detailed work produced an excellently organized tournament, which bore the imprint of the organizing minds behind it and was characterised by a spirit of harmony and cooperation. The guiding hand of Fernand Sastre was felt even after his death, and he and his co-president Michel Platini had done a huge amount of work. They were ably assisted by the CFO's directors Odile Lanceau, Isabelle Delay, José Santorini, Dominique Spinosi and Caroline Duret, who kept in close contact with every aspect of the organization, which was run by general director Jacques Lambert. We would like to thank this group and their 12,000 helpers up and down the country for making France 98 a wonderful event, of which we will keep lasting memories.
World Cup 98: A huge media event!

By Keith Cooper, FIFA Director of Communications

France 98 was always billed as the most media-oriented in the history of the World Cup. This was not a particularly difficult prediction to make, considering the role that the media have come to play in our everyday lives, and especially with regard to sport and to football in particular.

But there had also been concerns that this orientation towards the media may become unduly pervasive.

This was the challenge that FIFA and the CFO faced in planning the 1998 World Cup finals: how to satisfy the demands of the media, and through the media how to satisfy those of an increasingly expectant public, while always preserving the integrity of the game and the welfare of its players.

This conundrum had occupied not only the media services of FIFA and the CFO for much of the four years of intensive planning for the big event, but had also been the subject of lengthy debate within the FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee, especially with regard to the perplexed question of media access to the players.

Media trends in football coverage in recent years have focused more and more on the personalities of the individual players, raising their profile to that of highly visible public figures. Consequently, the media expected to be able to have access to the players at virtually any time, threatening to encroach upon their private sphere and disrupting their serious preparation for the world's premier sports event.

On the other hand, the argument was repeatedly put forward that the World Cup is, anyway, essentially there for the public — who depend upon the media for their information and their entertainment. To cloister teams away and to forbid press access would, in a certain way, be against the object of the entire exercise.

Regional radio and television stations broadcast the matches in 200 countries.
Some photographers were accredited for France 98.

Striking a balance between these philosophies was not an easy matter. The new guidelines which FIFA introduced to bring order to the access to the teams between matches went a long way towards satisfying the media's appetite while preserving a measure of distance and solitude, but as has been seen so many times in the past, cultural attitudes vary greatly and the press of some countries are less easily served than others...

At the same time, FIFA was concerned to maintain a reasonable balance between the different sectors of the media. In a healthy media environment, everybody -- television, radio, reporters, photographers -- is given equal opportunity. While television is becoming ever more important for the live coverage of the games, radio retains a greater flexibility, reporters constantly have to adapt their reflective writing skills to complement the live broadcast coverage, and photographers relentlessly pursue the original image that serves not only as a factual document but also as an evocation of a mood.

Each sector of the overall media family has its part to play and each deserves to be provided with the best possible facilities in which to do so. Media tribunes in the stadiums occupied large sections of the best-placed seats, with up to 1,750 reporters and 110 television commentator positions for the Final and accordingly fewer for the other matches. Photographers were given the unprecedented opportunity to work from new positions on the touchline as well as from excellent locations in the stands. The post-match mixed zone continued to divide opinions but remains the most productive alternative to the traditional and sterile press conference.

The media centres provided by the CFO set new standards, especially the International Media Centre at the Porte de Versailles in Paris. This huge area accommodated thousands of media representatives around the clock for six weeks, offering facilities on a scale never witnessed before at any single sports event. Combining the press centre with the International Broadcasting Centre, thus bringing all sectors of the media together under one roof, was a most positive concept, reinforcing the sense of co-operation media as well as reducing the need for repetition of facilities.

As had been anticipated, there was a concentration of media representatives in Paris, from where travel to the other venues was greatly facilitated especially by rail. Although a big country by European standards, France was still more manageable than its predecessor, the United States, where covering several matches meant long hours of exhausting travel for reporters. On the other hand, the newly introduced first-round system of teams moving between venues meant that the press were obliged to move with them, instead of being based in one venue, and several teams followed a new trend of establishing their own satellite media centres immediately adjacent to their team headquarters.

The media information services established by the CFO also surpassed anything previously experienced. The INFO on-line system enabled a quick and easy method of disseminating information, although certain technical problems cannot be denied and some members of the media still need to be more regularly exposed to such systems in order to make maximum benefit of them. In addition, daily news briefings by FIFA and the CFO at the International Media Centre in Paris proved a well-received innovation, providing media not only with up-to-date inside information but also giving a daily opportunity to inquire about topical issues.

While the photographers produced superb images of France 98 and the writers continued to find new and more elegant ways to describe the happenings of the 64 matches and occurrences around them, special mention must surely be made of the splendid pictures created by the host broadcaster team of television experts gathered together in the TVS group. Imaginative production, fascinating slow-motion replays and a thorough understanding of the game and of its individual players helped not only enchant expectant audiences worldwide but also capture new viewers enthralled by the sheer beauty of the pictures produced.

Such a high level of excellence has been attained in the media coverage of the World Cup that it is difficult to contemplate how further improvements may be possible in 2002. Inevitably that will be so, with the technological developments that will surely occur between now and then. But the challenge mentioned earlier will be renewed, and the task of FIFA and the joint organizing committees will be substantially more demanding. It is a challenge that, once again, will require the co-operation of the teams and their players as well as that of the media themselves.
The French were mentally prepared

By Ruedi Zahner (Switzerland), specialist for motivation in top class sport

How were the French able to succeed under the tremendous pressure that was unbearable down on them during the competition? Quite simply, they were conscious of it, accepted it and adopted the right attitude to deal with it. All their players were mentally prepared for every situation (even the toughest ones), so that they could give their optimum performance and never let their belief in themselves be shaken. This was the only way to cope with the very high level of expectation and yet still play consistently close to their upper performance limits.

Top performance is brought out in players by the pressure of competition – at the right level

In order for a player and a team to reach their full potential such pressure is essential. This will mean that there are feelings of fear and uncertainty before a competition, as to whether expectations will be fulfilled or not. Such feelings prevent players from being complacent or not taking things seriously enough. In this way a degree of tension is developed (it’s the same thing as stage fright for actors), that is shaken off once the competition begins, and then the required energy finds its outlet.

There is a direct connection between the level of tension and the level of performance.

The coach under pressure

At any world championship, coaches are under terrific pressure to succeed. The way to success is only to pass on as much of the pressure as is necessary.

An excellent example of this type of management was shown by the French coach Aimé Jacquet, he regulated the pressure on his team by dealing specifically with each player individually, as the need arose, either to boost their courage or to spur them on more, but without diminishing any player’s self-confidence. Doubt and fear (= negative emotions) were not part of the vocabulary of the French coaching manual this time around.

Jacquet’s talent lay in being able to regulate the pressure on his players so that it had no negative effect (tightening up, being afraid of making a mistake), so that only the positive effect of spurring them on to success was felt.

Developing mental strength (motivation)

Jacquet’s team knew exactly what their aims were. His style of motivation followed the line of thinking of the old Greek saying: – If you want to build a boat, first instil in your men a love of the sea. Then they’ll build the boat by themselves. – The hope of winning their World Cup in their own country, a dream for any footballer and a chance to become a sporting hero;

set up a desire in them that generated its own motivating power and inspired the whole country. It was clear to them all where the journey would hopefully lead and each one knew the reasons for making the attempt. Reminders on the way were: never lose concentration, nor the joy and the fun of playing – keep these important ideas in mind and you will be able to reach the top.

Success always starts with belief

Jacquet said before the tournament started: – What will decide will be belief and confidence in one’s own ability. – Or, put another way: the basis for any success is believing that it is possible. Thanks to their specific preparation, the French players had not only confidence in their own ability but also an unshakable belief that no-one was better prepared than they were. Every one of the squad was convinced that they could achieve their ambition. They went into each game with courage and determination, and with each victory their self-confidence grew and reinforced their belief in themselves.

Being mentally ready

The French were mentally ready for the situation facing them. Jacquet had managed to anchor the idea of winning in each player, or more than that, within the team.

The success of his approach shows that:

1. Strategy is not decisive; far more important are the mental potential, the motivation and the self-belief of each individual player, and of the whole team. What use are the best tactics or the greatest potential if motivation and self-belief are missing?

2. The successful modern coach is not primarily a tactician, but a manager with the right psychological ability to lead his players, by making it possible for each one of them to use his talents to the fullest extent.

3. Proper preparation is of vital importance in order to get the team into the correct mental state (positive emotions), so that they have exactly the right attitude from the start (their first attitude on the field).
VIP's
(Very Important Partners)

For the fifth time since 1982, the FIFA World Cup enjoyed the solid support of a group of committed sponsor companies, many of whom have remained loyal to the event throughout that period.

FIFA's thanks go to these partners who continue to demonstrate a thoroughly professional approach in helping promote the World Cup and a respectful understanding for the sensitivities needed in order to protect the integrity of the game itself.

FIFA's appreciation is also expressed to its marketing partner, ISL Worldwide, for the company's customary attentive and diligent co-ordination of all the manifold commercial activities surrounding France 98.
DELEGATION

FIFA Delegation France 98

Executive Committee

President: Joseph S. BLATTER (Switzerland)

Vice-Presidents:
- Julio H. GRONDONA (Senior Vice-President) (Argentina)
- David H. WILL (Scotland)
- Issa HAYATOU (Cameroon)
- Dr Antonio MATARESE (Italy)
- Dr CHUNG Mong-Joon (Korea Republic)
- Jack A. WARNER (Trinidad and Tobago)
- David H. WILL (Scotland)
- Issa HAYATOU (Cameroon)
- Dr Antonio MATARESE (Italy)
- Dr CHUNG Mone-Joon (Korea Republic)
- Jack A. WARNER (Trinidad and Tobago)

Members:
- Abdullah K. AL-DABAL (Saudi Arabia)
- Slim ALOULOU (Tunisia)
- Dr Michel D'HOOOGHE (Belgium)
- Isaac David SASSO SASSO (Costa Rica)
- Ricardo Terra TEIXEIRA (Brazil)
- Per Ravn OMDAL (Norway)
- Mohamed BIN HAMMAM (Qatar)
- Senes ERZIK (Turkey)
- Charles J. DEMPESEY, CBE (New Zealand)
- Chuck BLAZER (USA)
- Worawi MAKUDI (Thailand)
- Dr Nicols LEOZ (Paraguay)
- Ismail BHAMJEE (Botswana)
- Amadou DIAKITE (Mali)
- Angel Maria VILLAR LLONa (Spain)
- Dr L.L.D. Joseph MFUZI (Malta)

Acting General Secretary: Michel ZEN-RUFFINEN (Switzerland)

Organising Committee for the World Cup

Chairman: Lennart JOHANSSON (Sweden)

Deputy Chairman: Julio H. GRONDONA (Argentina)

Members:
- David H. WILL (Scotland)
- Issa HAYATOU (Cameroon)
- Dr Antonio MATARESE (Italy)
- Dr CHUNG Mone-Joon (Korea Republic)
- Jack A. WARNER (Trinidad and Tobago)
- Dr Vacheslav KOLOSKOV (Russia)
- Abdullah K. AL-DABAL (Saudi Arabia)
- Dr Michel D'HOOOGHE (Belgium)
- Ramzi RUHEE, OBE (Mauritius)
- Gerhard MAYER-VOLFELDER (Germany)
- Ricardo Terra TEIXEIRA (Brazil)
- Mohamed BIN HAMMAM (Qatar)
- Senes ERZIK (Turkey)
- Charles J. DEMPESEY, CBE (New Zealand)
- Jacques GEORGES (France)
- Egidius BRAUN (Turkey)
- Alan I. ROTHENBERG (USA)
- Claude SIMONET (France)
- Angel Maria VILLAR LLONa (Spain)
- Sir Bert MILLICHIP (England)
- Dr Franco CARRARO (Italy)
- Abdellatif SEMALI (Morocco)
- Jesus M. PALLARES Esculies (Paraguay)
- Fernand SASTRE T (France)
- Tadao MURATA (Japan)
- René HUSSY (Switzerland)

Advisers:
- Horst R. SCHMIDT (Germany)
- Peter VELAPRAN (Malaysia)

Honorary President

Dr João HAVELANGE (Brazil)

Honorary Members and Guests

Dr Abdel HALIM (Sudan)
Dr Hidalgo ROJAS (Ecuador)
Alfonso SENIOR (Colombia)
Rito ALCANTARA (Senegal)
Necdet COBANL (Turkey)
Tan Sri Datuk HAMZAH (Malaysia)
Dr Viacheslav KOLOSKOV (Russia)
Pablo PORTA BUSSOMS (Spain)
Abilio D'ALMEIDA (Brazil)
Jacques GEORGES (France)

Executive Committee

Dr Gyorgy SZEPESI (Hungary)
Dr Henry FOK (Hong Kong)
Sir Arthur GEORGE (Australia)
Poul HYLDEGAARD (Denmark)
León LONDONO (Colombia)
Carlos COELLO MARTINEZ (Ecuador)
HRH Sultan Ahmad Shah (Malaysia)

Honorary Members and Guests

Dr Abdel HALIM (Sudan)
Dr Hidalgo ROJAS (Ecuador)
Alfonso SENIOR (Colombia)
Rito ALCANTARA (Senegal)
Necdet COBANL (Turkey)
Tan Sri Datuk HAMZAH (Malaysia)
Dr Viacheslav KOLOSKOV (Russia)
Pablo PORTA BUSSOMS (Spain)
Abilio D'ALMEIDA (Brazil)
Jacques GEORGES (France)

Executive Committee

Chairman: David H. WILL (Scotland)

Deputy Chairman: Ricardo Terra TEIXEIRA (Brazil)

Members:
- Farcou BOUZO (Syria)
- Mario RUBIO VAZQUEZ L. (Mexico)
- Wehbyfield Farah ADDO (Somalia)
- Carlos A. ALARCÓN RIOS (Paraguay)
- Lars-Ake BJÖRCK (Sweden)
- Volker ROTH (Germany)
- Michel VAULTOT (France)
- Tai Grant NICHOLAS (Cook Islands)

Technical Advisers:
- George CUMMING (Scotland)
- Ken RIDDEN (England)

Coordinators:
- Hans-Ulrich SCHNEIDER (Switzerland)
- Robert RAJ (FIFA)

133
### Sports Medical Committee

- **Chairman:** Dr. Michel D’HOOGHE (Belgium)
- **Deputy Chairman:** Per Ravn OMdal (Norway)
- **Members:**
  - Prof. J.A. NOVA MONTEIRO (Brazil)
  - Prof. Lars PETERSON (Sweden)
  - Prof. Teodoro DELGADO (Spain)
  - Prof. Nozomu OHATA (Japan)
  - Dr. Roberto A. MONROIG (Puerto Rico)
  - Prof. Jiri DVORAK (Switzerland)
  - Dr. Rudy GITTENS (Canada)
  - Dr. A.Y. ZERGUI (Algeria)
  - Prof. René ESSOMBA (Cameroon)
  - Dr. Raul Horacio MADERO (Argentina)
  - Prof. Toni GRAF-BAUMANN (Germany)
  - Panel members:
    - Dr. Juan GARCIA-NETO (Spain)
    - Dr. Jorge GUILLEN MONTENEGRO (Spain)
    - Dr. Robert HUBERTY (Luxembourg)

### Protocol Committee

- **Chairman:** Dr. CHUNG Mong-Joon (Korea Republic)
- **Deputy Chairman:** Rami RUHEE, OBE (Mauritius)
- **Members:**
  - Worawi MAKUDI (Thailand)
  - Eugenio FIGUEREDO AGUERRIE (Uruguay)
  - Dr. Pierre Reginald HUTH (France)
  - Guido CORNELLA (Switzerland)
  - Jeffrey WEBB (Cayman Islands)
  - Mme Fatou Sarr B (Senegal)

### Disciplinary Committee

- **Chairman:** Pablo PORTA BUSSOMS (Spain)
- **Deputy Chairman:** Me Marcel MATHIER (Switzerland)
- **Members:**
  - Dr. Alfredo F. CANTILO (Argentina)
  - Rafael ESQUIVEL MELO (Venezuela)
  - Rafael O. SALGUERO SANDOVAL (Guatemala)
  - Joao OMNO (Kenya)
  - Pentti SEPPALA (Finland)
  - Rahif ALAMEH (Lebanon)
  - Ernst KNOESEL (Germany)

DELEGATION

Appeal Committee
Chairman: Jean FOURNET-FAYARD (France)
Deputy Chairman: Fernando VARA DE REY (Spain)
Members: Omar KEZZAL (Algeria), Edgar A. PEÑA GUTIERREZ (Bolivia), Ousseynou DIENG (Côte d’Ivoire), Konstantinos TRIVELLAS (Greece), Jim FLEMMING (Canada), Rukma Shumshere RANA (Nepal)

General Co-ordinators
Petti ALAJA (Finland), Hisham AZMY (Egypt), Mustapha FAHMY (Egypt), Michał LUSTKIEWICZ (Poland), Stefano PUCCI (Italy), Hugo SALCEDO (USA), Paul Mony SAMUEL (Malaysia), Walter SIEBER (Canada), Oscar THAMAS TORRES (Guatemala), Peter VELAPPAN (Malaysia)

Media Officers
Jorge BAPTISTA (Portugal), Paul BASSEY (Nigeria), Pierre BENOIT (Switzerland), Borja BILBAO (Spain), Luca COLAJANNI (Italy), Andrin COOPER (England), George DAS (Malaysia), Les DICKENS (Ecuador), Víken DIJHEMEJIAN (Switzerland), Goran HAVIK (Sweden), Urs HONAUER (Switzerland), Michael H. JOHNSON (USA), Mehrdad MASOUDI (Canada), Faouzi MAHJOUB (Tunisia), Harold MAYNE-NICHOLLS (Chile), Abele MBENGUE (Cameroun), Mick MICHELS (Belgium), Paul RUSCHETTI (Switzerland), Ricardo SETYON (Brazil), Thomas v. UBRIZSY (Switzerland), Jay BAKER (En-Linea, USA), Alexander HOIT (En-Linea, USA), Cheche VIDAL (En-Linea, USA), Andreas HERREN (FIFA), Marius SCHNEIDER (FIFA), Markus SIEGLER (FIFA)

Technical Study Group
Head of TSG: Gérard HOUILLIER (France)
Members: Charles GYAMFI (Ghana), Raúl MAGANA (El Salvador), Rinus MICHELS (Netherlands), Chief A.O. ONIGBINDE (Nigeria), Oswaldo RAMIREZ (Peru), Andy ROXBURGH (Scotland), S. SUBRAMANIAM (Malaysia), Oscar Washington TABAREZ (Uruguay), Dr. Jozef VENGLOŠ (Slovakia), Brian HENDRY (AVC Enterprises)

Video expert: Jürg NEPFER (FIFA), Rolf SIEBOTH (FIFA)

Special duties: SUBRAMANIAM s/o Alagasundram (Malaysia)

Confederation General Secretaries
Gerhard AIGNER (UEFA), Eduardo DELUCA (Conmebol), Josephine KING (OFC)

Special Duties
HRH Prince ABDULLAH bin Sultan Ahmad Shah (Malaysia), Fernando ALVAREZ (USA), ANANDARAJAH JSN (Sri Lanka), Prya Ranjan DASMUNSHI (India), Cornelis DE BRUIN (Netherlands), José E. DE MORAES FILHO (Brazil), Eduardo FARAH (Brazil), Arani MATHIA (Togo), Christopher MONFORT (Philippines), Peter PULLEN (England/Brazil), Julio ROCHA LOPEZ (Nicaragua), Helen SYREGGELAS (USA), Asaad TAQI (Kuwait), Ganesh THAPA (Nepal), Constanțio VIGIL (Argentina), Ernest WALKER (Scotland), Léon WALKER (Switzerland), Windsor JOHN (Malaysia)

Staff
Management
Erwin R. Schmid, Walter Gagg, Keith Cooper, Helen Leuthardt-Petermann
President’s Office
Marie-Madeleine Urlacher, Norma Kummern, Marcel Citherlet
Translation/Secretariat
Anne Dupre, Maureen Huber
Co-ordination office
Daniel Kupf, Urs Kneubuhler, Laurent Citherlet
Management Services
Désirée Canovas, Christine Dirren, Flavio Battaini, Gian-Paolo Monteneri, Sheila Kroener, Manon Mayer-Vorfelder, Patricia de la Sierra, Sylamala Velappan, Beverly Hill
Administration/Finance
Stefan Wehrli, Guy-Philippe Mathieu, Carole Kälin, Felix Renggli, Dominique Kochendörfer, Lara Dworak

Reto Thumherr, Jürg Neurenschwander, Barbara Eggler, Natasha Bachmann, Nicoš Virliš, Georgios Kolovelonis, Costas Fitsos, Tamara Martin, Chantal-Nina Kouchi

Sports Division
Doris Valasek-Dobis, Helene Boban, Marusca Cotta, Daniel Schuler, Antonia Cammissa

Communication
Ursula Willmann, Rose-Marie Ried, Daniela Leeb, Hans-Peter Frei

Assistants to General Co-ordinators
Mirjam Lippuner, Rhiannon Collins, Vincent Monnier, Jill Fracisco, Daniela Leeb, Jacqueline Moresi, Jose Iovana, Marilyn Jones, Michele Bacchini, François Strasbourg, Javier Otero
Published by: Fédération Internationale de Football Association
Editors: Jürg Nepfer
with the assistance of the Technical Study Group France 98:
Editorial contributions: Keith Cooper, Walter Gagg, Volker Roth, Ruedi Zahner
Translations: John C. Hurst
Layout: Max Muller
Photos: Action Images, Allsport, Alfieri, Bongarts, Global News Network, ISO Sports, Daniel Metz,
Photo ASL, Sygma Temp Sport, Werek
Lithography: Repro Studio B, Zurich
Co-ordination of production: Jürg Hager
Production: Huber & Co. AG, Grafische Unternehmung und Verlag, Frauenfeld, Switzerland

© FIFA 1998
Printed in Switzerland
FIFA World Cup France 98